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ABSTRACT 
THE MARKETING OF MUSSOLINI: 
AMERICAN MAGAZINES AND MUSSOLINI, 1922-1935 
Author: Anthony F. Ambrogi 
Degree: Master of Arts, University of Richmond, 2006 
Thesis Director: Prof. John D. Treadway 
Until the Halo-Ethiopian War, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and the American 
press had a symbiotic relationship. Mussolini used his charisma and journalistic skills to 
put himself in the limelight of the American foreign press, and whether they loved him or 
hated him, American periodicals relished the constant flow of news and sensationalism 
from Rome. This analysis examines the rise of Fascism and Mussolini in Italy and his 
efforts to market himself to the press, especially the American press. It then reviews 
American magazines from 1922 until Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and their 
varying attitudes toward II Duce. Popular and business magazines tended to favor 
Mussolini, whereas high-brow journals generally did not, but these trends were not 
universal. Regardless, American magazines thrived off of the Mussolini phenomenon, 
and Mussolini used that relationship to his fullest advantage. 
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PREFACE 
The American soldiers had begun looting the town. After months of bitter, 
bloody fighting to recapture the Italian peninsula, the American army had just captured 
the hamlet ofDiecimo in northern Tuscany. The German army was continuing its slow, 
methodical retreat up the peninsula. The American soldiers had persevered through an 
agonizing and lethargic march through the Apennines, first fighting the Italian army and 
then the German Wehrmacht. Now, in last days of 1944, after repulsing a German attack 
north of Lucca, they were finally beginning to break the resolve of the Nazis. 
Having suffered so much in three years of war, the soldiers of the Fifth Army had 
hardened themselves to their surroundings. "Italian" now equated to "Fascist," and that 
meant simply "the enemy." Mussolini's Italy was allied with Hitler and the Nazis, the 
supreme global villain. Although the war was in its waning days, American soldiers were 
still dying. Now was not the time to get to know the locals. They were in hostile 
territory, and only their fellow soldiers could be trusted. 
Diecimo was not a remarkable town. Most of the residents lived in row houses 
clustered along the main street that branched off from a nearby highway. The most 
notable building was the church, a spartan stone edifice dating to the thirteenth century. 
What interested the warring armies was the railroad that sliced through the town and the 
surrounding mountains. The Germans had erected anti-aircraft batteries on rail 
platforms. They hid the batteries under the mountains in the railroad tunnels by day and 
wheeled them out long enough to fire upon passing American bombers by night. The 
Americans had been frustrated repeatedly by this tactic and had failed in locating and 
destroying the batteries by air; it would be up to the ground forces to demolish them. 
Thus, the unassuming town ofDiecimo took on strategic military importance. Now the 
Americans had driven out the Germans and had taken control of the area. They were 
tired, cold, and hungry, and this town offered some of the spoils of war. 
None of them expected the feisty woman that came into town a few days later. 
She was short and thin, with dark but graying hair and a weathered face that looked older 
than her thirty-two years. She had been hardened by the war and the two years that she, 
her husband, and her three young children had spent in the mountains hiding from the 
Nazis. Life during wartime had been a mission of survival. On many nights, she and her 
husband had gone without food so that their children could eat what little they could 
gather on the mountainside. But when they saw the men of the Fifth Army march by, 
they knew it was safe to go home. The Nazis were gone. The Americans were here. 
She did not expect to find them in her home and certainly not destroying her 
furniture for firewood. She barged into her house, yelling in Italian and interjecting the 
only English she could remember: "I am American! I am American!" The soldiers were 
taken aback. After fumbling around, they found a fellow soldier who knew Italian and 
could translate. Her story was ultimately passed up the chain of command and checked 
out. Yes, sure enough, she was an American, born in Richmond, Virginia, the seventh 
child of Italian immigrants. Her mother, weakened from the birth, died within months. 
Her father was a saloon keeper, but after Prohibition began, he took his three youngest 
children, including little Teresa, back to his home in Italy, while the older children stayed 
11 
to make a life in America. Since she had been born in the United States, Teresa was an 
American citizen. The American soldiers were destroying the property of an American. 
What Teresa did not tell them was the story of her husband. Aladino had been 
born in Italy and was a carpenter by trade. After Mussolini's rise to power, the Fascists 
controlled all of the labor unions and employment opportunities. The only way to get 
work was to be a Fascist, whether one agreed with Mussolini or not. It was the 1930s and 
the height of the global Depression, and Aladino needed work to bring food home to his 
new wife and growing family. The politics meant nothing to him, but the money did. 
Now, however, that allegiance, tenuous as it was, could mean a death sentence if the 
Americans discovered it. She may be an American, but he was a card-carrying member 
of the Fascist party. He was the enemy. 
Fortunately, the soldiers were so surprised to find an American in this backwoods 
town that no one asked about Aladino's political affiliation. Instead, the commanding 
general made his headquarters in their house and diverted fresh fruits and meats to the 
family. A few weeks later, the Americans departed to continue the fight in the north. In 
a couple of months, the war was over, and Diecimo, damaged though it was, was once 
again a quiet, forgotten hamlet. 
A decade later, the youngest child discovered that, as the son of an American 
citizen, he was also legally an American. At age sixteen, he boarded a boat to America 
with only twelve dollars to his name. Over the next few years, he saved enough money 
to pay for his parents and brother to join him back in Richmond. 
For the first time in forty years, Teresa saw her sister. 
Ill 
My father and grandmother shared many stories with my siblings and me about 
life in Italy during and after World War II. (Many of them were a lesson about how we 
should not be complaining about our chores.) But I never heard this story until I was 
seventeen, years after my grandmother passed away. She rarely spoke about the war to 
anyone. My father was only five years old when he and his family returned to Diecimo, 
but my aunt was a teenager. Today, she only mentions the war to remind my father 
teasingly of the time she "saved his life" by rescuing him from his bedroom during an air 
raid. (Only one bomb actually fell in the town throughout the entire war, and it wasn't 
that night.) 
So it felt like an archeological discovery when my father rediscovered the house 
in the mountains where he took refuge during the war, and I saw a sense of wonderment 
in his eyes as he introduced me to the woman who helped them during those years and 
who still lives on that same mountainside. I listened with rapt attention as he pointed out 
where he saw the first American soldiers marching by. I could not believe that, after all 
of his stories of growing up in Italy and immigrating to the United States, I had just 
experienced an entirely new chapter of his life. When I asked him why he had never told 
me about this, his answer was simple: "We just don't talk about those days anymore." 
Thus it is with World War II and Mussolini in modem-day Italy. Sixty years after 
the war, Mussolini is still a touchy subject. He was, and by many still is, revered as II 
Duce, Italy's savior and leader out of the darkness of the first world war. He brought a 
sense of national pride back to an Italy that was struggling with its identity and self-
worth. He put the country back to work. And then he brought the nation back into a 
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devastating war. Again, Italy was ripped apart from inside and outside. Again, Italians 
were forced to live on nothing and still sacrifice for la patria. Again, Italy would face 
defeat. It is little wonder that Mussolini was hanged, shot, and his body put on display in 
the piazza in Milan to be mutilated and defiled by the public. But so many Italians did 
and still do believe in much that he did. How can that be reconciled with the horrors of 
the war? For many, the easiest solution is simply not to talk about him. 
When I was young, Mussolini always went into the same category as Hitler: evil 
World War II villain. As I got older, however, I discovered that history is not so black 
and white. There are nuances and shifts in opinion and behavior. The figure that was 
beloved one day could be hated the next and reconciled the third. So it is with Mussolini. 
As much as his legacy is ensconced among the devilry of Fascism and Nazism, the truth 
is that he did some great things for Italy before he brought her to her knees in ruin. But 
he often did them with violence, Machiavellian intentions, inflammatory rhetoric, and 
pure machismo. For a time, he was admired, reviled, and ridiculed simultaneously 
around the world. That is what makes him interesting. It is also why it is difficult to 
discuss him today, but is it exactly why we must discuss him. 
This thesis is nearly six years in the making, beginning with a simple research 
paper in my first graduate class. I chose Mussolini as my topic because of my family 
history, not realizing just how complex a character he really was. That first infatuation 
has ballooned into this. I had a great deal of help from many people along the way, and I 
would be remiss ifl did not take a moment to thank them. 
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The first is my graduate advisor and my professor for that first class, Dr. John 
Treadway. He has been my mentor and guide throughout my education, starting with that 
first phone conversation about the graduate program at the University of Richmond. He 
has been an inspiration for me. I also want to thank Dr. John Gordon for his help during 
my thesis preparation. Next is my family: my mother for instilling in me the desire to 
learn always; my father for teaching me to work my hardest at everything I do; my 
brother, Paul, for showing me the importance of doing what I love; and everyone else for 
their encouragement and support. Most important, I need to thank my ever-patient wife, 
Laura, who has put up with countless late nights of class and piles of books and magazine 
articles about Mussolini scattered all over the house. Most of all, her constant love and 
devotion has kept me going - without it, I never could have come this far. 
Finally, there is Benito Mussolini himself Thanks to his ego, his braggadocio, 
his journalistic eye and ear, and his love of the limelight, I had a wealth of sources to use 
in this analysis. There was never a dull moment while he was alive, and there has never 
been a dull moment researching him. His big mouth made my job exceptionally easy, 
just as it got him into trouble. If nothing else, we can learn from that. 
VI 
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Introduction 
"He made the trains run on time." For many Americans in the pre-World War II 
years, this phrase encapsulated Benito Mussolini. As the strongman ofltaly, it was 
difficult for many to decipher ifhe was a new, glorious Caesar or a back-alley thug kept 
in power by his henchmen. Nevertheless, it was hard to argue with results. Mussolini 
rebuilt Italy after the destruction of World War I and turned a backward nation into a 
progressive economic and political power. He was a man of action who dared to dream 
and took bold steps for his nation. And for a while, America loved him. 
It should not be hard to understand why. Mussolini embodied the American spirit 
of hard work, self-confidence, ingenuity, and strong leadership. As the violence that 
accompanied the early years of his reign died down, the Italian economic engine revved 
up. During the late-1920s and early-1930s, Italy seemed to be in the midst of a new 
Renaissance with Mussolini as a twentieth-century de Medici. This revival stood in stark 
contrast to the rest of Europe that was plodding along in the aftermath of World War I. 
England and France were reconstructing their economies and their populations and 
bickering over war reparations and debt burdens. Russia was transforming itself into the 
Soviet Union, tearing itself apart and rebuilding its society into a Communist state. It 
would sift through the fallout of the October Revolution for years, and even then, the 
constant internal struggles and political chaos would hamper its progress. Many of the 
small European nations, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, were trying desperately to 
recover from the devastation of the war. The old Austro-Hungarian Empire was no more, 
and the small states born out of its demise were still searching for their identities. 
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And then there was Germany, the monolith of central Europe, the anchor of the 
European balance of power, now reduced to a dysfunctional republic beset by corruption, 
distrust, and attempted coups from the outset. Its people carried the yoke (unfairly, in 
their minds) of the full blame for World War I, and the culminating treaties threw down a 
gauntlet of debilitating reparations that would have hamstrung any nation, but especially 
one with so many other problems. Before long, its economy would collapse, sending 
inflation to stratospheric levels and making currency worthless in a matter of hours. 
In the first years after World War I, Italy seemed to be following the same path. 
The Liberal government that had guided it through the beginning of the century and the 
war was still in power, though many citizens questioned whether it had any true power or 
if it would even know what to do with it. Most Italians saw it more as a nuisance than 
anything else - a bureaucratic logjam of lazy and corrupt politicians who had little 
contact with the people and no understanding of the real problems and issues facing Italy. 
In addition, the rest of the world looked down on Italy as the "beggars of Europe" who 
came to the table at Versailles demanding an empire after switching sides during the war 
and being routed by the Central Powers' armies at Caporetto. This made the rest of the 
world have about as much faith in the Italian Liberal government as its own people had. 
Then, like a bolt of lightning from the dark and dreary skies of Europe came 
Benito Mussolini. He stormed Rome with flash and thunder and a cadre of violent but 
ardent followers. It was certainly style before substance, but it was also an improvement. 
He promised action, reform, economic stability, and ethnic pride. He promised to make 
Italy great again and to let the rest of the world know it. He spoke loudly and with 
emotion, and he spoke directly to Italians about their problems. For the first time in 
years, Italians began to embrace their heritage. And for the first time since the Roman 
Empire, the world had to contend with a young, vibrant, energetic, and fiercely 
nationalistic Italian dictator. He was a new kind of leader in Europe, and he got results. 
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The American press took notice and seized on this modem-day revival. Although 
not universal in their praise, the American press on the whole made the Italian premier 
into a hero and a media darling. Even for those who hated him, they had to admit that 
Mussolini and almost everything he did was news, and the American public devoured it. 
Mussolini himself fostered this. The one-time newspaper editor never lost his sense of 
what was news and how he could put himself on the front pages of magazines and 
newspapers around the globe, but especially in the media-rich United States. This love 
affair could have lasted much longer, but when Mussolini's ambition led him to invade 
Ethiopia against the wishes of the United States and her allies, the American media 
quickly turned against him and helped put an emphatic end to a burgeoning relationship 
between American and the Fascist dictator. 
While Mussolini was on the rise, so were magazines in the landscape of the 
American media. The 1920s and 1930s were the heyday of American national 
magazines. Unlike newspapers, which at the time were mostly dry, regional in scope, 
and except for an editorial page, gave little elaboration or opinion on the happenings of 
the world, magazines had the chance to delve deep into particular topics of interest and 
create a much richer and sometimes nuanced picture of the events of the world. Most of 
the larger magazines sent reporters around the globe to cover important people and 
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stories, something that only a handful of the largest American papers and the Associated 
Press could afford to do. This would all change as new technologies entered the 
mainstream and as Americans became more mobile, but for this space in time, magazines 
were quite literally a window on the world for the American public. 
This thesis investigates the relationship between American magazines and Benito 
Mussolini. First, it explores the back-story of Fascism in Italy by looking at the legacies 
of the Reunification and the Liberal government of Italy and how they and the social 
tensions surrounding the Great War allowed Fascism to take root in Italy. Then, it looks 
at the unique and symbiotic relationship between Mussolini and the American media. 
The research examines Mussolini's attempts to market himself to the world and to the 
United States in particular, as well as the opinions and attitudes of various and different 
types of American magazines toward fl Duce. Finally, it considers the impact that these 
magazines had on American public opinion and how that influenced America's political, 
economic, and social relationships with Italy and Mussolini. American magazines varied 
in their responses to Mussolini, but all of them agreed that he was newsworthy, and at 
some point in his reign, virtually all of them saw him as Italy's savior and a possible 
prototype for a new kind ofleader. Their readers listened, and until Mussolini turned his 
back on the West and invaded Ethiopia, there were few places in the world that held him 
in higher esteem than the United States. 
Chapter I: Italy before Mussolini 
To understand Mussotini·s rise to power and why many Americans took such a 
favorahlc viC\"' of his arrival, one must understand how mo<lcm Italy came into hcing. 
The modem Mediterranean slate began a.s a conglomcr.uion of independent kingdoms 
under the House of Savoy·s King of Piedmont in present-day nonhwcst lraly. As the 
Piedmontcse united nonhcm Italy, they joined forces with Giuseppe Garibaldi. who had 
united the southern pan of the boot. A fl er France withdrni,• its troops guarding the Pope 
in Rome to use during the Franeo-Prus.'iian War, the Italians took control of Rome. 
completing ltaty•s unification. Unlike Gcn11any. which had unified in much the s.1me 
way under the Prussians, Italy was not seen a..'\ a threat to Europe. It did nor dominarc 
central Europe as Germany did. and the French and British navies still maintained control 
of the Mediterranean Sca. 1 
Although unified under one govcn1ment. the peoples of haly were quire different 
The nonh was much more industrialized; the south wa.c; largely agrarian. Italy wa.c; truly a 
nation of"haves·· and .. havc-nors:· The industrialists and large landowners constituted a 
hourxcoisic in Italy and were far removed from the industrial workers and the hrarcw1111, 
the landless agricultural peasants. ~fany Italians. especially tho~c in the more po\·crty-
stricken areas of the south, cmiE,.'T.ltcd to the United Stales. France. and to qua.~i-colonics 
I Thonus Rmo1c, wluly in the ln!cn-..l:1orul Sy\:rm. ''"'"'· '''::.- m /.Jf..-n:I al'ld Fmn11 /t.1fr. cd 
1\drun l.)1ld:on. (0-i;.ford. (hfon! l 'ni\ cn:t~· rr~\ .. :(.-:12 '· r ~.: Sec .J(\l) htx1 ('rnsrnc lrt'\i:lpn." 
S>-:ort /111:or;·o( :lil' /1.1/um l'mrlr • .:t> C'l! (Pllnun ~c-. Yorl. 1'>~61. Jr..! Cimluno P11x.acca. llutn~·o.fth<" 
/:Jf:.117 l'<•',"'l<". tum. Ar.thony l'Jul c:o-;c-.-.· Yotl lhrrin J:-•I Ru·•. 19'.'fJI 
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in Tunis, Beirut, and Tripoli in order to find jobs and a better standard ofliving. From its 
beginning, the socioeconomic conditions in Italy were ripe for confrontation.2 
Italy began its life with difficult economic conditions; however, it was able to 
recover fairly quickly. Its first fifteen years (until 1885) were marked by slow economic 
progress, followed by fifteen years of depression, which included a banking crisis. 
Beginning at the turn of the century and leading up to World War I, Italy experienced a 
great deal of economic advancement and relative prosperity. Imports doubled and 
exports tripled between 1881 and 1913, the number of miles of railroads increased ten-
fold from the 1860s to the 1910s, and the population grew by over 30 percent between 
1870 and 1914. After initial budget problems due to the costs of unification, Italy began 
to balance its budgets. There was a noticeable trade deficit, but much of it was covered 
by tourism and remittances from emigres. On the eve of the Great War, Italy's economic 
and industrial base still lagged behind most European nations, but it was catching up fast 
and was making more economic progress than any other nation in Europe. 3 
As a newcomer to European politics, Italy suffered from some of the same 
insecurities felt by Germany, whose feudal enclaves coalesced with the Prussian state in 
1870. After unification, Italy was still politically isolated and had no overseas colonies, 
in contrast to the vast amount of African and Pacific colonies held by Britain and France 
2 Paul Comer, "The Road to Fascism: An Italian Sondenveg?" Contemporary European History 
II, no. 2 (2002): pp. 276-7; Richard Overy and Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War, 2"d ed. (London: 
Penguin, 1999), p. 166. 
3 Gaetano Salvemini, The Origins of Fascism in Italy (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 3-8. 
Emigration was still a big issue: in A History of Italian Fascism, Federico Chabod notes that, on average, 
650,000 Italians emigrated each year. Most of these went to the U.S. and sent money home to their 
families, thus helping to bridge the trade deficit. 
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and the enormous land area of Russia. As its economy recovered, Italy began looking for 
new markets, more resources, and imperial glory. Most of the world was now closed for 
colonization, but parts of Afiica were still open. In 1889 and 1890, Italy formed the 
colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somililand on the Afiican horn. It then looked to expand 
into neighboring Abyssinia (modem Ethiopia), but was defeated in a brief, humiliating 
war with EmperorMenelik in 1896. (Mussolini would seek revenge in 1935.) In 1911, it 
captured Tripolitania (modem Libya) from the Ottomans, but not without difficulty.4 
To end its isolation and to lay the groundwork for future territorial expansion, 
Italy entered into the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1882. Italy 
had its eye on the Trentino, southern Tyrol, and Trieste, three areas of Austria-Hungary 
that bordered northern Italy and held a sizeable Italian population. Italian leaders knew 
that they were too weak to provoke a possible war with the dual monarchy, but they also 
knew that Austria-Hungary had designs on Serbia and the Balkans. For Italy, the Triple 
Alliance was a defensive treaty, but it also provided for equal compensation for Italy if 
Austria-Hungary gained territory in the Balkans. Italy hoped this provision would 
eventually allow it to take the coveted lands away from its despised neighbor.5 
Pre-War Politics 
Pre-war Italy had almost no organized political parties, but most people in 
government classified themselves as "Liberal." The Liberals had their origins in the 
4 Overy and Wheatcroft, pp. 166-7; Procacci, p. 302. See also Timothy W. Childs, ltalo-Turkish 
Diplomacy and the War over Libya, 1911-1912 (New York: E. J. Brill, 1990); and Paolo Maltese, La terra 
promessa: La guerra italo-turca e la conquista della Libia, 1911-1912 (Milan: Sugar, 1968). 
5 Salvemini, pp. 92-3. 
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formation of Italy: they fought against the privileges of the Catholic Church, especially 
as the Vatican was still feuding with Italy over the latter's capture of the Papal lands in 
1870. By the tum of the century, however, they had moved away from this inflammatory 
platform and were seeking to reduce friction among all factions in Italy. The Liberals 
and the entire Italian pre-war government were dominated by Giovanni Giolitti. Among 
other posts, he served as Italy's prime minister in 1892-94 and again in 1904-14. He 
hoped to bring all of the different factions in Italy slowly together under one government; 
in particular, he hoped to form a coalition with reformist socialists, who made up one of 
the few true political parties in Italy, in an effort to shut out revolutionary socialists. 6 
Giolitti was a masterful parliamentarian and a Machiavellian one. He routinely 
"managed" elections to obtain the preferred outcome. The political system in Italy 
allowed him to do this easily. The central government appointed the prefects ofltaly's 
provinces, and these prefects had the power to summarily remove local mayors and 
councils. Giolitti would pressure the prefects to rig the votes, and they in tum would do 
the same to the mayors. Anyone who played along would be guaranteed to keep his job, 
be it by appointment or by election. Anyone who resisted would not. Giolitti tried to use 
this "influence" sparingly- he only manipulated votes in a few key areas (usually in the 
south, where the electorate was less educated) and only enough to make a difference. 
After suffrage was extended in 1913 to all males over age thirty or who had served in the 
army, the voting poll grew substantially, and Giolitti's machinations became much more 
6 Ibid., p. 77. See also Filippo Burzio, Politica Demiurgica (Bari: Laterza, 1923); Benedetto 
Croce, A History of Italy 1871-1915 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1929); Salvatore Saladino, Italy from 
Unification to 1919 (New York: Crowell, 1970); A. William Salomone, Italy in the Giolittian Era, 2nd ed. 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1960); Cecil J. S. Sprigge, The Development of Modern Italy 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944). 
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obvious. Although cilizcns protested. Giolini and the Libc:r.ll t,-on:mmcnt wcr'C 
completely out of touch with the people a.-. they wrapped thcmsd\'CS into their 
parliamentary cocoon. 111is was the beginning of the growing dis.s.,tisfaction among 
Italians for the Liberal go\'cmment and their scar-ch for an cffc:cti\·e altcmati\·e.' 
TI1e anger wcnc beyond policical corruption. Catholics wcrc still anno)'cd al lhc 
continuing feud between the stale and the 01urch. To protest Italy's sci1urc of Papal 
lands. Pope Leo XIII had forbidden all ltalian Catholics to \'Ole in elections or to hold 
political office. His successor. Pius X. began to make exceptions; by 191'), :i Catholic-
Populist political party had been fonned, the /'art110 Popolare, a. .. an opposition lo rhe 
Liberals' style of govcmment. In a nation dominated hy the CJtholic Church. this new 
party was quickly viewed as a potential ath·ers.ary• for the L1bcr.Jls.' 
There persists a m)1h that the Italian people were politically .. bad;w;mis·· ·· th.11 
they had little knowledge of politics or the is..o;ucs and were largely apathciic. ll1c truth as 
that Italian voters were. by and large, no d1ffcrCflt than the electorates of other 
industrialized nations. One key diffcrroce h.'ld to do with how \'Otcrs \\'CfC rcg1!'.tcrcJ: 
instead of being registered In their current hometown, Italian \'otcrs were rc~i!'.tctcJ m the 
town of their birth. In add1t1on. there were no provision.-. for ahscntce \'oting. thus 
discnfr.mchising lt.1lians linng ahro.1d and lhos.c scr.·ing in the rmht~ry. SC\·crthcl~<i.. Ill 
most elections aflcr suffrage was e-.;tcn<lcd. between 55 and (J(J percent of cl1~1hlc \OICf'i. 
went to the polls. 111c:s.c numhcrs arc \Cf)' simil.v 10 the \'Oler turnout'> in the 193:! and 
• tl>ld. l"'i' ii.SI. II Sr1;..i:t llu;.~t. lil<' l'-:1:"'! S:.::r1 a,.,.J {:.;/;-, J'' cd (C.Jn-l.•nd;.t'.. MA fhr,.a:J 
l'nl\tt11ty Prru. 1'17'11. rr .c.~~ 
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1936 United States presidential elections (57 and 62 percent, respectively). After 
factoring out absentee citizens who could not vote, the participation rates are over 
seventy percent, comparable to those enjoyed in Great Britain.9 
Economic conditions also sparked resentment and some political movements. As 
in many European nations, the northern industrial workers had begun to form Socialist 
trade unions, and a Socialist party entered the government. Giolitti helped bring the 
Socialists into existence by removing some of the legal barriers against them at the tum 
of the century. This was part of his plan for greater integration of all classes into the 
state. Workers attained some concessions from their employers, but recessions in the 
early 1900s made industrialists reluctant to make further wage increases. From 1912 to 
1914, there were numerous strikes and lockouts, and the bitterness grew until it exploded 
in the violent protests of"Red Week" in 1914, during which the state was forced to use 
the army to gain control of some areas ofitaly. The Socialists would quiet down 
somewhat during World War I, but their anger would resurface later. Giolitti was never 
able to form a true coalition with the Socialists: his core supporters (which included 
many industrialists) would have been alienated, and there was not enough support within 
the Socialist party to accept a truce with a government that appeared allied against 
them.10 
9 Salvemini, pp. 61-3. In the March 1929 polling, at the height of Mussolini's power and prestige, 
90 percent of the electorate voted. See lvone Kirkpatrick, Mussolini: A Study in Power (New York: 
Hawthorn, 1964), p. 274. 
1° Comer, "The Road to Fascism," pp. 278-9, 283-4. See also Giampiero Carocci, Giolitti e I 'eta 
giolittiana (Turin: Einaugi, 1962) and A. Aquarone, L 'Italia giolittiana (1896-1915): le premesse politiche 
ed economiche (Bologna: II Mulino, 1981 ); Douglas Forsyth, The Crisis of Liberal Italy: Monetary and 
Financial Policy, 1914-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
11 
On the agricultural side, anger against the state was more acute. 111e large 
landowners had exploited the bmccicmti for centuries. In Italy, there was no progn:ssi\'c 
tax; e\'eryone paid the same rate, gi\'ing the impression that the poor were ta.'(cd more 
hea\'ily. There were attempts to introduce a prog.rcssi\'c ta.'( and redistribute some of the 
wealth, but Giolitti could not risk alienating his wcahhier l>011ry.:eois constituency. 
Instead, the braccianti were lefl on their own. ·111e \'iolence that had alrc.-idy existed 
between them and their oppressors became worse, and their animosity toward a state that 
ignored them grew, making them some of Fascism's first disciples. 11 
Drifting into \Var 
With this seething cauldron of discontent in the background, Italy found itself 
facing the prospect of war. Afler hostilities began, Germany and Austria-llung.<try called 
on their partner to join their fight. In response, Italy hedged, insisting that the Triple 
Alliance was merely a defensi\'c alliance. Since Gem1any and Austria-Hungary were the 
aggressors in August 1914, Italy claimed that it was under no obligation to join, 
especially since it had pledged to France in 1902 that it would not panicipate in any \t,,·ar 
of aggression against France. Instead, Italy dcclaral itself to be neutral in the war. 1: 
11 Ibid. pp. 2S0·3. Sec .ih.o Anthon;· Cudot..:a . . -f1:r.:r1>11t f:l1us ar.J /r.;/1,m Fauum Th<" l'rnur.a 
flf Rfllo>:na 1901-1?:6 (Pnnccton. 'SJ: Prmccton l"m\cf'lt)· l'rt'i.i. 19.'i.21 
i: S.ih·cmm1. rr 9.2-3. 1\lthou~h .iltt.ohm~ 11\.clf from ... -.ar. lt.ilr i:im:cd ttul II rC-CCl\C 
C<'mpcm.ll10n for :my g.i1n<> nude by Au\tru·lhmprJo· m th!: U.ilhn\ Thu idn;ts\·c .irrhc .. uum of the 
trc.lt\' str.imed rd.3tl0n\ \\lth the Cc.-r.tr'.31 Po\lo't'f'S cn·n lv.'(Ofc luh H<k•l •l!h the Er.!cn!c S.Cc .iho R. 1 n. 
Bo\~'Clrth. /Mfr. th· / .... ·mt of tlir Grrat l'n"""' lr.:fr.;,, FMor.1t l'olin lv:i>t< ti:r Finl'"''"' u-.1r 
(London C.irr.!>ndr.c t: nl\ a-sity Pr~\.\. 1979 ) 
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Antonio Salandra succeeded Giolitti as prime minister for much of the wartime 
period and guided Italy's course in the war. Most Italians favored neutrality; regardless 
of their feelings for either side, they did not want to enter a war. Socialists were 
especially against it. However, this pacifist feeling was not universal. Many saw the war 
as a chance for Italy to be involved more aggressively in European affairs. There had 
been a recent and growing trend of nationalism, and the war made the nationalists a 
louder force in Italy, which led to deeper divisions. Salandra saw another benefit to the 
war: he saw it as a chance to restore social discipline to an unruly and schismatic 
populace. Wartime Italy would become more autocratic, but more ordered. 13 
Italy finally signed the secret and very generous Treaty of London on 26 April 
1915. Ifthe Allies were victorious, Italy would capture its coveted Trentino and South 
Tyrol, as well as the cities of Gorizia and Trieste. Italy would also receive !stria and the 
hinterlands around Trieste, Dalmatia and most of the Dalmatian Islands (but not the city 
of Fiume), a free hand in Albania and the Dodecanese Islands, and unspecified additional 
territory proportionate to what Britain and France would gain. A month later, Italy 
declared war on Austria-Hungary. (Realizing Italy's weakness, Salandra would not 
declare war on Germany for another year.14) 
Although Salandra was ready for war, the rest of the Liberal government was still 
tom. The Socialists, though against the war, saw it as a chance for revolution. The 
Nationalists increased their patriotic hysteria against the "internal enemy" (i.e., anyone 
13 Paul Comer, "State and Society, 1901-1922," in Liberal and Fascist Italy, ed. Adrian Lyttelton 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 30-1. See also Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from 
Liberalism to Fascism, I870-I925 (London: Methuen, 1967). 
14 Salvemini, pp. 21-2. 
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against the war). The government did not have broad support from the public because it 
never asked for it. Salandra and Foreign Minister Sydney Sonnino acted alone. Like 
most leaders in Europe, they thought the war would be a short one. Rather than create a 
propaganda machine to convince the public of the need for war, Salandra resorted to 
harsh repression of public dissent. He gave broad powers to the military in "war zones" 
to crush opposition through summary courts-martial and even execution. At the outset, 
the '\var zone .. included only the area around the front; by the end of the war, it included 
the entire nation. The army took over factories and confiscated peasants' property. A 
workers' strike was considered the equivalent of desertion and dealt with similarly. 
Salandra assumed that, after a quick, glorious victory, the people would forget these 
repressive policies, but as the war dragged on, the public's ire grew exponcntially.1s 
The army was a microcosm of the nation. Southern peasants made up the bulk of 
the infantry. The more educated northerners and the professional soldiers were 
predominantly assigned to artillery or engineering units, and most commanders and staff 
generals came from these groups, thus perpetuating the already existing divisions within 
the country. Overall, the army was not prepared. When Italy declared war, most of its 
best troops were still stationed in Libya. The geography of the Italian Front '"'as the 
harshest in the theatre, running along the highest mountain range in Europe, and Italy 
lacked the mountain troops and heavy artillery for large-scale oper;itions along this front. 
The unpopularity of the war meant that the soldiers' morale was always low and 
1
' Paul Comer and Gionnru Proc3cci, 'Ille (13h.tn Expcrirncc of ·rot.ii" ~fob1h:r.auon 1915· 
1920, .. in Sr arc. Society. and .\fohih:at1on in Eurnf'<' l>um1r, thr F1nt World W11r. cd John Home 
(C3mbridgc: C.1mbndgc L'niH·rsny Press, 1997). pp. 22-S-230. 233. 
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desertions were always high. Perhaps the army's greatest liability was its new chief of 
staff, General Luigi Cadorna. He was one of the most brutal commanders in the war for 
any army. He had no respect for his soldiers or lieutenants, who consequently had no 
respect for him. He was overly aggressive, repeatedly ordering new offensives and 
hopeless attacks. Cadorna wielded his constitutional authority as supreme commander 
with a heavy hand, ordering summary executions of stragglers and deserters. 16 With such 
poor leadership, the Italian army was never destined for greatness in the Great War. 
In analyzing the state ofltaly at the onset of war, it is hard to understand how an 
Italian army stayed unified at all. Considering the amount of public opposition to the 
war, the division among the government elite, the lack of preparation of the army, and the 
repressive tactics used against civilians and industry, Italy in 1915 appeared to be very 
similar to Russia one year earlier. Italy's entry was also poorly timed. Had it entered 
earlier, it may have defeated an Austro-Hungarian army that was being routed by the 
Russians. By May 1915, however, it was the Russians who were being routed, and 
Austria-Hungary, and later Germany, could afford to move troops to counter the Italian 
threat. None of the eleven Italian offensives mounted through 1917 resulted in the 
breakthrough that Cadorna had predicted. The geography was a natural defense for the 
Austro-Hungarian army. In fall 1917, a combination force, led by German generals, used 
new infiltration tactics to focus on smaller areas and drive through the line to high ground 
in the Italian rear, bypassing strong points and isolating entire Italian divisions. 
16 John Keegan, The First World War (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), pp. 226-228, 344-345; 
Hughes, p. 57. For more about the war in Italy and the Italian army, see James E. Edmonds, Military 
Operations, Italy (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1949); John Whittam, nie Politics ofrhe Italian Anny 
(London: Croom Helm, 1977); John Gooch, "Morale and Discipline in the Italian Army 1915-18," in 
Facing Annageddon, ed. Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle (London: Cooper, 1996). 
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The result was the battle, or more precisely, the debacle ofCaporetto. By 3 
November, the Italians had retreated eighty miles to the River Piave. The attackers had 
to stop - they had outrun their own supply lines - and the Italian line stabilized. 
Although only 10,000 Italians were killed, about 275,000 had been taken prisoner. 
Cadorna was replaced, and Italy would not resume the offensive again until the next year, 
when they received reinforcements from the British. Only in the closing days of the war 
would the Italian army reclaim its lost land in a victory over the demoralized Austro-
Hungarian army at the battle of Vittorio Veneto.17 
Other nations suffered major setbacks in the war, but Caporetto became an 
ignominious defeat. The reason lies less in the tactical outcome and more so in how the 
Italian military and government leadership dealt with the defeat. While generals from 
other nations played down their defeats and chose not to discuss them, Cadorna publicly 
and loudly blamed his soldiers of cowardice and executed scores of deserters. The same 
was true in the political arena: while other governments launched quiet investigations of 
the Battle of the Frontiers or Passchendaele, the Italians declared a full-scale inquisition 
and produced a voluminous public report, good for newspaper headlines for months. 
With such publicity, people could not forget the battle, even if they wanted to do so. 
Ultimately, the controversy turned to blame. Socialists, Liberals, and Catholics who were 
against the war were upbraided for ruining the soldiers' morale and priming them for 
defeat. The growing nationalist Fascist party, which had always been pro-war and anti-
socialist, was a particularly vocal accuser. Italy's allies did little to help the situation. 
17 Keegan, pp. 229, 346-50, 416. See also Cyril Falls, Caporetto 1917 (London: Weidcnfeld & 
Nicolson, 1966); Mario Morselli, Caporello, 1917: Victory or Defeat? (London: F. Cass, 2001 ). 
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Britain, France, and later the United States, were never happy with Italy's designs on 
Dalmatia and Africa. They also believed that the Italian Front was a parallel war that did 
nothing to lessen the burdens that they faced on the Western Front. Until Caporetto, Italy 
had maintained minimal relations with her allies, and yet Italian politicians were always 
demanding their piece of the postwar pic. 18 Britain and France could not help but feel a 
little pleasure in the fact that upstart Italy had been put in her place at Caporetto. 
But the greatest effects were felt at home. Caporetto galvanized disparate groups 
among Italians either for or against the war. Those who had been interventionists and 
nationalists before the war were unified under a patriotic and anti-socialist/anti-
communist banner. To them, and to the political and military leaders who were still 
fighting the war, socialists became pariahs, which only reinforced the socialists' hatred of 
the state. Interestingly, nearly everyone blamed the state for the defeat, not merely the 
generals. The government saw this as treason and clamped down harder on the public, 
rather than address their concerns. 19 
The "Mutilated Victory" 
After the war, Italy joined Great Britain, France, and the United States as one of 
the "Big Four" at the Paris peace conference. President Woodrow Wilson's ideals of 
open covenants and self-determination of peoples were at odds with most of the postwar 
aims of the other Allies, but especially those of Italy. The Italians received some of its 
18 Salvemini, pp. 13-7; Row, p. 96. After Caporctto, the Allies developed a central strategic and 
command center. 
19 Comer, "State and Society," pp. 34-5. 
demands easily, including Trentino, South Tyrol, Trieste, Gorizia. and western Istria. 
However, they lost their bids for additional land along the eastern Adriatic (which went 
to the newly-created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later known as 
Yugoslavia), African and Middle Eastern colonies, and spheres of influence in the 
Balkans. Then-Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando introduced the city of Fiume as an 
additional demand. Wilson and the other representatives had a very low opinion of the 
Italians; Britain's Sir Charles Hardinge labeled them "the beggars of Europe" for their 
greed in Paris. Wilson had grudgingly agreed to the other territorial concessions, but he 
was adamantly against giving Fiume to Italy, earning him the wrath of many Italians.20 
Back at home, Italians reopened the old wounds and divisions among them. 
Socialists and Liberals who had been against the war in 1915 voiced a vehement "I told 
you so!" Nationalists and Fascists screamed about a "mutilated victory." Ex-soldiers 
wondered why they had fought for three years. The mindset left over from the days of 
the Roman Empire made Italians want the impossible, and when they did not get it, they 
turned a victory into a pessimistic defeat. Some were not willing to accept the peace 
settlement at all. Italian poet and war veteran Gabriele D' Annunzio led about one 
thousand Italian shock troops in an unsanctioned occupation of the city of Fiume. 
Although patently against the orders and wishes of Rome, D' Annunzio became an idol 
for Italian nationalists and ex-soldiers, even drawing comparisons with Garibaldi, and 
heightened nationalist fervor throughout Italy. 21 
20 Row, p. 99; Sah·emini, pp. 22-3. 
21 Salvemini, pp. 24-6, 39-43; Overy and Wheatcroft, p. 169. In fact, ifltaly had achieved all of 
its goals, the cost of managing such a large addition of territory may have ruined any chance for postwar 
17 
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Most Italians could agree that the Liberal government was not working. Giolitti 
and his Liberal successors had never been able form their majority coalition, and many 
non-socialists were alienated by the government's overtures toward the workers, whose 
strikes and violence loomed as a threat to the middle and upper classes. Nationalists were 
disappointed with Italy's lack of international recognition and the weakness of "i signori" 
("the gentlemen") in Rome. Middle-class intellectuals hoped for something better than 
the Liberal mediocrity that they had seen.22 With no common cause in World War I, no 
long-standing political traditions or parties (aside from the loose conglomerations of 
socialists and Catholics), and no faith in the political and military leadership, the war left 
many Italians expecting a radical change in government. 
The economic situation in 1919 was also uncertain. During the war, Rome had 
turned over many responsibilities for war production and mobilization to groups headed 
or influenced by private industrialists, who became very rich in this military-industrial 
complex at the expense of the workers and small farm owners. This intertwining of 
Italian big business and the government would become the genesis of Mussolini's 
"Corporate State" that he would pursue in the late-1920s. In 1919, a wave of workers' 
strikes hit northern Italy. Most were merely obstructionist; few involved large-scale 
sabotage or violence. The workers received some concessions, including an eight-hour 
workday, but the main issue was wages. Italy was not unique: most European nations 
saw an increase in strikes immediately after the war, as soldiers returning to their homes 
economic recovery. Eventually, Rome persuaded D' Annunzio to leave Fiume, which became a free 
international city through the Treaty of Rapallo ( 1920); however, Italian troops occupied it in 1921 after 
incidents of violence against Italians living there. 
22 Comer, "The Road to Fascism," pp. 285-6. 
--1 
19 
sought jobs with decent pay and hours. Nor were the strikes noticeably worse in Italy 
than in other nations, and never did a strike completely paralyze the Italian economy. 
However, it was the beginning of two years of socialist activity- the biennio rosso. It 
climaxed in August 1920 with the takeover of northern factories by 500,000 industrial 
workers, who then tried to establish local soviets. The world, still reeling from Lenin's 
communist takeover in Russia, began to think that Italy had "gone red." The workers, 
however, never pursued a Leninist revolution and ultimately agreed to adopt syndical 
control of the factories. The poor leadership and organization of the workers proved that 
Russian-style Bolshevism had no future in Italy, opening the door a little wider for a 
takeover by the anti-socialist nationalists who were congealing into the Fascist party.23 
One of the claims that Mussolini made repeatedly after taking power was that he 
had inherited an Italy in financial crisis. To some extent, he was correct, but his claims 
were mostly hyperbole. The war had been very expensive for Italy. The "invisible 
exports" of tourism and emigrants' remittances had dried up during the war. Italy had to 
borrow billions of dollars in war loans to balance its payments. Between July 1918 and 
July 1922, $4 billion ofloans matured. Railroad and towns had to be rebuilt in the north; 
coal, which Italy had always had to import, was even more scarce as Great Britain, Italy's 
biggest coal vendor, needed it for its own rebuilding; agricultural land had been overused 
during the war; and cattle had been slaughtered by the thousands to feed soldiers.24 
23 Comer, "State and Society," p. 36; Row, p. 98; George Seldes, Sawdust Caesar (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1935), pp. 86-90. See also Salvemini, p. 33, and J. Hampden Jackson, The Post-War 
·World: A Short Political History 1918-1934 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935), p. 56. 
24 Salvemini, pp. 19-20. 
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Despite all of these obstacles, the Liberal postwar government did a remarkably 
fine job. After an inflationary period in 1919, inflation slowed and then reversed in 1920 
and 1921. Italy restored its balance of payments, helped by the return of tourism and 
remittances. Although wages were still low, fueling the biennio rosso, unemployment 
was also low. Foreign businesses, especially American ones, began investing in Italy. 
By the time of Mussolini's 1922 coup, most of the frontier towns damaged by the war 
had been rebuilt, and agriculture and livestock were rebounding nicely. The war had 
been a boon to industrialists, and the postwar period saw greater expansion, especially in 
the power, automobile, aviation, and shipping industries. War loans had primed the 
economy and kept Italy solvent, and the government was making great strides in repaying 
the loans. By 1922, Italy carried only $1 billion more in public debt than it had in 1914 
($4 billion versus $3 billion). Mussolini claimed to have inherited this debt, which 
translated to about 15 billion lire, and to have reduced it to 3 billion lire in one year. The 
truth was that the Liberal government had been responsible for the fiscal policies and 
budgets that reduced the debt. They had already budgeted the payments that reduced the 
debt to 3 billion lire, and Mussolini simply followed their plan. Thus, Mussolini's claim 
that the Fascists were rescuing Italy from economic chaos was overstated; there was no 
chaos, but rather the groundwork for one of the better economic recoveries in postwar 
Europe.25 
Although the framework for a democratic government was in place, Italy was 
quite different from other European democracies. It was a young nation-state in an old 
25 Ibid., pp. 28-36, 44-45. 
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Europe, but it clung to the memory of the Roman Empire. Its experience in the war was 
demoralizing. These factors have been cited as causes of Mussolini's coup, but by 
themselves, they do not fully explain why Italian democracy failed. The rise of Fascism 
in Italy was due in large part to the weak leadership and misguided policies of the Liberal 
Italian government both before and during World War I, and the war itself acted as a 
catalyst for a revolution already brewing in Italy's populace. The government's actions 
(and inaction), coupled with Italy's position in Europe and the war, opened the door for 
the Fascists to take the helm of a rudderless Italy. 
The Rise of Fascism 
Fascism, as a political and social philosophy, grew out of a response to the 
excesses ofliberalism in the late 1800s and early 1900s. By the turn of the century, many 
Europeans were already decrying the growing corruption and decadence of the 
bourgeoisie and industrial capitalists in liberal European societies. Liberalism had 
evoked an economic and political individualism that allowed particular interests to take 
precedence over the whole of society. The result was a great disparity between a small, 
wealthy elite and a large group of peasants and working-class citizens. Many within the 
latter category began agitating for change and a voice in their society. Industrial workers 
often turned to the collectivist views of socialism, but many non-industrial workers and 
peasants saw socialism as a threat to their way of life and the order of society. 26 
26 Eugen Weber, Varieties of Fascism: Doctrines of Revolution in the Twentieth Century (Malabar, 
Florida: Krieger Publishing, 1964), pp. 8, 13, 16-7. See also Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism: Action 
Fran{:aise, Italian Fascism, National Socialism, trans. Leila Vennewitz {New York: Holt, Rinehart, and 
Winston, 1966); A. James Gregor, The Ideology of Fascism (New York: Free Press, 1969); Alexander J. 
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At the same time, a growing sense of nationalism took root in many European 
nations. This ideology professed a new awareness and shared identity among the citizens 
of a nation, as well as a belief in man's ability to build a rational society. In the fading 
light of the declining power of European monarchies and the erosion of the influence of 
the Church (Catholic and Protestant varieties), nationalism became a unifying force, a 
source of collective pride, and a religion by proxy for many in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. This was especially true in Italy following unification. After 
centuries of :fragmented feudal, papal, and foreign rule, the creation of a unified Italian 
state conjured ghosts of the Roman Empire in the minds of would-be Italian leaders.27 
At the intersection of nationalism and the displeasure with Liberalism, Fascism 
was born. Under Fascism, the state is the highest priority and the end to which all 
economic and political means are directed. Individual interests are not eliminated, but 
rather they are subjugated by the interests of the national state; personal liberty is 
conceded by the state if the individual acts in the interests of the state. Accomplishing 
this requires forceful and undivided leadership, a great contrast to the Italian Parliament 
before and immediately after World War I. Politicians with their self-serving agendas 
and promises to constituents have no place in a Fascist regime. The goals of Fascism 
lend themselves best to totalitarian rule, especially that of a dynamic, energetic leader. 
It is useful to examine the types of people in Italy that were drawn to Fascism. 
Ex-soldiers returning from the war were attracted to the nationalism embodied in Fascist 
De Grand, Fascism: Its Origins and Development (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1982); and 
Philip Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1919-1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995). 
27 Ibid., pp. 17-8, 20-1. See also Angelo Rossi (Angelo Tasca), The Rise of Italian Fascism, 1918-
1922, trans. Peter and Dorothy Wait (London: Methuen, 1938). 
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doctrine. Some of the educated bourgeoisie and lesser bourgeoisie were attracted to 
Fascism as well. They maintained a sense of pride in the nation and were worried about 
the general disorder incited by the socialists and their strikes. But the backbone of the 
Fascist movement was the agrarian workers, including the braccianti. Looking at these 
dissimilar groups, it is obvious that Fascism, unlike socialism, was not born as a class 
struggle; rather, the common thread among these groups was disgust with the state.28 
The more pious adherents to Fascism, particularly the ex-soldiers and some 
students, formedfasci di combattimento, translated as "bundles of fight." These pseudo-
military organizations roamed the countryside and fell into violent clashes with other 
groups, especially socialists. The northern agrarian peasants had been fighting for 
countless years against oppressive employers and the socialist unions who threatened to 
take their menial jobs. Rarely did anyone step in to stop the fasci. Commercial farmers, 
especially those in the Po River Valley, were happy to see them drive out the unions; in 
return, they offered jobs to peasants who were not socialist. The local police also were 
not inclined to defend the socialists, who had been condemning the police as pawns of the 
state. The/asci were a response to the weakness and ineptness of the government, but 
they were also a product of it. Their organization, tactics, and objectives were similar to 
modern terrorist groups. They attacked with impunity because they knew the state was 
impotent and, harkening back to the "failure" of the biennio rosso, that the socialists were 
not a powerful rival. Fascism did not represent the majority of Italian citizens - far from 
it. Many Italians, including some Fascist sympathizers and even Mussolini, were put off 
28 Comer, "State and Society," pp. 39-40. See also Federico Chabod, A History of Italian 
Fascism, trans. Muriel Grindrod (New York: Howard Fertig, 1975), pp. 52-3. 
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by the violence at times. Nor was the rise of Fascism inevitable. The socialists had 
opportunities to rise up as an effective force, and the military high command was ready to 
crush the Fascists as treasonous rebels, if given the order. What the Fascists did have was 
a zealous group of followers, a dynamic, energetic leader in Benito Mussolini, and the 
knowledge that in the absence of any other kind of true leadership, the people would 
ultimately flock to them.29 
Benito Mussolini did not plan on creating a new movement in Italy. He was born 
in 1883 in the Emilia-Romagna region to a peasant family with a father whose political 
views were as radical as his were to be. Mussolini was a hellion as a child (and bragged 
about it in his autobiography). After failing as a teacher and then doing odd jobs in 
Switzerland (perhaps to avoid compulsory military service in Italy), he returned to Italy 
and served his tour of duty. He became a member of the Socialist party and editor of one 
of its largest newspapers, Ava111i! He was a rising star among socialists, and he initially 
toed the party line and spoke out against World War I through his paper. Soon, however, 
he found himself publicly supporting the war effort, and for that he was expelled from the 
Socialist party. He started a new newspaper, II Popa/ad 'Italia, with a decidedly pro-war 
tenor. He became a patriot and condemned his old party for its pacifist stance.30 
~Ibid., Richard Collier, Duce! (New York: Viking Press, 1971 ), p. 18. Days before the "March 
on Rome" by the approachingfasci, ChiefofStaffGeneral Pietro Badoglio told a fretting King Vittorio 
Emanuele III, "five minutes of fire will scatter that rabble." 'Ille king ne\·er gave the order. 
30 Ibid., pp. 12-8, 34-40; Benito Mussolini, ,\~l' Autobios:raplry (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1928), pp. 4-6. See also Collier, pp. 47-8. 
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Mussolini's autobiography, while obviously biased, provides a glimpse into his 
psyche and motivation for creating the Fascist movement. His father and his childhood 
in the poor agricultural district of Romagna gave an early impetus to his f uturc career: 
I began with young eyes to see that the tiny world about me ·was feeling une:isines.s under the 
pinch of necessity. A deep and secret grudge was darkening the hearts of the common people. A 
country gentry of mediocrity in economic usefulness and of Ji mired mrcllcctwl contribution were 
hanging upon the multitudes a weight of unjustified privileges. 
In 191 S, aflcr Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary. Mussolini entered the am1y 
and went to the front at lsonzo. He sent bulletins from the trenches to be published in his 
paper. More aware than most of his fellow soldiers of the political forces in Italy, 
Mussolini's hatred of the anti-war groups increased. ''The poisonous currents of non-
intervention and neutrality were still spending their last strength upon us. I knew they 
were doing their utmost to minimize the energy and elasticity of our fighting forces."31 
Although he was in the army for eighteen months, Mussolini's fighting 
experiences were limited. He spent only four months at the front - the rest of the time he 
was held in reserve - and only two and a half months in actual fighting. Nevertheless, he 
made himself and his paper into champions for the common soldier and the war cause. Jn 
1916, he was wounded when an Italian mortar exploded behind the lines. Four soldiers 
were killed, and Mussolini received forty-four shrapnel wounds. He spent months of 
grueling recovery in a hospital, then returned home to resume his editorial position with 
II Popo/o. Soldiers credited him and his paper with maintaining morale at the front. even 
after Caporetto. After the war, Mussolini spoke out against Wilson, his opposition to 
Italy's postwar territorial demands, and the peace plan, as well as the horrible treatment 
31 ~fussolini. pp. JO, -46. 
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that returning soldiers were receiving. especially from anti-war factions. Mussolini was 
patriotic, but his vitriolic editorials served to divide the population even more.': 
Mussolini was tired of government by the aristocracy and the elite politicians, but 
he still believed in his motherland. He wanted a govcrnmenl for 1he masses. With his 
expulsion from the Socialist party, his time in the trenches, and the patriotic propaganda 
that he was publishing, Italy's nationalists congregated around Mussolini. I le soon 
created a new movement centered on the/asci di combclltimc1110 that alrc.ady had been 
formed. The Partito Na:ionale Fascista, or PNF, was vehemently nationalist, anti-
socialist, anti-communist, and anti-Liberal. 
The old p3rt1cs clung in \·3in to the rattling prognmmes. These ~ftl~ tud to .i~pl lhcu 1hc:ones 
3S best they could 10 the new d3ys. It w3s nccc~ury to inugine :av.holly new pol111c.al conccp1ton. 
3dcqU3le lo rhc ll\·ing reality of the twcnlicth ccntUI)', o\·crcommg the hrrulcd hor11on\ of uuous 
spent 3nd cxh3ustcd democracies, 3nd firully lhc \·iolcntly Utopi.in spmt of llol\hcnsm 
In the 1919 parliamentary elections, Fascist party members ran for election for the first 
time. None of them, including Mussolini, was clccted . .lJ 
Mussolini's Fascism 
Since he made his living as a nC\\'Spapcr editor, it is no surprise thal Mussolini 
wrote often about his political and societal viC\\'S. What started as tirades ag.1inst the 
Italian Liberal government evolved into a doctrine of Fascist rule. The comcrslonc of 
this doctrine, and of any Fascist regime, was the superiority of the state. "In Fascism 
man is an indi\·idual who is the nation and country;· and instead of pursuing merely 
J! Sah·cmm1. p. 124; Collier, pp. 51-5; Scldcs. p. 83. 
n ~lus.solmt pp. 69. S l ·2. 
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personal happiness, every citizen is in an "orbit of duty" to the welfare of the nation. 
"Fascism reaffirms the state and the only true expression of the individual.. .a totalizing 
concept, and the Fascist State - the unification and synthesis of every value - interprets, 
develops, and potentiates the whole life of the people."34 
Mussolini was a man of action, and he believed strongly that Fascism depended 
on constant action for its survival. It was born to sweep away the stagnant Liberal 
government. To Mussolini, the successful state always moved forward and never looked 
back or apologized for the past. Fascism is Machiavellian at its core. The need for 
violence to control the people, for expansionism, and even for war is justified by the 
necessity of keeping the people in a constant state of tension and anticipation of 
greatness. The state and the people are one, and all social and economic edifices are 
structured to serve the whole. In this way, Fascism unifies the people. This makes 
Fascism more than a rational doctrine; it imbues an emotional connection, a passion in its 
ardent followers. A Fascist government does not always adhere to one ideology in its 
methods (even Mussolini admitted that); it may draw from socialism, democracy, 
republicanism, or totalitarianism. It is pragmatic, doing whatever necessary to achieve 
the higher goals of the state. Mussolini attributed the intellectual impetus behind his 
vision to Nietzsche, Georges Sorel, William James, and of course, Machiavelli.35 
34 Benito Mussolini, "The Doctrine of Fascism," in Readings 011 Fascism and National Socialism 
(Denver, CO: Alan Swallow, 1958), pp. 8, I 0. 
35 Ibid., pp. 13-5, 21-4; Alfredo Rocco, 'The Political Doctrine of Fascism," in Readings on 
Fascism and National Socialism. (Denver, CO: Alan Swallow, 1958), pp. 27, 32-6; William Y. Elliott, 
"Mussolini, Prophet of the Pragmatic Era in Politics," Political Science Quarterly 41(June1926), p. 164. 
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Although he had been expelled from the Socialist party and spent much of his 
effort in railing against it in his newspaper, Mussolini had maintained some socialist 
contacts during the factory takeovers of 1920 and was ready to support them if they chose 
to take their revolution to Rome. Although he stood on the right of the political 
spectrum, he was ready to return to the left to accomplish his ultimate goal of 
overthrowing the govemment.36 After the workers relented, Mussolini knew that if he 
wanted a revolution, he would have to do it himself. 
The Socialist party was splintering. In 1921, the communists broke away, and in 
Italy's proportional parliamentary election system, this split hurt the Socialists and gave 
an opportunity to the PNF. Hoping to neutralize a potentially dangerous political enemy 
and expecting to manipulate the Fascists as he had done to so many other political 
opponents, Giolitti, once again Italy's prime minister, invited Mussolini and the PNF to 
enter the April 1921 election. Thirty-five Fascists were elected to the Chamber of 
Deputies. Giolitti had turned a movement that was still localized into a legitimate, 
national force. Giolitti and many other Liberals did not understand Fascism until it was 
too late. They expected Mussolini and his cronies to act like other politicians. They did 
not appreciate the subversive nature of this paramilitary movement. They assumed that 
Mussolini would play by the rules, not rewrite them.37 
The Fascist party, however, was not a united one or a disciplined one. Although 
Mussolini was recognized as its leader, many local Fascist groups ran themselves as 
36 Seldes, pp. 93-5. 
37 Corner, "State and Society," p. 41. See also Hampden, pp. 56-7. 
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autonomous organizations. They conducted raids, bombings, and assassinations against 
their enemies. The fact that they used violence was not unprecedented in Italian politics 
and society, but its widespread nature and systematic operation was. Mussolini was 
organizing and mobilizing his troops in the way that the state had attempted to do for 
World War I. He was instilling in them a common cause and identity, and his speeches 
and newspapers provided the propaganda to rouse his loyal subjects. At times, however, 
his minions got out of hand. Mussolini proposed and concluded a "peace treaty" between 
the Fascist and Socialist parties in July 1921, and he urged his party members to restrain 
their violence. Most local groups paid him no heed. In protest and, it seems, genuine 
dismay, Mussolini resigned as head of the Fascist party. He hoped that this bold move 
would shock his unruly party members into acquiescence. Instead, new splinter groups 
offascisti came into being, and the violence continued unabated throughout Italy. 
Unwilling to relinquish his influence, and realizing that the party was surviving (albeit 
tumultuously) without him, Mussolini accepted the Fascists' brutal methods and 
reclaimed his leadership of the party. Fascism appeared to have conquered Mussolini.38 
Over the next year, the Fascists would muscle their way into power. Taking a cue 
from Lenin (ironic, considering their anti-communist tone), Fascist groups took control of 
cities across Italy, including Ferrara and Bologna. They took over public utilities and ran 
them effectively. During a general strike by the socialists in August 1922, Mussolini, 
enraged that Prime Minister Luigi Facta would not step in to break the strike, ordered his 
fasci to keep the trains running. At the same time, he ratcheted up his rhetoric against the 
38 Ibid.; Seldes, pp. 100-3. 
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state. By October, the cabinet was bordering on crisis. On 27 October, the anniversary 
of the victory at Vittorio Veneto, 40,000 Fascists started toward Rome. TI1ey surrounded 
the city and captured the vital utilities and transportation arteries. The king thought that 
he was about to be deposed by thefascisri revolutionaries. lie feared a repeat of the 
French Revolution, and he knew he would receive little protection from his circle of 
friends and advisors. Even his cousin and mother were Fascist sympathizers, raising the 
specter of a potential overthrow of the crown from within the I louse of Savoy. 
Mussolini's representatives, however, promised the king that his throne was safe; their 
complaints were with parliament.39 
Facta suggested that the king declare a state of siege, but the king rejected it for 
fear of sparking a civil war. Instead, he distanced himself from Facta and told him that 
he would have to resign as prime minister. Jn a last ditch effort, the Liberal government 
offered a compromise to Mussolini: he and his Fascists would enter a new cabinet 
headed by Salandra. For a while, Mussolini considered it. Jn the end, however, he chose 
the more dramatic route. He told the king that he would only accept an off er to form his 
own government. Recognizing the encroaching mobs and the recent violence incited by 
Fascists in Genoa and other cities, the king relented. Mussolini arrived in Rome by train 
the next morning to take his scat as ii capo . .w 
J? Collier, pp. 17-20, 62. 
40 Ibid .• pp. 22, 28, 32. 
Chapter II: Italy in the Eyes of Americans 
Mussolini inspired curiosity and admiration throughout the world, but nowhere 
outside of his home country was he more popular than in the United States. For over a 
decade of his tenure, he was the darling of most of the American popular press. He won 
the hearts of thousands of the huddled masses ofltalian expatriates. He became a model 
for modem businessmen and was even appreciated by leading American politicians. His 
image was not untarnished, nor was this praise universal. On the whole, however, the 
Fascist dictator who hoped to lead his nation out from the shadow of the Great War saw 
his star rise the highest in the only Western nation to grow stronger from the war. 
The Immigration Invasion 
Most Americans did not take kindly to the influx of Italian immigrants in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. From 1870 to 1914, about four million Italians 
came to the United States, making Italy the second-largest donor of immigrants to the 
New World after Great Britain. The vast majority were poor peasants from southern Italy 
who came to America looking to escape poverty in their homeland and lured by the "land 
of opportunity" across the ocean. Their arrival created competing images within the 
minds of many Americans. There was first the "idea" of Italy: a romantic, historic, 
picturesque land, whose people lived a hearty, rustic life along the Mediterranean. This 
was the idyllic Italy that Americans longed to visit and idealized. It stood in sharp 
contrast to the reality of the boatloads ofltalians arriving every day at the dock, whom 
31 
32 
they saw as a poor, backwards, ignorant mass of humanity that would fall into corruption 
and crime at the first opportunity.41 
Italians tended to congregate in the major East Coast seaports - New York, 
Boston, Philadelphia - but they slowly spread across the nation from there. Knowing 
little English and eager to take any job, no matter how menial or how little it paid, Italian 
immigrants soon felt the same anger that had been directed toward their Irish brethren a 
generation earlier. Lower-class Americans hated Italians for taking their jobs away by 
offering to work for less, middle- and upper-class citizens lamented them as another 
invasion on American culture, and Protestants (the large majority of Americans) spurned 
them as a new wave of Papists. Their southern European heritage did them no favors. 
The dark hair and swarthy features (especially among southern Italians and Sicilians) 
made them stand out among their Anglo-Saxon neighbors. Their culture and customs, 
more festive and uproarious than the reserved Victorian ideals, was an affront to most 
Americans. As a result of the language barrier, the discrimination, and their meager 
earnings, Italian immigrants usually settled into run-down tenements and clustered near 
one another creating a "Little Italy'' in towns such as New York, Baltimore, and San 
Francisco. Some Italians turned to better-paying illegal activities, especially during 
Prohibition (since alcohol was a major ingredient in Italian culture). Many Americans 
suspected them of being anarchists, especially after the sensationalized Sacco and 
41 WalterT. K. Nugent, Crossings: The Great Transatlantic Migrations, 1870-1914 (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 95-8; Walter F. Willcox, ed., International Migrations, vol. 1 
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929), pp. 418-442; John P. Diggins, Mussolini and 
Fascism: The View from America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 6-13. Annual 
immigration from Italy to the United States peaked at nearly 300,000 in 1914 before plummeting during 
World War I. It rebounded in 1921 to over 220,000. Beginning in 1899, these statistics were subdivided 
into northern and southern Italians; from 1899 to 1921, southerners made up 84% ofltalian immigrants. 
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Vanzetti trial of 1921. This camt.-d the entire Italian-American population an undeser\'ed 
reputation as lazy, scc<ly, and dangerous as Americans' nativist fears ran unchecked. 
This f car and bigotry extended beyond the Italian-American population. In the 
early part of the twentieth century, there was a general concern growing among .. native .. 
Americans that the hordes of immigrants arriving each year would slowly but insidiously 
co-opt the United States and its government. In particular, many Americans felt that 
immigrants - Italian, Russian, Irish, or any other ethnicity - would never fully assimilate 
into American culture and would always divide their loyalties between their motherland 
and their new home. Some rook this a step farther, believing that immigrants were 
actively organizing to undermine the social, political, and racial fabric of the U.S. One 
alarmist aulhor for World's Work (who, ironically, was named Gino Spcran1..a), warned in 
a 1923 article that these immigrants "arc also using that [coherent political] power more 
and more for non-American if not un-American ends." To prove his poin~ he cited an 
example of an Italian politician pressuring Italian-Americans (through an Italian-
American publication) to vote for candidates in American elections that would work 
favorably with the new Fascist Italian govcmment on immigration issues. His point was 
clear - immigrants' loyalties would always be with their homelands, and they cannot be 
trusted to be faithful, patriotic Americans."2 
The performance of the Italian army in World War I and that oflralian politicians 
at Versailles made matters worse. Italian soldiers were viewed by many in the western 
world. including the Cmtcd States. as falling somewhere between weak and cowardly. 
•: Gmo Spcn:t7.i. Mlk lm:r.ir.uhOn Pent- lfor/J"J lforl.. l>i:-cc~ 19.?J. in Th(": RraJrr 0J 
{)1,r:<":1t. J.inuuy 19~.S. rP l•'~-' 
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The crushing defeat ofCaporetto overshadowed the later success of Vittorio Veneto. 
Prime Minster Orlando's demands at the peace table seemed petulant and greedy. Many 
Americans and members of the United States government bought into the theory that 
Italian nationalists, including Mussolini, had been promoting: that the socialists within 
Italy were undermining the war effort and were at the root of the failure at Caporetto. 
Designed to prevent Italy from following Russia down the path of Bolshevism, 
American-sponsored speakers, including then-Army Captain Fiorello LaGuardia, started 
a counter-propaganda campaign and made a series of rousing speeches to promote 
Wilsonian ideals of democracy and postwar peace. 43 The stain of Caporetto, however, 
was indelible. Although Americans revered Italy's culture and history, the view of a 
country with an inept army scrambling for the spoils of war at London and Versailles was 
never far from their minds. 
After Germany's surrender, postwar America was tired of war, tired of peace 
negotiations, and tired of grandiose proposals of world peace and international 
organizations. Americans wanted Warren G. Harding's promise of a "return to 
normalcy." It was Europe's war; let the Europeans sort out the mess. The failure of 
Wilsonianism led many to question the supposed benefits of democracy. They further 
questioned whether democracy was the best form of gove~ent for all nations. 
Suddenly, a new leader emerged in Rome in 1922 among the ashes of the crumbling 
Liberal government. To most Americans, Mussolini initially appeared to be Italy's 
43 Louis John Nigro, "Wilsonian Propaganda and Italian Politics during the First World War, 
1917-1919: Data and Hypotheses," in Proceedings of the 9'h Annual Conference of the American Italian 
Historical Association, The United States and Italy: The First Two Hundred Years, ed. Humbert S. Nelli 
(Staten Island, NY: American Italian Historical Association, 1977), pp. 64-67. 
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savior. They expected II Duce and his Partito Nazionale Fascista to straighten out the 
chaos of the Italian government and provide at least a little stability in Europe, even if 
they did not fully understand what Fascism was.44 
Exaltations came from those close to Mussolini and from those who never met 
him. They deified him as a self-made man and a modem Horatio Alger. He believed in 
order, business, and action. Most of all, he detested communism. He embodied 
everything that was good to Americans. Saturday Evening Post contributor and U.S. 
Ambassador to Rome Richard Washburn Child called him "the greatest figure of this 
sphere and time." Charles M. Bakewell of Yale University commented that "he is a sort 
of Italian [Theodore] Roosevelt," an often-made comparison due to his personality, his 
ruggedness, and his constant political motion.45 Perhaps most important, Mussolini was 
different than any other head of state, and he appeared to be the exact opposite of his 
recent predecessors. He was decisive, stem, unwavering. He was a leader, and 
Americans love a leader. 
The Marketing of Mussolini 
Mussolini realized the value of good press abroad. He was, after all, a career 
journalist himself and had true journalistic talent. For Mussolini, however, the concept of 
44 Laylon Wayne Jordan, "The American Image of Mussolini: Public Opinion and the Press in 
Italian-American Relations 1922-1930" (Thesis, College of William and Mary, 1967), p. l O; John P. 
Diggins, "Flirtation with Fascism: American Pragmatic Liberals and Mussolini's Italy," The American 
Historical Review 71, no. 2 ( 1966), pp. 490-1; Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 22-23. 
45 Foreword to Benito Mussolini, My Autobiography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928), 
p. xix; Saturday Review of Literature, 4 July 1925, p. 873: quoted in Jordan, "The American Image of 
Mussolini," p. 66. 
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"journalism" never equated to a dispassionate report of facts, but rather a mechanism by 
which to persuade others through sensationalism and reducing issues to simple black and 
white terms. As a political leader, he transferred his talents into his speeches, 
propaganda, and relations with the press and the people he met at home and abroad.46 
Mussolini was a gregarious character, but he carefully crafted his public image 
and the events and speeches that went into it. Depending on the nature of a speech, his 
voice could be calm and measured or booming with raw emotion; he selected the tone to 
match the spirit of his oratory. He wrestled with his pct lion cub. He harvested wheat 
alongside peasants, stripped to his waist, exuding strength and virility to the running 
newsreel cameras. He played his violin in tie and tails and played with his children at 
home. He drove fast cars, flew airplanes, and rode horses. Mussolini knew how to create 
a spectacle to get into the news. Whether it was his arrival by speedboat to the Locamo 
conference, the squadron of Italian planes he sent to fly over Chicago, or one of the 
massive parades with call-and-answer exchanges with throngs of Italians, II Duce knew 
how to make the front page. In cultivating his cult of personality, he was helped by 
Giovanni Starace, who was appointed secretary of the PNF in 1931. Starace was a very 
dubious character in his own right, but he knew how to make the most of a public event. 
He helped to build a myth of II Duce in Italy and abroad by encouraging the wearing of 
uniforms by government officials (at one point, there were up to twenty uniforms for 
ol6 Alan Cassels, Mussolini ·s Ear~r Diplomacy (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 
p. 194. 
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different occasions) and by starting the cry of "Viva ii Duce!" by the people at rallies and 
parades, building the impression that all ofltaly was wholly behind their leader.47 
Mussolini also knew how to manipulate the press corps. Margherita Sarfatti, 
Mussolini's biographer during his early political years, noted that "the journalist in 
Mussolini comes out in most of his public utterances." His major speeches contained the 
equivalent of a modem "sound bite" - that phrase or sentence that jumps out to a reporter 
as tomorrow's headline. He knew how to use "press leaks," news conferences, and all of 
the other tricks of the trade because he had been on the other side for so many years. He 
gave emphatic, militaristic names for his domestic initiatives: the "Battle of Wheat," the 
"Battle of the Lira," the "Battle of the Birthrate." These sobriquets were used in part to 
motivate the Italian populace, but also to gain headlines and give the impression of a 
dynamic political agenda, even when it was really just a catchy phrase to mask a 
confused or non-existent policy. Mussolini, through the Stefani agency, always tried to 
put Italian concerns and actions in the best light to the rest of the world, even when his 
bluster was at his greatest. At times, this meant saying one thing publicly while fully 
intending to do another. During the temporary occupation of Corfu in 1923, sparked by 
the murder of Italian agents on a Greco-Albanian boundary commission, Mussolini 
publicly asserted his intention to evacuate the Greek island once the Greeks had paid the 
demanded indemnity. In fact, he notified his subordinates there of his plans to stay in 
Corfu much longer. In this case and some others, this duplicity worked in the Duce's 
47 Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 55-6; Edwin P. Hoyt. Mussolini's Empire: The Rise and 
Fall of the Fascist Vision (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1994), p. 114; Martin Kitchen, Europe 
Between the Wars (London: Longman, 1988), p. 154. 
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fa\'or. When his bid to annex Corfu failed. he was ;ible to fall back on his public 
stalcmcnt and cl;iim th:u the occupalion was a success while withdrawing llali;m troops.u 
His ~lest marketing WC3pon w;is lhe inlavicw. Mussolini granted counllc:ss 
inlerviews to n;poncrs. writers, statc:smcn. 3Jl\l public nnd business figures from 3f0und 
lhe globe. Atlcr being snubbed by his counrcrp;uu ;al loc;uno, he no longer lr.t\·c:Jcd 
;ibroad. bur he de..-clopcd a world follo\i,·ing th;it brought the imponmt :md lowly to him. 
Among them were some of the bcst·knmm Amcricms. including news m:1(.t113tc Willi;am 
Randolph HC31'St. New York Gtwcmor Al Smith. b;mkcr TilOnt.3.S f..301on1. U.S. Anny 
Colonel Frank Knox. and Archbishop of Boslon W1lli;am C:irdinnl O'Connell. TilOm.3.S 
Edison c.-illed him lhc grc.-ilest genius of modem limes nflcr n mcciing "·ith him. 
Between 1922 and 1929, Mu~lini granlcd 60,000 ;audiences 10 people from all lC\·cls of 
society. and he replied to almost C\'Cf)unc who \HOie him. (In return. he rccct\'ed up ro 
30,000 Christmas canJs each year :ii the height of his popul.arit)'.) For most people. a 
visit with the Duce wa.s :i rapturous experience. ff is presence ;ind vi~~or were imposing. 
Alexander Kirk. ch:ui:c d'affazres of lhc Amcricm crnb;usy. accompamed Mui.~lini on n 
\'isit to oonhcm llaly ... The ouL\tmdmg fc:.Jturc of the \'isit;• Kirk noted. ~-3.S the 
sincerity of the popular acclaim which greeted hrm wherever he wcnl and "hrch h;id 
crc.itcd rhc gcncr.il impr~sion th.11 fascism 3Jl\l its leader h;ivc tod.ly :i firma hold on lhc 
llah:m people th.m ever before.·· E'en tunkned Jounl.lhsts succumbed 10 hrs charm -
which. of course. \1..1.<t cuclly \'tu: he w.mrat "Ir 1s \"CT)" d1fficulr;· noted \\TllCT John 
&t '.\b:r:?-.c:;!.J S11fa~:1. Ti-:r I ;'r cl ft.f-,;:,) \f:.iur.':-:1. r::a:::1 f tt»!anx \1ih-1tr '~" 'iOfl forn'l 
A S:Cttn C(l:r:pz~r. l<J: \I ... .-,r •. f>;;.;;.::::1. \f:..1.1£'.';<:: .:-:.! F.:.101.-.. r ~I>. );1:.:hm:. r '" i. Cut.ell. 
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Gunther, .. for the average correspondent to write unfavorably about a busy and important 
man who has just donated him a friendly hour of conversation. '"'9 
Mussolini walked a fine line during the early part of his dictatorship between 
giving access to the press and censoring it. Afier becoming prime minister, he ordered 
that journalists be given free use of telegraph and telephone lines. He made sure that 
foreign journalists had the finest working facilities, and he made himself readily 
accessible for interviews and comments. The Stefani news agency, which was controlled 
by the PNF, made contracts 10 provide information to many of the world's news 
organizations, including the Associated Press. This made news gathering about Mussolini 
and the Fascist party easy, but not necessarily objective. Not only did Mussolini the 
former edilor know how to manipulate a young reporter, but he also knew that a private 
interview with II Duce was a nattering invitation and a career opportunity that would 
cause the reporter to be more favorable and less objective. Negative stories would 
quickly make a foreign reporter unwelcome by the PNF. Chicago Tribune reporter 
George Seldes was the center of the most infamous case and was expelled from Italy aficr 
smuggling out stories implicating Mussolini in the murder of Giacomo Mattcotti, a 
Socialisl leader who was found murdered days afier delivering a stinging tirade against II 
Duce's abuses of power. TI1is subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) censorship led to a 
press corps that oficn was not critical of Mussolini, even iftheir editors at home were.~ 
0 Dig.gin,~. ,\fuJrn/m1 ar.d Fauum, p. 48; lfo)1, pp. 116-22; John Gunther, ··~tussohm." /larpa'1 
Monthly, Fcbn.ury 1936, p. 302. 
"°Diggins, ,\fuuolm1 and Faicum. pp. 4 l ..4i. 
40 
In addition to these indirect marketing ploys, Mussolini concocted plans for more 
direct propaganda targeting the United States. One instrument was the policy speech. 
Italy's dictator peppered many of his speeches with references to the United States. Most 
of them were quick, passing comments, but even those were geared toward maintaining 
good relations with the powerful potential ally across the water. At the same time, the 
Duce usually slipped in a phrase or a sentence concerning what he expected the U. S. to 
offer back to Italy. This began even before his March on Rome. In a speech in Milan in 
April 1918, Mussolini paid homage to the American intervention in World War I: 
As Italy discovered America, so America and the rest of the New World must discover Italy, not 
only in the great towns, pulsating with life and humming in industry, but also in the country, 
where the humble laborers wait with quiet resignation for the dawn of a victorious and just peace 
to appear on the horizon.51 
After welcoming the American troops to Europe earlier in his speech, Mussolini makes it 
clear that he demands respect for Italy and its workers from the United States, as well as a 
share in the spoils of war. A later speech, given soon after becoming prime minister, 
contained a similar veiled expectation and was typical of remarks he would include in 
speeches to come. "Our relations with the United States are very good," Mussolini told 
his audience, "and I shall make it my care to see that they are improved, especially as 
regards a close economic cooperation."52 The new Duce was already thinking about 
renegotiating Italy's war loans and building more trade with the wealthy United States. 
In 1923, Mussolini had a golden opportunity to address the American government 
and, through the press coverage, its people when the Italo-American Association held a 
51 Benito Mussolini, Mussolini as Revealed in His Political Speeches 1914-1923 (New York: 
Howard Fertig, 1976), pp. 49-50. 
52 Ibid., p. 214. 
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banquet in Rome to honor American Amb.llwor Ricturd Washburn Child. Dy lfml 
time. Child had been convened to a true belu;,·a in Mus.solini's expertise n.s :i sl:ltesmnn 
and ci,·ic lcadcr and in Fascism as an effccti\·c politic.JI ;dtcm:iti\·c. Child spoke first. 
congr:uulating Mussolini on his ascension 10 po'.l.CT :ind for "giving lo nil mnnkind nn 
example of courageous national organiration founded upon the disciplined rc:sponsibility 
of the individual to the State, upon the :ihandonmrnt of false hope in feeble doctrines. nnd 
upon appeal lo lhe full vigorous strength of the human qimt.'' Ould continuc:d his 
effusive oratory, saying the world nccdc:d fewer "'thrones nnd dteltnS, bul bcucr men to 
carry than out," before extolling Mu..~sohni ;is the uJc.Jl man for this mu.-sion.H 
Aflcr such obsequiousness (cspcci:illy conmJatnf! 1>u1 lhc dinner wu 10 honor 
Child, not ~fus.solini), one might thi.nk 1h;it ~fu~\Ollm would humbly 1hmk the 
Ambassador, compliment him on his firm~~ of the true mcanmg of Fascist 
government, and reiterate Italy's brothahood with Ammc.J" In fact, he did do nll of this. 
stating his conviction in common beliefs ;ind :attitudes mlong lt.:ahms nnd Amaic..ms, 
reaffirming his desire for strong politic.JI nnd ccooom1c n:l.lt1ons with the U.S., nnd 
lauding AmcriQJ\S who. without the wcight of ccntunc:s of history lo hold them b.1d:. 
''march today in the v;ingu.m.I of human pro~cu ·· Bui ~fuuolmi did not miu lhis 
oppor1unity for a c.aJJ 10 ac110n. In .:almost the s..unc b:c.uh an "h1ch he comphmcnled 
Amhlls.ador Child. the pnmc minister c..illcJ for lhc r-cmo\ :al of h.1nh 1mm1gr~111on 
rc:stnctions for llahans wishing to come to lhc Cmrcd Sr.-.1c.s md pul m 3 plug for the 
ros.s1h1h11c.s .1\.111.lhk for 10\C.Str.lcnl o( Amcnc.tn C.lf'll.ll m 11.111.m lfl(hulncs, Mu~'°hni 
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had the ears of the ambassador and the newsmen; this was his chance to make his voice 
heard across the ocean. 54 
The relationship between Ambassador Child and II Duce was a crucial conduit for 
crafting Mussolini's image in the minds of Americans, and he used it well. Just before 
attending a Fascist congress in Naples, in late October 1922, just days before his 
assumption of power, Mussolini called Child at the U.S. Embassy to inquire about the 
attitude of the American public toward thefascisti. Soon after the March on Rome, he 
called on Child again to express his desire to work with the United States and promised to 
end the incessant talk of intrigue and overlapping European alliances that fonned the 
powder keg of pre-World War I Europe. Recognizing that he was already on good tenns 
with Child (who maintained a high opinion of him throughout his reign), Mussolini also 
asked Child specifically to infonn the American press of the premier's friendship toward 
America and belief in common ground and goals between the two nations. He would 
continue to make similar requests of Child, including the publicizing of Mussolini's 
statements promising to meet all loan obligations to the U. S., to boost American public 
opinion concerning the Fascist government and to negotiate good business and loan 
agreements (which would include a sweetheart restructuring of Italy's war loans). What 
is most interesting, however, is how Mussolini, ever the journalist, seized on a key, 
respected American official with tics to both the U.S. government and media and used 
that relationship to win the hearts and minds of the most powerful nation at the time.55 
}' Ibid., pp. 340-2. 
ss Louis Aldo DeSanti, "United States Relations with Iuly under ~lu.ssolini, 1922-1941," (Ph.D. 
diss, Columbia Uni\·cr5ity, 1951 ), pp. 36, 42-8, 83-98. 
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As Mussolini's fame sprC3d :md gn:\''• he continued to market himself. bul he also 
became more markelable. Biographies. au1hori1ed and un.1uthori1Cd, appeared in halinn 
and American bookstores. lllOSC \\Tittcn by lufotn.'> were univers.11ly posili\·c. 
prcdiclablc considering lhc censorship lh.lt :ibounded and his domin;mt rule. Mussolini 
endorsed one by Margherita Sarfatti by writing the preface.~.(, B10!,"Phics published in 
the U.S. were more varied. George Seldcs's pscudo·hiogr.iphy. Smu/1HI Car.sar, wus 
very critical of Mussolini and his Fascist regime, illumin.:aling the more \·1olcnt clements 
of the movement. It was so inflammatory :md negall\'C that pubhshcn were cxtn:mcly 
reluctant to publish the work by the Chi('tJf.:O Tnhune reporter. (II would not be puhlisJu:d 
until 1936, aflcr Mussolini invaded Ethiopia and public opinion h.Jd turned .:ag;ainst him.) 
Others were more positive, including Emil Ludwig's Ta/J.s \\llh .\frurn/tnr.)' 
Ullimardy, Mussolini rook control of this mn of his m.ukctmr. app.u;irus by 
publishing his autobiography (although most of the 3CtU.1l wnllO!! fell to his brother. 
Arnaldo). It was C\"c:ntually relea.~ as a book, but It was origuully puhhrJlt'll in serial 
fomt in the popular Sarurda)' faY."Tttnf.: /'011 map.1jnc. Tius was not a r;an<lom C\"cnl; 
during an interview by /'011 writer Is..~ ~brcos.son. Mus.sohm d1S('.o\·cta1 jtut how luge 
an audience the magvine had. ··ue wa.s 1mmcnscly infert::lited m rhc circul:won of the 
Sarurday Eh·n1n1: Post.'' \\TOie ~brco"°n in his .u11clc. ··uc knew lhc wcdJy. of 
"Pit' fa~<.' 10 '.\f.tr,:bn1u S..Cfa::1. T'J:r l..1fr "f ffr..,,:,1 .lf,.u,•!:0:1 (St"* Y<>tl ftt"•~n:l A S!ol~ 
lO~l:i: ... l')]~I. rr CJ.10 In It M:.;u«'t::-:1 ~~C'\!\ !~JI .. Tll:..~;. l~.;.1 t::r.'l~d! I\ .a ra::-:fol (~t' hi: r..iu 
C"nfutc' .u .a rut-k f"1U'O. l::.J ~Up t~.al ~ <~e~nt\ i"'"f~~ ,.n~m;. ah-w.;1 t::~ .a H:cm::;. hi of t:Jm1hty, 
rel hu r::>.::l f'C'(t>fif m dt'".a!:~r. .. 1:~ 1"'r.::r...ab:.i .a!'.l;i bi .a~~~"'f.1l;h:,· t:.:r.F.t"\l n1.~·•11c 
•. P:;:r.:m. t(:..ll<';';1';f .:o:.! F.:.t<:.IW., rr ~ .... ~? Scir .ahn (~~·~ S.CJ.!.n . . '>.r .. <!'J.11 C.;n.:, f~C"A' 
Y NL fb~t lr.f (l:nl.~'l. fQ1 <I l~ f·r.;:! ft.)(!.,,.1;.. f,;Il_r .. ,:iii U .. 1.i.o/;<':1, tUl".:l hk?l .l:')f C'cdu P.auJ 
On~loon Ci t\l~m!.: t·n .. 1.'l. IQ_;~I 
course, but he had no idea of irs far-reaching power. TI1is derail touched the joumalist 
and publisher in him."ss 
Amb3.SS3dor Child, who translated the tome into English, wrote a sycophantic 
foreword that compan.-d II Duct." to Napoleon, Joan of Arc, and Leo Tolstoy, and 
described him as above petty politics and selfish economic gain. TI1c book then lakes the 
reader through Mussolini's childhood, his invoh·cmcnl in lhc army in World War J 
(which he over-romanticizes) and the socialist moven1ent, his lum to Fascism, and his 
plans for Italy's future. Most of his book is ajustific.ition for his coup and his party's 
actions through 1928, lhe year of its publication, and a chance ro pul his O\VO spin on his 
life. He claims that the Liberal democracy was little more lhan a bloalcd bureaucracy 
that did nothing for the Italian people. When he \\'JS in\·itcd ro fonn a govcmmctll by lhc 
king. Mussolini writes, he remained magnanimous and chose not to declare an absolulc 
dictalorship or order reprisals against his opposirion, although he could ha\·c.''' 
Early in the book, Mussolini rums his auention lo his American audicncc. ···Ille 
American nation is a crcalive nalion .... I admire lhe discipline of lhe American people 
and their sense of org.ani1..ation. Amcric3. a land harboring so many of our cmigranls, slill 
calls to the spirit of new youth." Later. he responds to his critics. Concerning Mallcolli, 
he asserts that the whole incidcnl was cxag,gcratcd hy a disgruntled opposition th.11 was 
looking to pin any scandal on him. He then provides a primer on FJ...scism, ir.s cffccrs on 
Italy and its people, and his pcr5{)n.1l beliefs on politics, social order. and pmg.rcs.s: 
p. 141. 
I must then conclude that a strong policy has yielded really tangible results .... A new sense of 
justice, of serious purpose, ofturmony and concord guides now rhc destinies ofall rhc peoples 
and classes of Italy. There arc neither vexations nor violence, but there is exaltation of whar is 
good and exaltation oflhe virtue of heroism. 
Before beginning the final portion of his book, which lays out his agenda for 
improvements for the working class citizens of Italy, Mussolini sums up his personal 
doctrine, saying, "He who looks back over his shoulder toward those who lag and those 
who lie is a waster. ... "60 As with all of his other efforts, Mussolini's autobiography and 
its initial publication in one of the most widely read magazines in the United States was 
calculated to produce a favorable image of the dictator among Americans. He hoped to 
build popular support throughout the U. S. for the Fascist regime, but also to gain 
political and economic support from American government and business leaders. 
One group that remained steadfastly supportive of Mussolini and his aspirations 
was the Italian-American community. Centered in New York and other cities of the 
eastern seaboard, this sizeable and growing immigrant group became the target and the 
distributor of much of the Fascist propaganda emanating from Italy. Mussolini's appeal 
to Italian-Americans went far beyond simple national identity. Italian immigrants had 
never been fully accepted by the United States; many Italian immigrants, even those 
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whose families had been in the United States for a generation or two, felt like strangers in 
the New World. Mussolini's rise to power instilled in them a new sense of pride. He 
appealed to their Old World traditions, especially as the second generation that was born 
in the United States seemed to be rebelling against those traditions. Mussolini, for his 
part, attempted to exploit their disillusionment with the American dream and their 
~Ibid., pp. 26, 2 J 9.25. 2.t0-3. 
familial bond to their motherland by appealing to them to remember their homeland and 
to display the strength and virtue of the Italian people while in America.61 
Fascist tendencies arose in Italian-Americans even before the March on Rome. 
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The humiliation of Versailles was an especially poignant theme to these immigrants, who 
were experiencing their own personal humiliation. Although Mussolini had little to do 
with the initial rise of Fascism among Italian-Americans, he wanted to cultivate it and 
exploit it as a tool to export Fascist ideals to the United States and the world. His 
government was split over this idea. Some, including Ambassador to the United States 
Gelasio Caetani, feared that it would anger the U. S. government and that Italian-
Americans would face even more discrimination from American citizens and the press, 
especially the anti-Fascist papers of the Hearst organization. Others salivated at this 
opportunity. By 1923, nearly forty Fasci organizations existed in North America, some 
of which employed the same violent methods of the Blackshirts in Italy. By taking 
advantage of the already pro-Fascist movement in the immigrant community, the PNF 
could further legitimize and strengthen its position, but early attempts to assemble a 
cohesive American wing of Fascism were disorganized and ineffective.62 
Mussolini himself was duplicitous with his policy: he publicly denied any 
connection between the PNF and the American Fasci, but secretly he made plans to 
organize these groups and use them as a propaganda tool. He sent Count Ignazio Thaon 
61 Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 78-80; Vittorio DeFiori, Mussolini: the Man of Destiny 
(New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1928), pp. 208-9. 
62 Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 86-87; Alan Cassels, "Fascism for Export: Italy and the 
United States in the Twenties," The American Historical Review 69, no. 3 (1964): pp. 707-9. See also 
Cassels, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy, pp. 196-8. 
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di Revel to the United States to consolidate these different clubs into the Fascist League 
of North America (FLNA). The U. S. government initially was divided on its opinion of 
the Fasci and the FLNA. While some were sympathetic to their ideals, their denunciation 
of Bolshevism, and their First Amendment rights, others were wary of a possible "nation 
within a nation." Soon, these arguments became academic as the court of public opinion 
rendered its decision. Negative press, particularly by Harper's Weekly, accompanied the 
rise of the FLNA. A Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations began an 
investigation into the subversive behavior of the Fasci groups. Much of the testimony 
was false or exaggerated, but the investigation coupled with the journalistic attacks killed 
the FLNA, which disbanded in 1929.63 This ended the PNF's direct intervention in the 
U. S., but there was another tool at their disposal: the Italian-American press. 
Italian-American newspapers became the major outlets for Fascist propaganda. 
Most were written in Italian to appeal to immigrants. The Stefani news agency directly 
supplied information to these papers and helped explain Fascism to Italian-Americans at 
the beginning of Mussolini's reign. Ever cognizant of his public image, Mussolini did 
not want a consolidation of these papers; instead, he relished the competition among them 
as each paper tried to outdo the others in their fawning praise of// Duce.64 
The PNF also moved into radio by sending broadcasts across the Atlantic into 
major U. S. cities. In many ways, this was an even more powerful instrument than the 
press: it could be understood by illiterate immigrants, and it provided them another 
63 Cassels, "Fascism for Export: Italy and the United States in the Twenties," pp. 709-11; Diggins, 
Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 89-90. 
M Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 81-5. 
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reminder of their eternal relation to the country of their birth. Until the mid-1930s, both 
the creators and distributors of this propaganda took great pains to avoid appearing anti-
American. Rather, they concentrated on drawing parallels between the ambitions, past 
and present, ofltaly and the United States. They compared Italy's territorial ambitions to 
Manifest Destiny and Mussolini's bid to rejuvenate the Italian economy to Franklin 
Roosevelt's New Deal.65 Even during the Ethiopian conflict, Italian-Americans bought 
into these comparisons and felt great pride that their homeland was on its way to 
becoming in the Mediterranean what the U. S. was in the Americas. 
Was Mussolini successful? There is little doubt that his wily charm manipulated 
more than a few foreign reporters into adding a more adulatory spin to their articles. His 
speeches directed toward Americans wooed some citizens and a few diplomats. His 
autobiography and other endorsed biographies certainly put him in a very favorable light. 
His attempts to export Fascism through Italian-American communities were much less 
successful and could have cost him dearly in the area of public relations had he not 
divorced himself from that process quickly. Ultimately, Mussolini's direct marketing 
efforts ended in mixed results, but his indirect maneuvers with American reporters 
showed more promise. The old journalist knew the power of the press, and perhaps 
nowhere else did it carry as much influence as in the United States. 
65 Ibid., pp. 96-9. 
49 
Chapter III: ll Duce in American Magazines 
The 1920s and 1930s were the heyday for magazines in the United States. Radio 
was still in its infancy - the first regular programming began in 1920, and the first 
national network did not exist until 1927. Television was little more than a pipe dream. 
Print still dominated American media. Newspapers delivered the general daily news, 
some more objectively than others, and with a few notable exceptions, their focus was 
mostly local in nature with a few national and international wire stories added to the front 
page. Magazines, on the other hand, had national subscriptions. Some were general 
interest news magazines, similar to newspapers, while some were the equivalent of 
modem cable television networks, each with its own niche market and specific offering to 
its subscribers. There were entertainment and society magazines, sports periodicals, 
literary journals, business publications, and editorial and compilation weekly and 
monthly magazines. The industry would soon be ravaged by competition from radio and 
television, but during the Roaring '20s and the early years of the Depression, magazines 
held staunchly, if tenuously, to their lofty lair in the realm of American media. 
With a proliferation of national publications of both broad and specific interest, it 
is no surprise that it is difficult to glean a consistent, general opinion of American 
magazines toward Benito Mussolini. By clustering magazines into groups of common 
type and audience, it becomes easier to see patterns within each group. The bifurcation 
of this medium into popular magazines and high-brow journals is a clear and helpful 
method in unearthing their respective views of fl Duce. The popular magazines tended to 
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appeal more to the general public and had a readership that included people from all 
walks oflife, but especially middle-class Americans. Magazines like Time, The Outlook, 
Reader's Digest, and The Saturday Evening Post published a variety of general interest 
articles, editorials, and synopses of articles and quotes from other sources, including 
newspapers. The high-brow journals had a more elite readership - mostly upper-class, 
college-educated Americans - and some had a more limited scope. Journals such as 
Atlantic Monthly and Century Illustrated were primarily literary magazines that included 
opinion pieces on current events. Others, including New Republic, reported on broad 
current events, but did so with an eye toward their upper-crust audience. Many business 
magazines like Fortune and Barron's can also be included among these high-brow 
journals, as their core market was wealthy businessmen and industrialists. 
Most American magazines of the 1920s were attracted to Mussolini, whether they 
liked him or not. Mussolini was a phenomenon - a new kind of political leader in a new 
Europe. One could agree with or decry his methods and rhetorical bluster, but they made 
news and attracted eyeballs, and magazines rushed to capture as many eyeballs as they 
could. As a result, Mussolini became the most widely covered foreign leader of his time. 
A crude search of the Time magazine archives for the last names of prominent 
contemporary statesmen provides some clues into his media appeal. Between 1923 (the 
year Time began publication) and 1935, Mussolini is mentioned in some way in 1,186 
articles. During the same period, Josef Stalin appears in only 335 articles, Lenin in 245, 
and Hitler in 587. Admittedly, the dates for these leaders do not line up perfectly with 
Mussolini's tenure. However, even after restricting the search to 1932-1935-just after 
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Hitler's political ascendancy and a decade afler Mussolini's - JI Duce is still competitive 
with Der Fiilirer, losing out 522-415. As for the two British prime ministers of the 
period, Stanley Baldwin and James Ramsay MacDonald, their combined cache resulted 
in a mere 760 articles, still far short of Mussolini's tally.66 Time also pictured// Duce on 
its cover eight times between 1923 and 1943 (although he was never named their "Man 
of the Year," a snub which always angered him).67 
The trend is far from universal, but on the whole, until the Ethiopian invasion in 
October 1935, the popular American magazines held a much more positive opinion on 
Benito Mussolini than the elite journals. There was the occasional castigating article 
afler certain notable events, such as the Mattcotti murder or the Corfu invasion, but for 
the most part, the magazines with the widest circulation printed some of the most 
flattering pieces on the Italian dictator. Their more elite counterparts, on the other hand, 
held markedly different views. Many of them took every opportunity to sound the alann 
on the menace in Rome and printed few articles in his defense. These journals, however, 
did not fully reflect the mainstream of American views, nor did they have the circulation 
to disseminate their views widely throughout American society and to make a radical 
change in public opinion on Mussolini. 
With these classificarions in mind, it must be said that there were notable 
dissenters in each camp. Two popular compilation periodicals, n1c Reader's Dixc.st and 
The Literary Digest, were especially negative toward ~fossolini. They also had a unique 
f<'> Archive search conducted at 1.1'"'w.11mc.com on 9 Augmt 2005. 
67 Diggins, .\fusso!tm a11d Fascum. p 26. 
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influence on American opinion. First, they enjoyed a wide audience. Second, through 
the editing and selections of articles by their editors (and in the case of the latter, some 
editorial comment), the magazines could manipulate quotes from newspapers (in the case 
of The Literary Digest) or magazines (The Reader's Digest) to construct an overall 
impression of a topic based on seemingly "expert" and "objective" sources. In other 
words, these organs let others do the talking for them, but they were able to choose which 
others did the talking and make sure that they said the right things. 
Meanwhile, business magazines, which can be classified among the high-brow 
journals due to their more limited and elite readership, almost universally affirmed the 
Fascist regime and its revitalization ofltaly. In addition, these different types of 
publications did not cause a polarization of opinions about Mussolini between the more 
educated upper class and the "common folk." This was due in part to the schism among 
American intellectuals and academicians concerning JI Duce. For each respected 
professor or philosopher who was ready to throw roses at Italy's salvation, there was 
another ready to throw stones at the Latin Satan. 
Just as it is difficult to make generalizations based on the mission of individual 
magazines, it is also misleading to say that American media outlets had similar reactions 
to events in Fascist Italy and Mussolini's actions. Nevertheless, one can still show that 
many magazines in the U. S. did share common sentiments. At times, the type of 
response corresponded to the type of magazine (popular, elite, or business). At other 
times, those boundaries blurred. Mussolini's rise to power was an encouraging sign in 
most comers of the American media, although some were more skeptical. The Corfu and 
Matteotti affairs inspired not only condemnation, but also apologists in some popular 
magazines (often through a rebuttal to a negative article). The economic revival of the 
late 1920s was hailed as a new type of renaissance by all but the staunchest opponents. 
Mussolini's peace overtures and mediations of the early 1930s elicited praise from even 
the most critical high-brow journals. And finally, regardless of their opinions before 
1935, nearly every American magazine turned against Mussolini after his invasion of 
Ethiopia. 
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This thesis examines the opinions and views of major national American 
magazines toward Mussolini, as well as his reactions to them, based on chronology and 
major events. A similar study based on publication type would also be valid; both have 
inherent organizational advantages, and both have complications. This study is limited to 
major national periodicals, using a representative sampling of publications from the time. 
It does not delve into regional publications, trade magazines, periodicals targeted toward 
immigrants (and there was a substantial Italian-American press), or other publications 
with a more a limited scope; doing so would far exceed the space allotted for this thesis. 
Similarly, this study does not include religious magazines. Although many of these 
magazines, especially those for Catholic readers, had much to say on Mussolini, the 
nature of the publications and their smaller readership make them unsuitable for this 
examination. Indeed, one could easily write a separate thesis on the different and 
complex opinions of American Catholic publications and the Roman Catholic Church in 
the United States toward Mussolini and their impact on American citizens. These are all 
intriguing areas of study, but ones that will be left to other historians. 
54 
Regardless of how one reviews American magazines in the 1920s and 1930s, one 
must always remember that, especially with Mussolini, these articles did not appear in a 
vacuum. Benito Mussolini, always a journalist at heart, manipulated his image and the 
media representatives (Italian and foreign) who reported on it to create a desired effect. 
At times, he was more concerned about the persona he portrayed at home to Italians. 
Sometimes, he directed his energies and media savvy abroad. The important point is that 
the interaction between the reporter and the subject, while always influential in 
journalism, was certainly more pronounced when dealing with II Duce. 
Initial Reactions to the March on Rome 
Americans may have disagreed on Mussolini's rhetoric, braggadocio, and heavy-
handed methods, but most agreed that Italy before Mussolini (and much of the rest of 
Europe, as well) was a cesspool of corruption and laziness. After the March on Rome, 
Italy seemed to change overnight. Suddenly, the Fascists and Mussolini in particular 
appeared to be forcing the whole ofltaly to follow an American-style work ethic. 
Americans and the press noticed the change. Although there were some negative side 
effects, most Americans were not educated enough in foreign affairs or the suppression of 
civil rights to understand fully what was happening in Italy. Rather, it was a romantic, 
historic nation that seemed to be crumbling after the Great War until a new, young, and 
dynamic leader arrived, promising to put its citizens to work, squash the communist 
menace pervading Europe, and make Italy great again. That is the image that many 
general interest magazines exploited, and fl Duce did his best to perpetuate it. 
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The Fascist coup of 1922 initially inspired a hopeful, albeit sometimes cautious, 
optimism among many popular periodicals. The most popular theme in the American 
media during the first years of Mussolini's reign was the pragmatic one: his methods 
may be a bit unsavory, but he gets the job done, and it is hard to argue with results. "By 
whatever methods, legal or illegal, it may have been brought about, in Italy today there is 
order and peace, and in Rome there is a Government of force, discipline and action," 
admitted Current History. "[Mussolini] belongs more to the Rome of the Caesars than to 
the Rome of the Giolittis." There was a general feeling that Italy was in a desperate 
situation that required desperate measures and new leadership, and Mussolini fit that 
mold. "The Fascisti came to the rescue, to restore law and order. ... Fascismo gradually 
undermined the reign of terror which the Extremists had succeeded in establishing."68 
Many writers and editors defended Mussolini's early actions against accusations 
of tyranny. Collier's frequently apologized for Mussolini's dictatorial methods and even 
agreed with them at times. The weekly offered that Mussolini "often acts wisely" and 
had taken drastic measures in large part to ward off a communist takeover. Editor 
William L. Chenery admired his ability to take a stand and spark necessary action in 
Italy, writing that "[Mussolini] can compel his followers to adopt measures sensible but 
too unpleasant to be voluntarily accepted." Others viewed Italy's rapid progress under 
Mussolini as an obvious refutation of the charges of brutal tyranny. "I have lived in Italy 
at different times for over twenty years," wrote Dr. A. L. Frothingham for Current 
68 Jordan, "America's Mussolini: The United States and Italy 1919-36" (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Virginia, 1972), pp. 42-4, 88-9; Louis D. Kornfield, "Benito Mussolini- Italy's Man of Destiny," Current 
History, January 1923, p. 574; Joseph Collins, "Italy's Bloodless Revolution," The North American Review, 
in The Reader's Digest, January 1923, p. 646. 
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History, "and I may be believed when I say that the Italian people, as a whole, have not 
been so happy, so light-hearted, so confident, so hard-working as they are now .... 
Mussolini is the one savior of their liberties, the one reorganizer of their present, the one 
guarantor of their future." Reports of victorious rallies by over 100,000 Italians crowding 
into plazas around Italy to hear Mussolini speak, either in person or by radio, furthered 
the notion of Mussolini as an enlightened and benevolent dictator.69 
The Saturday Evening Post, one of the most popular American magazines, was a 
quick and outspoken convert to the Mussolini phenomenon. In serial articles by Kenneth 
Roberts and Ambassador Child, the Post described the evolution (and necessity) of 
Fascism in Italy and Mussolini's March on Rome in vivid detail. These articles reiterated 
common themes from other periodicals: the feeble Liberal government was drowning 
under staggering deficits, a crumbling infrastructure, warfare between capitalists and 
unions, and rampant corruption. Mussolini assumed the grim task of rebuilding and 
reenergizing Italy. He swept away the excess and corruption; sped up the railroads, the 
telegraphs, and the postal service; harnessed the spirit ofthefascisti while maintaining 
control of them, and served notice throughout the world "that a nation doesn't have to 
endure the demagoguery that is based on lies and stupidity and perversity .... "70 
69 
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Most American business leaders and business magazines welcomed II Duce with 
open arms. After visiting Italy in late 1923, Lewis E. Pierson. president of the 
Merchants' Association of New York, did not cquiv~te in his adoration. ··under the 
superb leadership of that truly great man. Mussolini. the Fascisti have revived the flame 
of Italy's aspirations." The Joumal of Commerce was confident in Mussolini's abili1y 10 
reorganize Italy's finances and to reduce its deficit. Within n few months, other business 
publications (as well as some popular ones) noted specifics of this rcvitnli1.ation, nnd their 
praise went beyond the balance sheet. ••1t would seem clear that Mussolini is determined 
to govern Italy by principles and not by parties or pcrsonalitics."71 
Those publications with more selective readerships were split on their initial 
opinions of the effectiveness of the new capo of Italy and his legions of followers. 711c 
New Republic initially accepted the Fascist coup as a success, especially in light of recent 
events in Italy. "Fascismo is not a party; it is a social movement. It is the reaction of the 
middle classes ... against the oppression they were suffering ... from the peasant and 
laboring classes below, and from the great capilalisls above." Harper's Monrltl)' praised 
Mussolini for keeping the fairh of his followers, staying above petty politics, nnd tackling 
the corrosive and pervasive sloth and red rape that crippled the Italian bureaucracy. 72 
Meanwhile, The Na1io11. perhaps the journal with the most consistently negative 
opinion of Mussolini throughout his tenure, saw little substance behind the Fascist 
11 
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fa9ade. Comparing the fascisti to the Ku Klux Klan in the early weeks after the Mnrch on 
Rome, the editors asked, "What do these Fascisti mean by 'goodness, civili1..a1ion, bcau1y. 
and improvement?' They probably have no idea." For nu: Nation, lhe violence thal 
accompanied the revolution sullied any possible advances 1hat resulted from it. If n nC\v 
regime tried such tactics in the United States, the whole populace would rise up against it, 
but no one raises a voice against Mussolini and his expansionist vision; the Italians have 
deluded themselves by their own idealism and the rest of the world is just happy to sec 
the Italian government breaking out of its bureaucratic rut.n 
A second frequent theme was that a dictatorship, while analhcma 10 Amcricm 
ideals, was tolerable or even preferred in Jlaly, a nation 1ha1 had no experience with 
American-style democracy. "In the old days, Rome had dictators. Rome again has a 
dictator, one Benito Mussolini," rcponed nrc Outlook, but he is a dictator who is 
refashioning Italy into a strong, viable state. 
If, then. an 'irregular' Premier must g1\·e spc:-c1.1l proofs of scn·ice, Muuohni ccrumly h:a.s alrc.idy 
given them He is a wonder, and no nus1.:1lc. W11h .:all his possible bumpt1ousnns .ind proNhlc 
faults, he has succeeded, nor only in bnngmg belier .ind fnendhcr undcr11.1ndmgs all round. but m 
assuring long·nccded efficiency and economy 10 p.i11rnt. plucked luly.~• 
Italy was not the United States; therefore. one could excuse her for allowing a Mussolini 
to come to power. "It must not be thought that Mussolini is driving out democratic 
government from Italy," noted the editors of nrc Outlook, "for it would not be accurate to 
say that Italy has had democratic government in the sense in which \\'C understand it 
Italy has little to lose by scrapping many of ils more rcccnf experiments and theories .... " 
:> .. The Oath of the F.rn:1m.- The Sar:ori. 22 ~o\crrhcf 1922. p. ~2; Cirkton lk.:ih. Mlnc Dbcl· 
Shirt Re\·olution. - The Nation, 13 December 1922. ri' 655·6 
;, Elbert Francis B.:1ld"1n. "An luh.10 Crom·.-.'Cll.- T1:c 0-.itl()(ll, 20 June 1923. pp. 21.1·2 I 7. 
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This line of reasoning was popular in the American media during Mussolini's early years. 
"We cannot understand Fascism till we realize what it replaced," according to Robert 
Sencourt. "Mussolini is not faultless; he and his party must be measured, however, not 
by a standard of perfection, but by a comparison with what he succeeded."75 
At the same time, perhaps Italy truly needed a Mussolini. Collier's tried to 
explain pre-Fascist Liberal Italy in terms that Americans of the time could understand: 
"Imagine a country of forty million people, governed as New York was governed in the 
time of Boss Tweed and Boss Crocker, with every government office a Veterans' Bureau 
and every government contract a Teapot Dome." Many Italians did not agree with or 
understand the political philosophy behind Fascism, "but the Fascists with Mussolini at 
their head are at the zenith of their popularity" because of the quick reversal of fortune 
and overhaul of government they effected. "If you ask an Italian about conditions, all he 
will do is express his happiness that things arc again normal in Italy." Mussolini himself 
spoke of the need for strong leadership in Italy, with an obvious eye toward the future. 
"A dictatorship can last forever, if properly managed. A dictatorship has no doctrine, but 
when a dictatorship is a necessity, we must accept it. ... Fascism knows we arc far from 
equal. Take the great masses of human beings. They like rule by the few .... " Whether 
or not Mussolini would continue to rebuild Italy in a positive way was a still in question. 
Also in question was whether democracy could even survive in 1920s Europe considering 
n ":\fachia\'ellian ~fussolini;· The Outlook. 21 October I 925. pp. 265-6; Robert S.:ncour1. 
"Mussolini,"' Atlantic Montlily, ~fay 1926, pp. 693-4. 
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how much Italy was moving ahead in comparison to France, Germany, and even Great 
Britain. Perhaps Italy was not the only nation that needed a Mussolini.76 
Still, many writers and editors, especially those of the elite outlets, objected 
vehemently to Mussolini's usurpation of individual rights within Italy. The Nation led 
the charge, not only skewering the Fascists for their violent suppression of rights, but also 
castigating Americans for not speaking up against it. "At first sight, Fascism seems the 
essence of violence and revolution; certainly it is the avowed enemy of democracy." The 
Blackshirts had forcibly removed thousands of government workers in the name of 
efficiency, had manipulated elections by the threat and use of violence against voters, and 
had stifled opposition by imprisoning, beating, and even murdering those who spoke 
against fl Duce. "Instead of working through constitutional methods and attempting to 
improve them, [Fascism] glorified direct action and defied the 'outworn' principles of 
civil liberties. The end justified any means, and Mussolini and his friends were alone 
judges of the end." To the editors of The Nation, the Fascisti were no better than the Ku 
Klux Klan - patriotic, to be sure, and cloaking its violence in that patriotism. Still, many 
in the American public and government were so enraptured by Mussolini's dynamic 
figure that they overlooked the crimes of his followers. "This is dictatorship, the rule of 
force, the negation of democracy," the editors insisted. "But is there the world protest 
which greeted the dictatorship of the Bolshevik? There is not. Wartime methods killed a 
vast deal of respect for parliamentary institutions." Their frustration and cynicism would 
76 Frederick L. Collins, "Is It Good-by Mussolini?" Collier's, 27 June 1925, p. 7; "Che Cosa Fa, 
Mussolini?" Time, 24 December 1923, p. 11; "Apotheosis of Fascism," Time, 12 November 1923, pp. 11-2; 
"Mussolini's Road to Imperial Italy," The Literary Digest, 9 June 1923, p. 19. See also "Veni, Vidi, Vici," 
Time, 21 April 1924, p. I I. 
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only grow over the years. "(I}f such disorder had happened in a Spanish-speaking 
country of the New World, we should have instantly landed marines:'77 
The Nation was not alone; many of its peers echoed its concerns. "Instead of 
order following upon the wake of the Fascisti administration, disorder greatly 
multiplied," lamented Century Illustrated in 1925. "Instead of peace, there now came 
upon Italy a reign of terror that has endured ever since. While Mussolini was winning the 
support of the extreme nationalists and chauvinists ... he was abolishing the last remnants 
of civil liberty and instituting a Napoleonic despotism." The editors of 77re Nn.,. Republic 
concurred while aiming barbs at Mussolini's supporters in the American business 
community. They saw Mussolini as the consummate Machiavellian (a sobriquet which 
probably would have made II Duce proud) who was on his way to creating a full 
dictatorship. 'The last vestiges of freedom arc being stamped out in Italy with a 
scientific thoroughness which must excite the admiration of all those American business 
men whose avowed love for Mussolini is based on his 'efficiency. "'71 
Even the popular digest magazines scorned him for his political machinations. 
111e Literary Digest printed numerous quotes from both American and Italian papers 
complaining of Mussolini's dismissive attitude toward Parliament, which gradually 
turned into an active campaign against its existence. It also used Mussolini's own words 
77 Carleton Beals, '111e DicUtorship of the ~fiddle Cb.u," 71te Natwn, 17 hnu.Jf)' 1923, pp. 6-4-S; 
"Mussolini and the Klan," 71te Nation, 2 July 1924, p. 5; 71te ,\'arum, 6 Dcccmbcf 1922. p. 594: quoted in 
Jordan. "The American Image of~fussolini." pp. 187-8; Be.:ili, ··The Dbck-Sh1rt Rc,olut1on." p. 655. Sec 
also Robert Scncourt. "Benito ~fussolini - luly's Opportumsuc D1ct.ator," CurTcnt llutory. M.arch 1925, 
pp. 878-886. 
71 Charles Edw-ard Russell. "~cw Ph.Jscs in the luli.an Struiglc: JI.ts ~hmohm Justified Jfi.s 
Dictatorship'!" Ccnt11ry //111.stratcd, Apnl 1925. p. 749; "1k Wed:." 71t<" Nn<· Rrp11hltc. 13 J:mu.ary 1926, 
p. 199; Peter Brookl;11. "Mussolini n. Fascism." 71te Xt·w Rcpuhlic. 8 Dcccmbcf 1926. p. 65. 
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against him through a London Times quote responding to his comment that only a small 
number of Italians arc unhappy with his regime. "If the discontented arc but •a small 
group,' why is it necessary to gag the press, to forbid free speech, to forbid public 
meetings, and to arm the Executive with arbitrary and practically irresponsible powers?" 
Meanwhile, The Reader's Digest, which had run some complimentary articles in the early 
months after the March on Rome, soon turned against Mussolini (and never turned back), 
even repeating RusseJl's article from Century Jl/11srrarcd.19 
Nevertheless, it was easy for an American reporter to list Mussolini's 
accomplishments in his early years. To steal a line from the movie Patton, "Americans 
love a winner," and Mussolini was a catalyst for great change in Italy. The roll call of 
prominent Americans who praised II Duce's success read like a Who's Who of 1920s 
America: California Senator Hiram Johnson, General Charles Sherrill, Boston 
Archbishop Cardinal O'Connell, Wall Street banker Otto Kahn, U.S. Steel's Elbert Gary, 
and suffragette Carrie Chapman Catt, to name a few. Many Americans returning from a 
trip to Rome or Milan or Venice could not help but notice the transformation in the 
atmosphere and character of Italy. The old "impotent bureaucracy" had been converted 
to an orderly, efficient society. 8° Frank Simonds, who reported for various popular 
journals, became smitten with Fascist Italy. 
There is a new Italy which is a striking contrast to the old. There is a new sense of sdf-
conlidence .... Italy today is the li\'cst thing in Europe. It is, one must concedc ... thc one country 
which is governed in any real sense, the one country in which the business of rutiorul hfc is not 
79 
"Mussolini's New Victory," The Literary Digest, 11 August 1923, pp. 19-20; h~hmolini 
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paralyzed by struggles among various elements within the nation, by the ineptitudes and 
supineness of the politicians and political parties.81 
Perhaps most important to Americans was Mussolini's vehement opposition to 
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Bolshevism, which seemed poised to envelop postwar Europe ifleft unchecked. "[F]ew 
will know," noted The Saturday Evening Post, "how close to the edge of Bolshevism 
Italy came." He stifled illegal strikes, the hallmark of socialism, while mandating an 
eight-hour workday. He slashed unemployment (according to official figures). He 
encouraged private enterprise as he built the Corporate State. He put indolent bureaucrats 
of the old Liberal regime back to work for the people after expelling the worst offenders 
from his visionary state machine. He fought the violence of communism with the Fascist 
nationalist fervor for la patria and aroused a "spiritual regeneration" among Italians, 
especially the youth. He made Italians feel strong and powerful again. "Every great 
movement has found and brought to power a great man," professed Italian war hero Carlo 
Delcroix to the Chamber of Deputies during a session that saw opposition leaders rail 
against Fascism. "You now have this great man. Let it not be said that Italy had at last 
found a great leader and that envy struck him down."82 
More than anything, Mussolini was different. He was the most atypical leader of 
the 1920s. This frightened the Old Guard European statesmen because "he had no 
precedent." He was young, and he was the apotheosis of a young Italy and the leader of a 
81 Frank Simonds, "The Italian Revolution," The American Review of Reviews, June 1926, p. 636, 
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revolution ofyouth.83 He was outspoken and brutally honest. At times, he was brooding 
and pensive, but his speeches were dripping with emotion and occasionally venom. He 
made no apologies for his political tactics. He took quick action. He remade a 
government of "Old Europe" in a matter of days. He made his people feel proud about 
being Italian again, and made the world take notice of Italy as a real player in the 
European balance of power. He had exorcised the demons ofCaporctto and the feckless 
legacy of the Liberal government. To many Americans, Mussolini appeared to be the 
only European leader doing anything constructive. By the end of the decade, many 
Americans began to wonder if the United States might need a Duce of its own. 
War, Battle, Murder, and Prestige 
While the American press was still trying to detcnnine what kind ofleader Benito 
Mussolini would be, the new Italian capo soon found himself embroiled in scandal and 
armed struggle. He had not yet finished his first year as premier before he faced his first 
international challenge over the Corfu incident. The next year brought the Matteotti 
scandal. Then, after disappearing from the international scene for a few months due to a 
debilitating stomach illness, Mussolini's returned with his infamous boisterous rhetoric. 
During the mid- and late-1920s, he instigated his domestic "battles" to rouse the Italian 
83 Blythe, pp. 101-2. Mussolini ascended to the premiership in October 1922 at the age of39, the 
youngest premier in Italian history. His contemporary European leaders provide a remarkable contrast: 
Vladimir Lenin became chairman in 1917 at 47, Andrew Bonar Law became Prime Minister of Great 
Britain a week before the March on Rome at age 64, Stanley Baldwin (Law's successor in 1923) was 56, 
and France's Raymond Poincaire was 61 (he was 51 when he began his first ministry in 1912). The only 
major world leader of the time who approached Mussolini's youth was Theodore Roosevelt, who, at 42 
years and 10 months, became President of the United States after the assassination of President McKinley 
in 190 I - yet another reason why so many drew comparisons between Mussolini and Roosevelt. 
people to become more self-sufficient and to reinvigorate the national economy. At the 
same time, his blustery speeches increasingly contained references to Italian 
expansionism and allusions to the strength and reach of the old Roman Empire. 
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What were Americans to make of this Mussolini? Was he a vibrant, energetic, 
melodramatic leader trying to restore his people's pride and self-respect? Was he the 
vanguard of a new generation of European pragmatic political thinkers? Was he a violent 
and merciless tyrant, the second coming of Kaiser, about to launch his modem legions in 
an attempt to recapture the glory and power of the Roman Empire? Like the old story of 
the blind men and the elephant, it all depended on what part of Mussolini you chose to 
examine. Every American magazine had its own opinions of II Duce, and those opinions 
often changed with the wind from the Mediterranean. But one thing was certain: no 
matter what he did, Mussolini was always interesting and always good for a headline. 
The Violent Mussolini 
·The years of 1923 and 1924 were rou~ ones for Mussolini's image abroad. 
Many saw the invasion of Corfu as a thinly veiled imperialist annexation, a somewhat 
hypocritical view, considering that other nations, notably Great Britain and France, had 
taken similar actions in their recent histories. However, because those same two nations 
objected, Mussolini was vilified in Europe and America for the invasion of Corfu. The 
American press censured this "high-handed action" and "megalomaniac nationalism" as 
part of"an endemic European militarism." They warned that this could be proof that 
Mussolini's tough talk would be followed by a new wave of aggression in the Adriatic 
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and Mediterranean, making Italy another potential continental powder keg. The Nation 
commented that "Mussolini's ultimatum to Greece was inexcusable swashbuckling .... 
One may even suspect that he would like to pick a quarrel." Perhaps this was because 
"things have been getting dull at home," and The Literary Digest ran a full page of 
political cartoons from American papers criticizing the Corfu takeover and assembled a 
long list of quotes calling II Duce a bully and a new Caesar. Some even saw it as a ploy 
to mask divisions within the PNF in Italy. "Fascism lives by fighting." Interestingly, 
however, many articles saved most of their vitriol for the League of Nations. It was as if 
people expected a leader like Mussolini to take advantage of such a situation and 
therefore did not fully blame him. The League, on the other hand, was designed in the 
wake of World War I to deal with just such a contingency. Thus, with Corfu, "the 
League is facing its supreme test, say many editors, [but] it is also facing its supreme 
opportunity." Was the League simply a paper tiger? Or would it step up to the task and 
reproach Italy? Some reporters felt that Mussolini would back down from his warlike 
bluster once Greece met his demands, and most gave a sigh of relief when he did, but the 
League never lived up to its promises in the eyes of the American media. Its vacillations 
and sluggish response to the crisis doomed its reputation in the United States, making 
some editors happy that the Senate never ratified the Versailles treaty after all.84 
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Mussolini dodged another public relations bullet with the Matteotti affair. After 
Matteotti's body was discovered, rumors quickly spread that Mussolini may have been 
involved somehow. Documents smuggled out ofltaly in 1933 by a PNF squad leader 
indicate that Mussolini did indeed approve the murder (although not necessarily order it). 
In the immediate weeks after the incident, however, no one knew just how high up it 
went. With a few exceptions, most American magazines did not single out Mussolini as 
the provocateur in the Matteotti affair. Rather, many saw it as a sign that the violent 
elements within the Fascist party were getting out of control, and some truly believed that 
Mussolini would bring justice to these rogue elements and purge the party of such 
murderers. Of course, not everyone subscribed to II Duce's innocence. The New 
Republic was convinced that Mussolini was little more than a fervent disciple of 
Machiavelli, and Matteotti 's ignoble disposal was just another necessary act to keep the 
PNF alive and in power. In a scathing article for Current History, H. G. Wells lambasted 
Mussolini for killing (literally, in some cases) criticism and free speech in Italy, 
comparing the PNF to the Soviet Communists and the Kuomintang. "Away with them! 
Nitti, Amendola, Forni, Misuri, Matteotti, Salvemini, Sturzo, Turati! Away with all these 
men who watch and criticize and wait!" Wells saw Fascism as unidimensional, 
demanding conformity and unquestioned loyalty from its citizens. "[Italy] sees taking 
thought in the light of treason, discussion as weakness, and the plainest warnings of 
danger as antagonism to be beaten into silence and altogether overcome."85 
85 DeSanti, p. 52; "What Keeps Mussolini in Power," The Literary Digest, 9 August 1924, pp. 16-
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With violence within Italy, Italian troops on the march outside ofltaly, and 
Mussolini's persistent, passionate, and increasingly imperialist speeches to Italians, two 
concerns began to creep into American magazine articles written in the mid-1920s. First, 
perhaps Mussolini's control over tbefascisti was not as strong as the world was led to 
believe. Instead of a regime that was the model of efficiency, Fascism may be splintering 
into warring factions. The opposition press, often cowed into submission, was becoming 
more vocal, and its quotes were finding their way into American publications. They 
railed against Fascist violence and questioned Mussolini's leadership, calling him a 
sixteenth-century anachronism and proclaiming that "Italy cannot be governed by a man 
who is implicated in a criminal trial."86 
Second, instead of just rattling his saber, maybe Mussolini was sharpening it. He 
was certainly manipulating the Italian populace into believing his nationalist message. 
"Every dream, every hope, every desire of every true Fascist and nationalist was captured 
and held. Everything was engulfed in Mussolini's triumphant imperialism." Some saw 
Mussolini as another in a long line of antagonistic European dictators who inflamed their 
peoples with nationalist zeal and ultimately brought their nations into war. "He was 'JI 
Duce' as Napoleon was 'The Man.' He won the same plaudits in speaking of his 'iron 
hand' as the Kaiser won in speaking of his 'mailed fist.' Bismarck with his 'blood and 
iron' and the Kaiser with his 'mailed fist' never used stronger language than does 
Mussolini." The ultimate fear was Italy would spark another world war, and that the 
United States would be dragged into another intercontinental struggle. "What the Italian 
86 
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superman is aiming at is a sort of Holy Roman Empire - at the head of it, God and his 
Superman." Even Frank Simonds, one of the most pro-Mussolini American reporters, 
was worried, although he also was impressed by the "fire and frenzy about this 
patriotism" in Fascist Italy. "Can Mussolini, great man as he certainly is, control and 
canalize this enormous and explosive patriotic force which he has aroused? Can he lead 
it into safer channels and direct it to the development of national resources? Or will he, 
in the end, be captive of the forces which he has roused and looscd?'.s7 
The Resilient Mussolini 
Nevertheless, throughout the 1920s, Mussolini had an uncanny way of distancing 
himself from at least some of the intrigue within Italy. Even his inflammatory speeches 
were forgiven by some in the American media. The 1920s was an era of pragmatism in 
the United States. Business became king, as did the Hamiltonian principles that 
accompanied it. As Jeffersonian liberalism waned, so did some of the concern over the 
loss of certain liberties in Italy. Mussolini was changing Italy and making it look more 
like the United States, partially by placing business at the fore. American businessmen 
liked it for obvious reasons, but the rest of the American populace also took note. With 
vast improvements to public utilities and roads, the drainage of swamps for more living 
and working areas, the demolition of slums, unemployment and pension programs, and 
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efforts to curb street begging, Italy was becoming "modern" by American standards and 
began to mimic the United States. Americans saw this progress and saw how Italians 
responded to Mussolini - according to many accounts in popular magazines, by chanting 
his name in unison by the thousands - and they were willing to accept that loss of liberty 
in exchange for results.88 By the end of the decade, II Duce was still a controversial 
figure, but his accomplishments and his longevity as a leader in a nation that saw 
previous governments turn over like pancakes in a diner made many American 
journalists, some more grudgingly than others, offer him respect. 
What made Italy different from other European nations of the time was a sense 
that there was real progress occurring on the peninsula. As mentioned before, this stood 
in stark contrast to the Italy of the first two decades of the century. In a response in 
Current History to H. G. Wells's attack, Roman newspaper editor Tomaso Sillani 
emphasized the restoration of order after years of socialist violence and the high esteem 
in which Italians hold the concept of "the nation." "Nationalism acquires the value of a 
religion," justifying some of the apparent abuses of power by the Fascist government. 
The truth, according to Sillani, is that Italians revere Mussolini for bringing them out of 
chaos, eliminating class conflict, modernizing their economy and infrastructure, and 
restoring their national pride. 89 
The economic recovery was of special interest to American businessmen and the 
U. S. government. Not only did it signal more opportunities for worthwhile investments 
88 Jordan, "America's Mussolini," pp. 143-161. 
89 Sillani, pp. 179-186. 
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of American capital (which Mussolini always courted), but it also meant the Italy would 
be more likely to pay its war debts. J. P. Morgan and Company's extension of $50 
million in credit to Italy certainly made headlines in the American press. If J. P. Morg.an 
had faith in the Italians to pay up, noted some media outlets, there must be something to 
this Mussolini fellow. The editors at The Outlook agreed. "The prevailing sentiment in 
Italy appears to be a desire to do the right thing" in maintaining strong relations with the 
United States and paying off the debt.90 
Obviously, the opinion of American magazines on Mussolini's greatness covered 
the entire spectrum. Some, such as Current History and The Outlook as seen in previous 
examples, tried to give him the benefit of the doubt by including positive articles and 
editorials while also being ready to cast stones at his menacing speeches and tyrannical 
methods. Time did the same, but also offered more objective views, which occasionally 
meant rising to Mussolini's defense. While many U.S. journalists condemned a 1927 
speech by 11 Duce as a prelude to a declaration of war, Time looked a little deeper. The 
Literary Digest, for example, covered the speech in an article titled "Mussolini Rattles 
the Sword" and began with "Is Mussolini mad?" The crux of the issue was his quote 
about the need to build up the Italian military machine. 
"It is a fundamental duty to perfect our armed forces. We must at a certain time be able to 
mobilize 5,000,000 men. We must be able to arm them. We must fortify our navy and make our 
air force so strong and numerous that its roaring motors will drown all other sound, its shadow 
hide the sun over Italian soil. We will be able then, between 1935 and 1940, when I believe there 
will be a crucial point in European history, finally to make our voice heard and see our rights 
recognized."91 
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The American press exploded. Newspapers and magazines across the country 
were calling him a wannonger who had learned nothing from World War I and who was 
ready to crown himself Benito I of a new Roman Empire, perhaps starting with an 
invasion of France or the Balkans. But Time noted that there was more to the speech than 
this one quote. American correspondents had twisted his meaning in a new form of 
yellow journalism, when in fact Mussolini was speaking of defensive measures. Europe 
was still a dangerous place, said// Duce, especially to the north in Germany. His 
mobilization was not to attack Europe, but to defend Italy against an attack, which he saw 
as his primary duty. 'The story was treated in the U. S. press like the confession of a 
man who publicly admits that he is going to buy a rifle and expects some day to practice 
on his neighbors. The real story was that Signor Mussolini spoke as might a sturdy 
householder who said: 'There are burglars in the neighborhood and so I am going to 
keep a pistol under my pillow."'92 
Not to say that Time was always pro-Mussolini. At times, its articles took a 
sarcastic, even mocking tone toward Mussolini's histrionics. The editors were also 
especially offended by the continuing bullying of citizens and visitors, including 
American tourists, by fascisti and the suppression of freedom of the press by the PNF. 
But Mussolini was news, even if the news was simply the release of his romance novel 
that he wrote as a younger man. Moreover, his domestic rejuvenation and diplomatic 
successes later in the decade - with the Vatican, Albania, Tangier, and even Abyssinia 
92 lb id., p. 11; "Mussolini Bids for More Power," n1e Outlook, 8 June 1927, p. 176; '"Profoundly 
Humiliated,'" Time, 6 June 1927, pp. 19-20. 
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(which would soon be broken) - were impressive. "In general terms, it may be said that 
Benito Mussolini can point today to more diplomatic victories and near-victories than any 
other Chief Executive."93 
Other publications were more consistent in their praise of II Duce. Perhaps the 
two most influential of these pro-Mussolini magazines were Collier's and The Saturday 
Evening Post. The pro-Fascists leanings of Collier's editor William Chenery have 
already been discussed. Although the periodical did include some barbs against him, the 
vast majority of articles on Mussolini were favorable. (It should be noted that much of 
the magazine was devoted to serialized fiction and American human interest stories; only 
a small portion of the articles concerned Mussolini or other foreign leaders.) 
"A Rooseveltian World Tonic," he was called by Frederick Collins. Comparing 
someone to the venerable President Theodore Roosevelt was high praise in the 1920s, 
and there were many willing to make that comparison in the case of Mussolini. Collier's 
was willing to look past some of II Duce's indiscretions and apologize for him when 
necessary. "Dictators are endured and embraced not for what they say but for what they 
do. Mussolini has a genius for bombastic nonsense but he often acts wisely." Collins 
even defends how Mussolini "'setiuestrates' a newspaper once in a while," claiming that 
the writings of hotheaded Italian editors would spark lawsuits in America. Better, then, 
to focus on his achievements - his leadership against Bolshevism, the Italian economic 
miracle, the end of government corruption - and the throngs of Italians shouting "Viva 
91 
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Mussolini!" in the streets. "We Americans ought to be able to understand such a man 
and to judge his chances of continued success, for he is more like Theodore Roosevelt 
than Roosevelt himself." But not even Collier's could avoid poking fun at the living 
caricature that was Mussolini. A tongue-in-check look at a hypothetical visit by II Duce 
to the United States had him summarily deciding to move New York City, to abolish 
Congress, and to add more rules to the game of baseball until the rules were completely 
undecipherable to anyone. "Add to this [his reckless overhaul of Italian society] that the 
Fascist never shaves, that he doesn't believe in democracy, that he hates people and that 
he won't stand for any back talk from anybody, and it is clear that the new doctrines will 
make a tremendous hit on this side of the water."94 
With its circulation of over three million by 1930, the Saturday Evening Post was 
able to reach a wide and varied audience. Like Collier's, the Post avoided taking a 
crusading position in an effort to appeal to its mass audience, but it did have a decidedly 
pro-Mussolini slant. George Horace Lorimer, its editor during Mussolini's rise, echoed 
the same sentiment held by Collier's Chenery: Mussolini's dictatorship, while restrictive 
and tyrannical, was appropriate for Italy at the time. The United States would never 
accept such a rule, but "circumstances alter cases" and "in many ways Italy is not doing 
so badly." Lorimer pointed to Italy's modernization in both agriculture and industry, its 
stabilized economy, and the general social order of the country as proof of the benefits of 
Fascism at a time when many other European nations, including a France that had fallen 
into gridlock with its bloc politics, seemed to be teetering on the brink of collapse. "One 
~Frederick Collins, pp. 7-8; "Tyrants are Popular," p. 20; Stephen Leacock, "What the Duce!" 
Collier's, 3 July 1926, p. 15. 
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hesitates to commend dictatorships ... but one must not hesitate to condemn democracy 
that wastes itself." It may be an autocracy, but at least something was happening.95 
The Post's adulation was not confined to its editor. Its battery of writers, 
including Roberts, Child, Isaac Marcosson, and the witty and trusted Will Rogers, 
contributed almost universally positive commentary on Italy. Echoing Collier's, 
Marcosson called Mussolini "a sort of super-Roosevelt in dynamic energy." After 
meeting with II Duce on separate occasions, Marcosson and Rogers were both impressed 
with his benevolent but stem leadership and his lack of pretension. He was a doer, not 
just a dreamer (like Lenin), who "weeded out the sluggards" in government and 
commerce. Mussolini was proof that postwar dictatorships (with the exception of the 
Bolsheviks) were a good thing for Europe and especially Italy, having brought about a 
political and a commercial renaissance. "You may not approve of Mussolini's methods," 
wrote Marcosson, acknowledging the continued criticism of his harsh style and fear over 
his expansionist policies, "but you must admire his results, and it is by results that the 
human being is measured." Child continued that theme in one of his sycophantic 
commentaries. "Change the facts upon which Mussolini has acted and he will change his 
action. Change the hypotheses and he will change his conclusions." Quoting Mussolini, 
Child wrote that while it may not be right for America, "Fascism was built for Italy - for 
our need, our emergency, our character, our growth, our soil. ... "96 
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Meanwhile, Will Rogers, in his inimitable down-home style, took a closer look at 
Mussolini the man, not just Mussolini the premier. In one of his "letters to the 
President," Rogers notes great similarities between It Duce and American politicians and 
business leaders (including Henry Ford and, of course, Teddy Roosevelt). As for his 
periodic militaristic boasts and imperialist rants, Rogers says those are just meant for his 
Italian audience, which is accustomed to such melodrama. He quotes the Italian leader's 
appeal to Americans, replicating I! Duce's broken English: '"You tell 'em Mussolini, 
R-e-g-u-1-a-r Guy .... Mussolini no Napoleon, want fight, always look mad; Mussolini 
laugh, gay, like good time same as everybody else .... "'97 
The Post went one step further when it published Mussolini's autobiography 
(written by his brother and translated by Child) in installments in 1928. Here, the Duce's 
eye for propaganda opportunities intersected with the Post's pro-Mussolini tenor and 
desire for increased readership. The series had little effect on circulation, but the Post's 
attitude toward Mussolini became clear. (Of course, it was no wonder that Child would 
be involved. He had also written a piece for the Post purporting that the death knell was 
already ringing for democratic self-government in Europe: "there is the inevitable 
conclusion in Europe that parliamentary democracy, in the main, is a failure."98) 
With so many trusted voices praising the Fascist dictator, it is no wonder that 
many Americans began to see him as at worst the lesser of two evils - tyranny vs. 
97 Will Rogers, "Letters of a Self-Made Diplomat to His President," The Saturday Evening Post, 
31 July 1926, pp. 8-9, 82-4. 
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anarchy - and at best a benevolent and constructive leader. Even after scandal and the 
threat of war, Mussolini's image in the United States had remained, for the most part, 
intact and encouraging. There were still voices of dissent crying out in the wilderness. 
The New Republic continued to lead the charge among elite journals, labeling him "the 
blackest shadow which lies over Europe at the present time" and "the most dangerous and 
disruptive force at work anywhere on the continent," threatening war to win concessions 
from a war-weary Europe. The Living Age published a short piece on the Fascist reprisals 
against the insurgent population of Molinella, a small town near Bologna, and how it may 
have inspired a boy to shoot at Mussolini. Harper's printed an expose on press 
censorship in Italy written by George Seldes of The Chicago Tribune. He detailed the 
PNF's subtle and explicit methods of suppressing negative coverage about Fascist 
violence in Italy and showing the world only Fascist successes (which were real but not 
universal), and he illustrated how "the foreign press in Rome have to ask themselves 
every day, 'Is this piece of Fascist terrorism worth mentioning? Am I ready to risk being 
thrown into the Queen of Heaven Jail or being thrown over the frontier for this small 
item?'" Seldes elicited sympathy from some of his compatriots at other magazines, 
including Time. Nevertheless, these protests were limited primarily to the high-brow 
journals; with most of the popular press, Mussolini was a rising star once again.99 
Most, but not all - the two main digest magazines were not convinced. The 
Literary Digest, though always including more positive quotes from American and 
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foreign newspapers, took an obvious turn against Mussolini following the Matteotti 
affair. Except for a couple of articles on the high opinions of Mussolini held by the 
American business community, most pieces expressed serious concern over his 
imperialist motives. Even the titles are provocative: "The Mussolini 'Empire,"' 
"Mussolini as the 'Menace' of Europe," "Mussolini Rattles the Sword." A second major 
fear for The Literary Digest was a concerted infiltration of Fascist elements into the 
United States. From the FNLA to "recreational centers" in American cities sponsored by 
the Italian government to Mussolini's instructions to Italian emigres about how to remain 
proper fascisti, Mussolini and his PNF seemed to be reaching their tendrils into American 
society. The Reader's Digest soured on the Italian premier at about the same time. 
Except for one item about economic recovery, nearly all of the articles about Italy that its 
editors chose to publish in the mid- to late-1920s were negative. Among these were The 
Living Age's "Why a Boy Shot Mussolini," Seldes's commentary from Harper's, and a 
personal reflection by the nephew of ex-Premier Nitti on his treatment as a political 
prisoner of the Fascist party. More curious was the inclusion in the January 1927 issue of 
a piece written by Oswald Garrison Villard for The Nation more than three years earlier, 
positing that Mussolini has created an oppressive regime with an economy propped up 
like a house of cards simply for his own aggrandizement, but Ainericans are letting him 
get away with it because they only listen to "official" statements. Instead of printing it 
soon after its original publication in November 1923 - a time when The Reader's Digest 
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was still pro-Mussolini - the editors dredged it up years later when they were of a very 
different opinion of II Duce. 100 
Mussolini is Italy 
"Italy and Fascism, Fascism and Italy, Mussolini and Italy, Italy and Mussolini -
all three are inextricably mixed up with one another. There is no more hint of conquest 
and conquered; you simply don't know where one leaves off and the other begins."101 
By the latter half of the 1920s, Mussolini had established himself as a political 
force in Europe and, more important, as the personification and identity ofltaly. After 
surviving political trials in his first years as capo and the physical trial of a long, 
debilitating stomach illness, he began to craft a social program designed to lift Italy up by 
its bootstraps and reduce its dependency on foreign aid. The goal was an independent 
and self-sufficient Italy that would be better prepared for the next conflagration. He 
dubbed them "battles" in an effort to motivate the populace (which further dismayed 
some foreign observers, who also saw a subtext of hardening the citizens to the 
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inevitability of war). Thus was born initiatives such as the "Battle of Wheat" to spur 
domestic food production, the "Battle of the Lira" to stabilize and strengthen the 
fluctuating currency, and the "Battle of the Birthrate" to reverse the decline in Italy's 
population caused by poverty, mortality, and emigration. Mussolini led these charges 
with his fiery oratory and some well-timed photo opportunities (including the famous 
photograph of a bare-chested Duce, pitchfork in hand, hard at work in a wheat field). 
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Why the attempt to cultivate a "spirit of battle, this fighting temper on the part of 
forty million people?" Beyond the outward signs of economic progress and 
modernization, much of Italy was still in poverty. American reporters who wandered 
beyond the Italian cities could see this quickly, and Mussolini realized it as well. "Italy's 
greatest foe is poverty," wrote Edward Corsi for The Outlook. "Poverty is the key to the 
Italian situation. It explains Fascism. It explains the excesses of Fascism. It explains the 
Kaiser-like utterances of the Duce." In a sense, Italy was at war with its own demons, 
and Mussolini was ready to take the reigns as a wartime leader.102 
Mussolini was honest with Italians about the obstacles, and he challenged them to 
overcome them. In doing so, he gave them hope, and they rallied around him. 
Meanwhile, he continued to revolutionize the Italian economy into his "Corporate State" 
model, subordinating all private business interests to those of the state, as well as labor 
issues, but still allowing for private control of business. Since the state was of primary 
importance under Fascism, the utility of workers and capitalists alike must be organized 
by the state, linked together by syndicates and managed by the Ministry of Corporations. 
'°2 Edward Corsi, "Italy: A Nation at War," The Outlook, 11May1927, pp. 47-9. 
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In doing this, Fascism was promoting Italian business -part of the "Battle of the 
Economy'' - but also building a lasting economic edifice and cooperation between 
government and business. In a sense, it was a compromise between a free-market 
economy and a state-run system.103 
Thus, by the end of the decade, Mussolini, already the head of government (and at 
one point, as many as seven other government positions) and undisputed voice and 
embodiment of Fascism to the world, had made himself the de facto leader of the Italian 
economy and Italian social order. On I I February I 929, Mussolini signed the Lateran 
Pacts with Pope Pius XI, establishing the sovereign Vatican City state, restoring 
diplomatic relations between Italy and the church (severed after the annexation of the 
Papal States during the Risorgimento ), and making Catholicism the sole state religion of 
Italy. Mussolini was now present in virtually every facet of Italian life. 104 
This did not go unnoticed by the American press. Reporters noticed a change in 
tenor among Italians - the shouts of "Viva Fascismo!" by the blackshirted youth was 
being replaced by a more widespread "Viva Mussolini!" As one Italian said, "I'm not a 
Fascista. I'm a Mussolina!" Mussolini became bigger than his party, and in many ways 
larger than life. Associated Press reporter Percy Winner saw him as little more than "a 
master at posing" whose "vanity is colossal," who succeeds by exploiting a situation and 
playing on people's emotions rather than through intelligence or true leadership, and who 
is surrounded by yes-men. Peter Brooklyn of The New Republic agreed. "The Duce has 
103 Ibid., pp. 48-9; "The Corporate State," Fortune, July 1934, pp. 57-9, 132-40. 
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played his hand so well that millions of Italians believe him when he says, as he often 
docs, that he is not a tyrant or a dictator, but the servant of the people." Still, Winner 
acknowledged that Mussolini, with his overwhelming personality, was probably the only 
person in Italy who could bridge the cleavages among Italians and the PNF and steer the 
ship of state. "Mussolini alone can hold the wheel, but he cannot chart the coursc."105 
The next question from the press was logical: if Mussolini is Italy and Italy is 
Mussolini, what does the future hold for both? Regardless, the fate of Italians citizens 
would follow that of their Duce. "In Rome there is indeed a constantly present 
undercurrent of uneasiness," wrote The Natio11 's Mary Kelsey, as she sensed the palpable 
tension caused by the ever-present and ever-suspicious blackshirtedfascisti. She 
reminded her readers of the ''Ten Commandments of the Militiamen" and especially 
number eight: "Mussolini is always right." With that sense of blind allegiance, it was 
easy for one to believe that Mussolini could take Italy to war and expect and receive the 
full support of the entire populace. In fact, the editors of The New Republic envisioned 
just such an occurrence and came close to predicting the events of ten years later. "What 
he is most likely to choose, if the prophets arc correct, is an effort at colonial 
aggrandizement, perhaps in northern Africa. Such an attempt, however, might easily lead 
to international friction of the sort which culminates in war." 106 
All this is not to say that Mussolini was unopposed in Italy, and American foreign 
reporters knew it. Former Italian parliamentarian and political prisoner Gaetano 
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Salvemini expounded on the anti-Fascist opposition working in Italy in the mid-1920s for 
The New Republic. Even Mussolini knew of them, mocking them in a July 1924 speech, 
calling them "a great, but at bottom, a grotesque army."107 But none of these groups were 
able to organize into a large scale, effective counterweight to the PNF. Mussolini was a 
one-man show. Everyone knew it, and most Italians and Americans accepted it. The 
bigger concern, morbid though it was considering his relative youth, was what would 
happen to Italy upon Mussolini's death. 
Premier Mussolini has been compared by some to Atlas, Hercules, Julius Caesar, Septimius 
Severus, Cromwell, Napoleon, etc. It would, perhaps, be premature to place him among great 
Italians, let alone the great of the earth. In a sense the Premier still has to achieve pennanent 
success. What he has done for Italy is indeed immense; but who can say that it is permanent? 
Many feel that his dictatorship has been harmful; few deny that his rule is not strictly personal. 
But who can say that with the man Fascism and all it stands for will disappear?108 
Mussolini was the glue that held Italy together during the 1920s. He was recognized 
around the globe for bringing Italy out of the postwar bedlam and building it into a 
modem state. There was no successor waiting in the wings; Mussolini himself said that 
his successor was not yet born. Would Mussolini be a flash in the pan for Italy, and all 
his reforms (good or bad) go for naught? "Such a government as that of England will 
never experience the benefits of a Mussolini; but it also will never suffer the sort of shock 
that apparently is inevitable for Italy when Mussolini is carried off by a motor accident, 
or a disease germ, or an assassin's bullet."109 
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The Unlikely Example 
While the media pondered an Italy after Mussolini, the head Fascist was remaking 
his image and repositioning Italy within the context of Europe. He still made speeches 
with great vigor and visionary plans, but the caustic edges were less acute. Meanwhile, 
as Europe faced the continued threat of communism :from the east, and the growing cloud 
of Nazism became more prominent in the north, Mussolini sought to reassure the world 
that he had no desire for war, whether caused by his actions or those of another autocrat. 
After all, by the early 1930s, Italy and the rest of the world had bigger concerns. The 
ripples of the Great Depression had reached the shores of the Mediterranean, and 
Minister of Corporations Benito Mussolini struggled to keep the resurgent Italian 
economic machine :from breaking down. By the middle of the decade, he had earned 
plaudits from even some of his harshest critics among American magazines, but to most 
American reporters and readers, Mussolini and his intentions were as confounding as 
ever. As one reporter observed in summation of Fascist progress over the first ten years 
of Mussolini's rule, "Mussolini has not changed; only his environment is different."110 
Peacemaker or Warmonger? 
For a time, it seemed as though the rambunctious boy from Predappio had finally 
grown up. The firebrand socialist had abandoned his impractical ideas. The soldier had 
laid down his arms. The journalist had softened his tongue. The rabid Blackshirt had 
eschewed his violent days and looked ahead to an Italy of peace and prosperity. He now 
110 William Martin, "Mussolini's Ten Years of Power," Current History, October 1932, p. 34. 
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stood as a bulwark against the e\'er-fractious political tunnoil of Europe. In the United 
States, some began to sec a new maturity in II Dure. nnd they beg."Ul to pin their hopes of 
a peaceful Europe on the one leader who seemed to f\3\'c enough s.mity, magnetism. and 
pragmatism to prc\'enl its dc\'olution into continental warfare. 
But had this leopard really changed his spots. or \\':1.S he just hiding them'! Titis 
question sparked debates among American media outlct.'i. Some wen: ready to enlbracc 
this new. amicable Mussolini. Others were much more skcplic.11, fC(ling between t11e 
lines to unco\'cr his hidden agenda. Reganllcs.s of who was ril'.hl. 3..'i the global economy 
faltered during the Depression. and as an ominous budding mo\'C:mcnt began ro uke hold 
in Gcnnany. Italy was at the center of European affairs. MuliOlini was llaly. Italy was 
Mus."><>lini. and the rest of the world held iL<i breath ro sec what he would do. 
The new. hopeful \·icw of Mussolini began to r.ake hold with the Lalcr.m Accords. 
The Concordat wi1h lhc Holy Sec hcaled a sixry-yc.11' rill between the Romm C•llholic 
Church 3fld the Italian state. In.stead of promoling the supremacy of Fascist l1aly O\'Cf 
C\'Cf)1hing else, Mus.sol mi had rclenlcd and rccogni1cd the SO\'crcignry of the V;uic.m 
3fld its spiritual importance in ltalim society. In fact. he made his first public o\·crcurcs 
of rcconcilialion before the Ma.rch on Rome. Aller King Victor Emmanuel authori.7.cd 
~f us.solini to bc~m nc~otiat1ons in December 1926, talks were sporadic :md sometimes 
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boon to the papacy and gladdened Italian citizens, and it was also a diplomatic coup for 
the PNF. Some, however, questioned the motives behind it, seeing it as a ploy to shore 
up support at home and abroad and to extend Fascist influence even more into the lives of 
Italians. The Nation, always suspicious of Mussolini, summed up the argument. "On the 
face is an attempt to vest the Pope with nominal sovereignty, temporal power, but the 
power is a shadow. Underneath the outward semblance is a move by II Duce toward his 
own ends, through the hierarchy. With the priest as his friend, he is assured of absolute 
contact with the whole social and political life ofltaly."112 
Nevertheless, the Lateran Concordat was a change in tone for Mussolini. It 
continued with his proposals for European disarmament, reorganization, and unity. 
These were new words in his rhetorical repertoire. Even the editors of The Nation were 
taken aback, calling his statements "encouraging and surprising," but difficult to interpret 
in light of his previous outbursts and overt efforts to increase its military armaments and 
readiness. Still, it was a step in the right direction. "[Mussolini] declared that it was 
unrealistic to talk of 'legal equality among nations when on one side they are armed to 
the teeth and on the other they are condemned to be disarmed.' This is a considerable 
distance from the bellicose and highly nationalistic attitude taken by the Premier a year or 
so ago." He reinforced this volte face by bringing his message directly to the American 
people through a speech in English broadcast by radio to the United States in January 
Pius felt tricked and protested the remarks through diplomatic channels and the Vatican press. JI Duce was 
more conciliatory in later speeches. See also Benito Mussolini, Discorsi de/ 1929 (Milan: Alpes, 1930). 
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1931 ... Italy," he pronounced, "let me repeat it - will never take the initiative of starting 
a war. Italy needs peace; Fascism desires to secure for the Italian people in co-operation 
with all other peoples of the world a future of prosperity and peace."113 
Mussolini was also winning praises for his continued resistance against 
Bolshevism. With the onset of the Depression in the United States, this became a more 
pressing concern for Americans. While few expected a workers' revolt in the United 
States, there were fears that Bolshevism could gain a foothold as capitalism began to 
collapse. Italy's Corporate State, with Mussolini at its head, appeared to be unyielding to 
communist influence, making it an inspiration to Americans. Although American 
journalists occasionally compared Mussolini and Fascism to Lenin and communism, 
almost all of them saw the Soviet Union as a much greater threat to the United States and 
world stability ... If peace is menaced by Benito Mussolini, at least, like an honest 
rattlesnake, he jangles his sword. Stalin acts without warning," noted Time . .. Compared 
to Stalin and Communism, Mussolini and Fascism arc negligible forccs." 114 
As whispers of general European disarmament grew into reality, Mussolini 
became a more active advocate of the process. Officials in the Hoover Administration 
were happy to goad// Duce into pressing his point; unlike their European counterparts, 
President Hoover and his cabinet wanted to see an arms reduction deal concluded, but 
without American involvement. Most American reporters, however, were dubious. 
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Despite his assurances to Americans, Mussolini's war rhetoric had recently taken a more 
threatening tone, especially in reference to France and her African colonies. Mussolini 
felt that Italy needed to gain more territory, especially in Africa. to allow his burgeoning 
population to spread out and continue to expand. He also wanted Italy to be on the same 
military footing as its neighbor. French Africa and the slowly resurrecting French war 
machine stood in his way. Thinly veiled references to France appeared in his fiery 
speeches, eliciting shouts of"Down with France" from the crowds and bands of[ascisti. 
He began hinting, then plainly declaring, that Italy would leave the League of Nations 
unless it was reformed into a less democratic body. "America needs a trusted partner" in 
Europe, wrote Paquino Ianchi for The New Republic. "But here the question arises: How 
real is Mussolini's pacifism? How sincere is he in now advocating peace at all costs?" 
The key phrase came from Mussolini's lips: "Italy is disposed to accept the lowest figure 
of armaments ... provided no other nation has more." This seemed to be evidence that 
Mussolini's peace overtures were disingenuous. 115 
The real reason, posited some writers, was that Italy could no longer afford to 
keep up in a European arms race. The expensive military expansion of the last decade, 
the enormous public works programs, and the deepening Depression had coalesced into a 
immovable financial roadblock to future military development, but Mussolini would not 
accept falling behind the British and French (and soon, German) war machines. He held 
llS "Mussolini's War Dare," The Literary Digest, 14 June 1930, pp. 8-9; Pasquino lanchi, 
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true to his goal: "I want to make Italy great, respected, and feared; I want to render my 
nation worthy of her noble and ancient traditions." Doing so would be difficult. "In 
short, Fascist Italy is finding that the price of Roman grandeur comes beyond its powers 
of payment. A parity with France, dictated by prestige, is out of economic reach."116 
For all of these disparaging comments, when the disarmament conference 
convened in Geneva in 1933, many looked to Mussolini as a crucial swing vote in the 
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final deal. British Prime Minister James Ramsay MacDonald visited JI Duce in Rome to 
pitch his arms reduction plan (Mussolini would later counter with his own plan), proving 
just how important the Italian premier's consent on the final agreement would be. After 
the conference, Mussolini reaped the rewards of his attempts to broker the arms control 
agreement. His reputation changed overnight among world leaders and many American 
news reporters. He was no longer seen as the inflexible, dogmatic warmonger, but rather 
as a practical, "sober statesman" and "conciliator" who seemed committed to preventing 
another European implosion.117 
Among the representatives involved in the Geneva conference was the new 
chancellor of Germany, Adolf Hitler. Although Mussolini would later call Hitler 
"certainly mad, possibly a liar," he pursued a somewhat friendly policy with Germany, 
causing some (including prominent journalist Walter Lippmann) to question exactly on 
whose side Italy was. Pessimists saw a Mussolini who was positioning himself for an 
alliance with Fascist partisans in Germany and Austria, a reprise of the original Central 
116 Ianchi, p. 36; Elliott. p. 44. 
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Powers of World War I. Others saw simply a realistic leader who could be an effective 
counterweight to and mediator between Hitler and the rest of Europe. Mussolini's 
actions toward Germany over the next two years would assuage many fears. Although he 
started an amiable relationship with Der Fiihrer, the assassination of Austrian Chancellor 
Englebert Dollfuss in July 1934 brought Mussolini to the side of Austria and caused him 
to lash out against the violence of the Nazis in Germany and Austria. Italy's participation 
in the Four-Power Pact and its reconciliation with France in early 1935 further solidified 
Mussolini's stature as a pragmatic and peaceful statesman. A world growing increasingly 
wary of Adolf Hitler now saw Mussolini as the only European leader willing to make a 
public stand against Germany's aggressiveness.118 
The Italian Miracle 
While the world kept one anxious eye on Germany, it used the other to find a way 
out of the deepening Depression. That eye often turned to Fascist Italy, which seemed to 
be the only major economy weathering the economic storm. Could the Corporate State 
be a model for the United States to follow? There were no masses of ragged men selling 
apples on the streets of Florence. There were no bands of hungry veterans setting up 
ramshackle camps outside the Palazzo Venezia. There appeared to be only discipline, 
order, and nationalistic pride. As one American living in Rome attested to reporter T. R. 
Ybarra, "it is a great source of satisfaction to be able to leave my place of business at 
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night and walk to my home, through one of the poorest quarters of the city, without the 
slightest fear of being molested. Really, I do not believe that you fully appreciate what 
this means to me. I come from Chicago."119 
For a decade, American admirers of Mussolini, especially those in business and 
finance, paid tribute to the miracle wrought by Fascism in Italy. A lawless society, 
bungling government, and fractured economy had been reinvented into an integrated 
system that would make Henry Ford jealous. As castigations against Herbert Hoover and 
his laissez-faire policies grew more heated, the Corporate State began to look like an 
attractive alternative. Italy's network oflabor, capital, the state, and the party gave the 
government (read, Mussolini) control of production and the power to umpire disputes and 
force contracts upon employers and employees alike. It also gave business leaders great 
autonomy (for as long as it benefited the state). It organized labor and capital and linked 
them in syndicates, managed by the Ministry of Corporations (headed by Minister Benito 
Mussolini). While such a system would be anathema to American labor leaders, many 
businessmen and politicians saw promise in replicating the Corporate State in some form 
in the United States as a way to meet the economic crisis of the 1930s. They had had 
enough of Hoover; perhaps the U.S. needed a Mussolini, if only for a while.120 
American magazines had printed such suggestions off and on since the mid-
1920s, but the comments usually came from business journals or the pro-Mussolini 
popular weeklies (i.e., Collier's, Saturday Evening Post, etc.). Occasionally, another 
119 T. R. Ybarra, "The Tenth Year," Collier's, 28 May 1932, p. 22. 
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publication such as The Literary Digest or even Harper's would throw in an article 
praising the new Italy and its resurgent economy and social order, only to be tempered in 
the next issue by reports of Fascist violence, oppression, and international aggression. 
The Literary Digest was a prime example, publishing perhaps one positive article for 
every ten negatives ones, and even the favorable ones contained accusations. But even its 
editors relented from time to time and included quotes def ending the Corporate State, 
including this quote from the Providence News in an October 1927 issue: 
Are we really any freer in this country than are the Italians under Mussolini? We like to think we 
are, of course, and it may be that we are. But take the steel workers of western Pennsylvania, for 
instance. Are they freer than they would be if the Steel Trust were compelled by law to negotiate 
all disputes with its workers? At times it is very difficult to define freedom, but we are all agreed 
that a great people should have the sort of government it wants. Italy evidently wants the Fascist 
regime, and, by all accounts, wants it because the Mussolini method has brought the people of the 
country prosperity, freedom from grafting bureaucrats and an amazing vision of their own 
future. 121 
After the stock market crash and the ensuing economic collapse, Mussolini's 
Corporate State gained new popularity in the United States. As Hoover was replaced by 
Franklin Roosevelt and his promises for a "New Deal," American magazines, some more 
subtly than others, exuded an admiration for an Italian economy that still seemed to be 
working, even as it was feeling some of the effects of the Depression. "As 1933 opened," 
reported Time, "some 950,000 Italians were unemployed, but II Duce's program of public 
works continues on a nationwide scale, new jobs arc being constantly created and the 
State's direct dole expenditure was kept down to just under S 1,000,000 last year." 
Fascist Italy seemed to be in the vanguard ofreorganizing the economy to meet the 
challenges of the time. It had some financial issues, especially debt, but its credit was 
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still good. Both its people and government seemed "hell-bent on economy," and 
Mussolini used his autocratic authority to force his citizens to economize and to work 
harder and sacrifice more for the good of la patria. Meanwhile, the Italian people and its 
government did not seem to feel the burden as heavily nor show the attitude of defeat that 
was growing prevalent in a Hoover-led United States. Instead, they carried a newfound 
sense of pride in being Italian, and the Italian spirit was noticeable to foreign reporters. 
They may be a bit down, but they certainly were not out - or at least, not officially. 122 
The phenomenon of the Fascist Corporate State reached its zenith in July 1934. 
That was the month that Fortune magazine devoted its entire issue to Italy, Mussolini, 
Fascism, and the Corporate experiment. It explored the history and culture of Italy, from 
ancient times to contemporary, but its main focus was on the economic theory that had 
been intriguing American businessmen. Fortune took a very favorable view of II Duce 
and the Fascist party. It seemed to them that he had restored national pride and 
credibility to Italy through a series of programs designed to "unwop the wops." As for 
the litany of criticisms against the Fascists for curtailing liberties, the editors explained 
that Americans simply do not understand what is meant by the "totality of the state" 
because they have been brought up in the tradition that government is best when it stays 
out of the way of the people and that American prosperity was due to its citizens, not the 
state. The Corporate State, borrowing from Hegel, takes the opposite tack - the 
individual cannot be divorced from the state and vice versa. It is the government's duty 
to direct the efforts of the people to the common welfare of the state (and, by extension, 
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the entire citizenry), but it needs the people to be willing partners in order to succeed. 
"The interesting point (and a point that is invariably missed by all off-hand anti-Fascists) 
is that in this new kind of autocratic state, the autocrat actually seeks the consent of his 
people."123 
As for Benito Mussolini, Fortune saw him as the dynamo at the heart ofltaly's 
noble revolution. His energy almost leaps off the page, especially in an almost comical 
montage of photographs of II Duce during one of his many vigorous speeches. The 
writers admired him for his refusal to back down from his beliefs, first as a young 
Socialist and later as the rising star of Fascism. They applauded him from rebounding 
from the Matteotti scandal after taking responsibility for it as the head of the party (even 
though they went out of their way to avoid any intimation that Mussolini was directly 
involved). They extolled his recent diplomatic achievements, especially the Lateran 
treaties. The only blight they saw on his record was Italy's "moth-eaten, scrubby, 
parched, fourth-rate" colonies in Libya and the horn of Africa, but they congratulated his 
efforts in turning them into a commercial conquest without taking new land. 124 
The opinions of Fortune aside, not all was rosy in Fascist Italy, and the more 
astute members of the media knew it. Even Mr. Ybarra, who submitted generally upbeat 
articles about Italy, saw some cracks in the Fascist veneer. Anti-Fascist graffiti artists 
were becoming more brazen and more prolific on Italian streets. Opponents of 
Mussolini, now exiled to Paris and other major European cities, were organizing an 
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underground railroad to smuggle their colleagues out ofltaly while exporting anti-Fascist 
propaganda back into the country. Percy Winner, who was decidedly less enamored with 
II Duce, saw a dying party in the 1930s. "Fascism is ailing. As a typical Italian dictator, 
Mussolini is finding the task of providing the people withpanem et circenses 
increasingly difficult." Fascist Italy had lived under Mussolini's invented state of war 
and its associated "battles" for so long that Italians were weary, in Winner's opinion. 
Mussolini's inability to prevent rising unemployment in the wake of the Depression 
denied Italians of bread, and the tired Fascist rhetoric now made for a boring circus. 
Even the Post's Marcosson admitted that the pendulum was swinging the other way in 
Italy. He described demonstrations in Genoa in 1930 with banners declaring, "Viva 
Mussolini, but we are hungry." He admitted the Post was one of the first American 
magazines to join the Mussolini bandwagon, but "ambition began to overreach itself," 
and now "in [Italians'] faces was etched unmistakable resentment. It is almost precisely 
the same kind of look that I found everywhere in Russia. It is the face that reveals 
acquiescence to intolerant rule that must be tolerated."125 
As for the Italian Miracle, the great Corporate State, many still saw it as a fa9ade 
for a brewing Fascist war machine, and not a viable solution to the economic downturn. 
Even Fortune had to admit that "Italy has a grievous unemployment problem; in Italy 
there are many who are poor and some who approach starvation." Mussolini's "Battle of 
the Grain" and "Battle of the Birthrate" were deemed to be failures, but just enough of a 
success to build a new army ofloyal automatons out of the children of "battle." Against 
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whom they would fight was still a mystery: either some aggressor, real or imagined, or 
their own fears. 
II Duce looks forward to Der Tag, a crucial day when the Italians will be obliged to fight against 
their own destruction .... II Duce is not getting his maximum birthrate. But he is getting millions 
of lusty young soldiers. And he is regimenting his people - whether they are soldiers or not - by 
propaganda of the most persuasive sort. He has his people solidly behind him now. 126 
But for how long? Mussolini was making speeches about the future of Fascism that 
looked to a sixty-year horizon, predicting the dominance of an expanded Italian state in 
the Mediterranean and North Africa. 127 But to what lengths would his people follow 
him? And to what lengths would the powers of Europe and America allow him to go? 
Benito Mussolini was ready to find out. 
Hubris 
Throughout this extended honeymoon with the American press, Mussolini proved 
to be quite resilient. His armor of popularity was dented by the Fiume and Matteotti 
incidents, but he escaped major criticism because his "action" in the late-1920s and early-
1930s stood in sharp contrast to the apparent lethargy of other European nations and the 
Hoover administration in the wake of the 1929 crash. Mussolini's Concordat with the 
Vatican was a public relations coup and elicited great support from American Catholics, 
including commendations from Archbishops O'Connell of Boston and Hayes of New 
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York. Detroit's famous radio priest, Fr. Charles Coughlin, became one of his most vocal 
supporters through his weekly radio broadcasts that reached nearly ten million 
Americans. Perhaps most important was Mussolini's adept maneuver to distance himself 
from the other rising Fascist, Adolf Hitler. Americans may have harbored concerns about 
fl Duce's ambitions, but they were dwarfed by fears of the motives of the swastika-
wearing corporal to the north. 128 
But those ambitions never completely died away. Benito Mussolini still imagined 
a new Roman Empire. Not the hegemonic dominion of Caesar Augustus; such grandiose 
visions were unrealistic in a modem Europe so recently tom apart by war. Not the 
commercial dominance of medieval Venice; the world was still in the grips of the 
Depression. Not just an outlet for the Italian population, although Mussolini saw that as a 
necessity. Not simply colonies in the Balkans and Africa; Mussolini expected that Italy 
had a right to these and would pursue them, regardless of British and French exhortations 
against it. There was also that quintessential Italian feature that so often obscures rational 
behavior: pride. To Mussolini, Italy's pride still had a wound that had not healed and 
continued to fester, even more than the bitter defeat at Caporetto. Its name was Adowa. 
In the late-nineteenth century, a newly unified Italy yearned to spread its power 
and influence to Africa, joining its European brethren as colonial overlords. Its first 
foothold was Eritrea, near the horn of Africa along the Red Sea routes used by Italian 
traders and migrants. Further inland was the independent empire of Abyssinia, later to be 
known as Ethiopia. Italian leaders saw Abyssinia as a natural direction for colonial 
128 Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 33-40, 183. 
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expansion, but Abyssinia Emperor Menelik II would not submit quietly. In 1896, after 
disagreements over an earlier treaty and repeated Italian encroachments on Ethiopian 
territory incited a war, Menelik's armies met the Italian colonial army at Adowa. The 
Italians and their Eritrean mercenaries were terribly outnumbered on rough terrain and far 
from their supply lines. As the battle was joined, the Ethiopians took control of the high 
ground, the Italians became lost and separated, and Menelik's armies exploited these 
advantages. The end result was a horrible, humiliating defeat for the Italians that stopped 
their colonial ambitions cold and sent shock waves throughout Europe. It remained a 
stain on the pride of Italy, one that Mussolini was determined to erase. 129 
Beyond Italian dignity, there were issues of parity and security. II Duce had often 
railed against the inequity of wealth and power among European states. Dredging up a 
refrain from Versailles, Mussolini believed the time had come to expand Italy's African 
colonial empire - at the time consisting of Libya, Italian Somali land, and Eritrea-
especially considering the vast acreage controlled by France and Great Britain, and to 
give a necessary outlet for a growing Italian population and economy. But always in the 
back of his mind was the blight of Adowa on the Italian ego. As preparations for a 
campaign became action, Mussolini made references - some veiled, some not - to the 
need to avenge the forty-year-old loss and to take Ethiopia into the Italian Empire. 
Mussolini had been working on a plan to take over Ethiopia since 1932. He 
believed that Britain and France had tacitly agreed to stay out of halo-Ethiopian affairs 
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and that they recognized that area of Africa as under Italian influence. He had also 
convinced himself that neither would protest an invasion for fear of driving him into a 
friendlier relationship with Hitler. Meanwhile, Mussolini felt that he had little choice but 
to carry out his plan in 1935. In March 1935, Hitler announced the rearmament of 
Germany, in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles. Now, Italy seemed to have another 
competitor for colonial Africa, but more important, Mussolini was sure that Hitler's 
action would make Britain and France even more likely to give Italy a free hand in 
Ethiopia (which, in fact, French Prime Minister Pierre Laval had done in the accords that 
ended the Franco-Italian feud). In addition, Mussolini needed to act. He needed to act 
before Hitler did. He needed to act before Britain and France objected. Finally, he 
needed to act for the Italian people. He and the Partito Nazionale Fascista had built their 
power base because they took action, and Mussolini's own philosophy was that a Fascist 
leader must always move forward to stay powerful. In the midst of a global economic 
depression, and with a rising adversary on the other side of the Alps, that would be 
difficult to do in Italy. He had to act in Ethiopia- to restore Italy's pride and his own. 
On 3 October 1935, the attack began - with a bombing raid on Adowa. 130 
The American press had heard Mussolini's proclamations and rhetoric, so the 
invasion was not a surprise to anyone. The backlash from the American press was 
immediate and nearly universal. Condemnations rang out from magazines and 
newspapers across the nation, calling the invasion unjustified and "murder." At the same 
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time, however, many in the press and many American citizens recognized that Italy's 
actions were not unprecedented. They saw Ethiopia as a backwards, barbaric, slave-
holding nation, and they drew parallels between Italy's attempted conquest to similar 
moves by Great Britain and France in Africa, India, and the Middle East, and even with 
the United States that decimated the Native American population in the name of Manifest 
Destiny. But that did not stop them from castigating Mussolini's aggression. He was 
even hanged and burned in effigy in some American cities. In larger cities, including 
New York, African-Americans, who were especially angry at the invasion, clashed in 
bloody urban brawls with Italian-Americans, many of whom were ardent supporters of 
Mussolini. Above all else, however, Americans and their journalists were adamant the 
United States must not get involved in the conflict, no matter how distasteful it was. 131 
That did not stop American magazines from heaping scorn upon II Duce. Even 
his most stalwart advocates had to muffle their praise somewhat as their readers 
responded vehemently to the war. Business publications that heretofore had laid their 
palms at// Duce's feet were now divided, with many of them, including Fortune, trying 
to stay neutral on the Ethiopian War. Others, such as Business Week, did not hesitate to 
support Italy's designs on Africa. Indeed, they reinforced Mussolini's arguments, 
claiming that Italy needed raw materials for future economic growth and should have the 
same colonial opportunities in Africa as those enjoyed by her European neighbors. Such 
open support, however, was rare. Most were either quiet on the subject or simply critical 
131 Jordan, "American's Mussolini,'' pp. 347-53. 
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of war in general, while some saw this war as a tragedy for both Italy and Ethiopia and a 
signal of the end of Mussolini's power.132 
The Saturday Evening Post, probably the most pro-Mussolini American magazine 
and the one with the widest circulation, hedged in two post-invasion articles, focusing 
more on issues external to the war. An editorial a week after the invasion was mostly a 
call for the United States to stay out of the fray. "We cannot take up the case of native 
people versus Europeans in all parts of the world." A month later, Frank Simonds, who 
had shown great admiration for Mussolini throughout the years, wrote of the reasons for 
the invasion in a low key article. Although offering the requisite criticism for starting 
another war, especially against a fellow member of the League of Nations, Simonds sees 
the war almost a necessity because of Italy's domestic and financial conditions. France 
had agreed to it and the British had stayed silent until it was too late; by the time they 
raised objections, Mussolini could not withdraw without losing face and committing 
political suicide. "But what could he do?" Simonds asks. "His armies were already 
poised to strike .... And why, again, were the British, who had refused to lift a hand to 
arrest Japan in Manchuria, ready to go so far to stop Italy in Ethiopia?" Simonds does 
not congratulate Mussolini, but he reserves the bulk of his damnation for Great Britain 
for setting up Mussolini to take the fall. Simonds contributed another article to The 
Atlantic Monthly based on the same themes, but also claiming that Mussolini was driven 
to violent imperialism by the poverty, lack of food, and economic stagnation at home. 
132 
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The rest of the world ignored those concerns and naively believed Mussolini would do 
the same to keep the peace, even as Italians starved and Mussolini made his plans known. 
"Whatever judgment History may ultimately pass upon Benito Mussolini, it can hardly 
deny him recognition as the symbol of a new revolt against another inequality."133 
Time initially defended Mussolini's reasoning to take Ethiopia about six months 
before the invasion, but followed the crowd in turning against him after the first bombs 
fell. In May 1935, its writers agreed with the Fascist party line that great natural 
resources could be found in Ethiopia, which would be a boon to Italian industry but 
would go to waste under Emperor Haile Selassie's primitive people. As for Britain and 
France, they had more to gain from Italy's annexation than from opposing it, and their 
criticisms seemed empty compared to their own imperialist past and present. 
In essence, this [Imperialism] was the keynote of Britain's Victoria more than half a century ago. 
The great Queen, with her pride in British valor and her joy that backward peoples should have the 
benefit of British rule, has a superficially different but basically similar counterpart in the Dictator 
of 1935, with his rousing trumps to Fascist valor and his real conviction that Ethiopians are 
savages who can properly be brought under Italian rule. 
By October, the stories were quite different. The focus was now on Italians attacking 
Ethiopian towns with wild abandon as they exorcised the demons of Adowa, while the 
Ethiopians put up a futile but spirited defense. Ethiopia was no longer described as the 
land of riches, but rather as an albatross that would require "fifty years of sacrifice before 
reaping the commensurate reward." In letters to Time's editor, readers lampooned the 
133 
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perennial "Man of the Year" candidate as "Aggressor of the Year." As a final shot at 
Mussolini, Time's "Man of the Year" for 1935 was Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie.' 3" 
While the Post and Time waffied, many other American magazines did not mince 
words. Colliers had already become more adversarial, lumping Mussolini in with Stalin 
and Hitler as "foes of liberty." After the invasion, its editors were even more outspoken. 
"Certainly no observing traveler returns from Germany or Italy without vivid impressions 
of the soul-sickness with which dictatorship has affiicted once-proud people. Dictators 
arc efficient, but their efficiency is directed too often to evil ends." TI1is was a 
remarkable change of opinion from the same editors who once defended Mussolini's 
tyrannical rule because he could "compel his followers to adopt measures" that were 
necessary but unpopular. 135 
Other journals saw the Italo-Ethiopian War as simply a confirmation of what they 
had been saying all along. nze New Republic, for example, pulled no punches against 
Mussolini in the wake of the invasion. Absolute power had absolutely corrupted II Duce. 
'This is not war; it is murder .... [TJhe spectacle of half-naked, practically unarmed, semi-
savages, men, women, and children, being mowed down by machine-guns, tanks, and 
aerial bombardment has shocked and sickened the civili1,ed world, and the repercussions 
will cost Italy dear for a long time to come." me Nation pondered whether Mussolini's 
ultimate goal might be to supplant the British Empire with a new Roman one, beginning 
n• ""fntolcrable Presumption!' .. Ttmc, 27 ~fay 1935, pp. 23-4; "Marie Anroincue & S.:mc11ons," 
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in Africa and spreading through the Middle East. The Reader's Digest, ever critical of 
Fascism, continue to publish only articles disparaging Mussolini and sympathetic to 
Ethiopia, including one Current History article calling Haile Selassie "that grave and 
cultured little Semite" who, along with his ministers, "outslave any of Ethiopia's 
3,000,000 serfs" in their death struggle with the Italian armies. The Literary Digest was 
already skeptical in an April 1935 piece, in which Mussolini was quoted repeatedly as 
promising, "I will not break the peace." After the invasion, there was no dearth of quotes 
from newspapers and world leaders condemning Mussolini and his defiance of the 
League ofNations. A 1935 Harper's biography by John Gunther compared him to Adolf 
Hitler - already a hateful comparison - and called him a "prima donna" who never takes 
advice from others. 136 Just a year or two prior, even some of the most critical voices in 
the American press were offering grudging admiration for Mussolini's peaceful 
resolutions with the Holy See and France, his vocal support for Austria, his exhortations 
against Nazism, and his attempts to keep Italy's economy alive. By the end of 1935, he 
was persona non grata throughout most of Europe and the United States. 
Mussolini's image in America never recovered from the Ethiopian war. His 
mercurial career had made him the centerpiece of the American foreign press and had 
brought him fame throughout the world. Now, his most resolute devotees were suddenly 
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quiet. His most scornful critics were louder than ever. The American press no longer 
viewed him as the practical, realist, hard-nosed leader that had saved Italy, but rather as a 
violent, imperialist, war-hungry tyrant threatening the stability of Europe. As the press 
went, so went public opinion, and later, governmental policy. In a matter of months, 
Mussolini's popularity plummeted in the United States and around throughout Europe. 
Soon, only one major political leader would be willing to work with him, and the price of 
friendship with Adolf Hitler would prove to be terrible. Benito Mussolini had no idea 
that, by invading Ethiopia, he had signed his own death warrant. 
Chapter IV: American Public Opinion 
Sixty years after his death, it would be very hard to find an American who would 
have a favorable opinion of Benito Amilcare Andrea Mussolini. He has been relegated to 
the ignominy of a compatriot of Adolf Hitler, almost universally recognized as one of the 
most evil men of the twentieth century. Mussolini, then, has become evil by association. 
The idea that he may have once been idolized by Americans seems anathema at best, 
perhaps even blasphemous. 
And yet, that is indeed the case. The idolatry was not unanimous, nor was it 
always especially vehement. Nevertheless, for most of the 1920s and the first half of the 
1930s, most Americans held very favorable views of the Italian dictator. There were 
pockets of resistance, especially among intellectuals (some of whom were emigres from 
Italy), some journalists (as discussed earlier), and other American liberals, including a 
few pockets within the Italian-American community. These voices, however, were 
drowned out by the louder outcries of support from more conservative Americans, who 
encompassed the majority of citizens at the time. Even some liberals had reason to 
support Mussolini, although they did not always agree with his practices. On the whole, 
aside from Italy, Mussolini found his greatest well of support within the United States. 
The All-American Duce 
A primary reason for that support was Mussolini's vocal resistance to 
Bolshevism. Americans, aside from the far-left of the political spectrum, were opposed 
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to the rising Red tide emanating from the Soviet Union. For those on the right wing, the 
fear of Bolshevism was supplemented by a general distrust of internationalism, 
immigrants, and progressive agendas. They lamented the chaos of World War I and its 
fractured aftermath and the rise in popularity of socialist ideas, unionism, and social 
welfare legislation. It was little wonder that groups like the American Legion and the Ku 
Klux Klan ascribed to Fascist doctrines. Woodrow Wilson's legacy was an end to 
America's isolation, and that scared not only the xenophobes, but also many in the 
middle-class who worried about the degradation of American values. This bourgeois 
class saw Mussolini as an enforcer of conservative values against unrestrained liberalism. 
A common chorus during the 1920s was that perhaps the United States might need a 
Mussolini to protect against Leninism crossing its borders. As for those on the left wing, 
many of them ignored Fascism at first. They did not sec it as a threat to communism and 
socialism until the 1930s (in part due to Hitler's violent anti-Bolshevism), and some even 
saw Italian Fascism as an outgrowth of socialism. They reserved their vitriol for the 
socialists who missed their opportunity in Italy and allowed Fascism to take the stage. 137 
But the real battle for public opinion was in the center. It was here that the 
competing themes of"Mussolini, the pragmatic statesman" and "Mussolini, the 
oppressive tyrant" were the most pronounced. As Wilsonianism and progressivism were 
viewed more and more as failed experiments, many Americans agreed with editors from 
137 Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 205-20; "Mussolini and the Klan," p. 5. Of course, the 
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The Saturday Evening Post and Collier's and writers like S. S. McClure and Ida Tarbell. 
Fascism was succeeding in Italy because mass democracy was on the wane. To these 
adherents, Mussolini may have been Machiavellian, but he was getting the job done in 
Italy. Intellectuals, including Herbert W. Schneider and Charles Beard, praised the 
Corporate State as an enlightened economic theory with national planning that 
transcended class. At the same time, Fascism was an open, experimental doctrine that 
preached national pride and spirit. This made some Americans see it as an improvement 
on the American system, especially as they read about the great advances in the Italian 
economy and infrastructure and Mussolini's legions ofloyal followers - a stark contrast 
to the scandal of Harding, the lethargy of Coolidge, and the ineptitude of Hoover. But 
others saw the violence and repression of the Fascist regime and saw a statesman who 
would turn pragmatism into unyielding dogmatism. To them, the words of The Nation, 
The Reader's Digest, and The New Republic rang more true. They also listened to 
Gaetano Salvemini, the leading exiled Italian intellectual and later Harvard professor, 
spearheading the accusations of tyranny against II Duce. 138 
Despite the rifts among the journalistic and intellectual communities over his 
merits, the American public as a whole maintained a largely complimentary view of 
Mussolini. By heaping honors upon him, the popular press gave Americans what they 
wanted to hear: a new man was in Rome who was strongly anti-Bolshevik and believed 
in order, stability, and industry. He was Italy's Henry Ford, a man of action, and many 
Americans identified with the man and his vision. 
138 Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 220-39; Salvemini, "Who Opposes Mussolini?" p. 324. 
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The Mattcotti affair of 1924 caused some of the first widespread criticism of 
Mussolini and his tactics. Afler avoiding any major public relations disasters for the rest 
of the 1920s, Mussolini saw his popularity in America fade during the 1930s as he made 
his ambitions more apparent. Nevertheless, as late as 1939, Americans did not sec Jlaly 
as a threat. In a September 1938 Gallup Poll asking whether President Roosevelt should 
.. openly criticize Hitler and Mussolini for their war-like attitude," 62 percent of 
Americans responded "no." An October 1939 poll found that 73 percent of Americans 
did not feel that Italy would pose a "serious threat" to the U.S. in the next fitly ycars. " 9 
Catholics in America 
The United States has always been a Protestant nation. By the c.arly 1wcntieth 
century, American Catholics had begun to break through into higher echelons of society 
and influence. New York Governor Al Smith and Ambassador to Great Brirain Joseph P. 
Kennedy were two examples of prominent Catholics who wielded great influence in the 
1920s and 1930s. Nevertheless, American Roman Catholics, many of ,,,.horn were 
immigrants or only a generation or two removed from their immigrant ancestors. were 
still fighting for legitimacy when Mussolini appeared on the world scene. Their opinions 
of I/ Duce were colored not only by the press, bur also by lhcir personal experiences. 
On the whole, American Catholics were biased fa\'orably toward Benito 
Mussolini during his first twcl\'e years of power. Catholicism and democracy have never 
in Gallup Poll. 25 September I 9JS. MPuhhc Op1mon Online." tcxa·Scu\ (12 !"o\anhcr 2000). 
Accession no. 0277SS6; GJllup Poll. 5 October 1939. "Pubhc Opm1on Onlinc." l.cx~\·Scu~ (12 !"ovcmhcr 
2000). Accession no. 0273910. 
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meshed well; a strong leader who inspired loyalty and obedience among his followers to 
do what was best for all, even if it was not always pleasant, fit much more cleanly with 
the Church's philosophy. So, many American Catholics could understand Mussolini's 
intent, even if they did not want it from their own government. It was even easier to 
swallow when American luminaries such as Archbishops O'Connell and Hayes and 
Monsignor Fulton Sheen raved about the "resurrection" of Italy and its spiritual life under 
Mussolini. And then there was Father Charles Coughlin, Detroit's famous and influential 
"radio priest" who broadcast his unabashedly pro-Mussolini message nationwide to an 
audience often million listeners in the early 1930s. He backed the Corporate State and 
defended Mussolini after the Ethiopian War and even after he agreed to deport Italian 
Jews to German concentration camps. But the event that most captured the allegiance of 
American Catholics was the Lateran Concordat of 1929. Although many had always 
viewed Mussolini as sympathetic to the Church, the official burying of the hatchet made 
him a champion for Roman Catholicism in the eyes of the faithful around the world. 140 
This is not to say that the praise was unanimous among Catholics. There were 
many Catholics, both ordained and lay, who echoed the concerns of the liberal press: the 
lack of personal freedom in Italy, the violence ofthefascisti, and even the erosion of 
spiritualism among Italians, in contrast to the comments of others. Nevertheless, most of 
the American Catholic flock was predisposed to view Mussolini in a favorable light, and 
many of their shepherds bolstered that view. The most vociferous calls for support 
among Catholics came from an obvious quarter: Italian-Americans. 
140 Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 183-197. 
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Italian-Americans and II Duce 
Italian-Americans felt a double sting of discrimination. First, as has been 
discussed earlier, they were unwanted immigrants, mostly poor, and a threat to many 
Americans who feared losing their jobs to cheap labor. Their Mediterranean complexion 
(at least for the southern Italians, who made up the bulk ofltalian immigrants to the 
United States) and their louder, livelier, and to some, lazier culture made them stand out 
among the more reserved and austere "native" Americans in the Northeast cities where 
most of them settled. Second, they were nearly all Roman Catholic adherents in a 
Protestant nation. Not only were they different, but their God was different, too. They 
were the downtrodden masses struggling in terra incognito and looking for a hero. 
Benito Mussolini became that hero for many Italian-Americans. It has already 
been discussed how his ascendancy provided a boost of national and ethnic pride to these 
immigrants, and how some of them formed ex patria Fascist organizations in major 
American cities, later confederated into the FLNA. These groups, with some direct help 
from the Italian government, spread Fascist propaganda among Italian-American 
communities through pamphleteering, radio broadcasts, social organizations such as the 
The Sons of Italy and the Balilla youth group, and the Italian-American press. Although 
many Italian-American newspapers had a small circulation, a few - including New 
York's II Progresso Ita/o-Americano and San Francisco's L 'Italia- were quite 
influential in the community and in political circles. When propaganda failed, some 
Italian-American/ascisti turned to violence and blackmail to gain support for Mussolini. 
However, the solidarity with /I Duce professed by many Italian-Americans was often 
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merely nostalgia for their homeland rather than ideological allegiance. Mussolini's calls 
for national pride resonated deeply within their hearts, but they were still aliens and 
alienated in a foreign land where democracy reigned supreme. When the American press 
praised the rebirth of Italy under Mussolini, Italian-Americans echoed the cheers. When 
it condemned Fascism's excesses, they stayed quiet. Perhaps more than anything, they 
were just trying to become good Americans. 141 
While Italian-Americans were Mussolini's staunchest supporters, they also 
spawned one of the first anti-Fascist movements in the world. This backlash was 
centered among Italian-American workers, and like many labor movements, embraced 
the communist, socialist, and even anarchist traditions of the left. These groups took to 
the streets in protest in New York and other major cities soon after Mussolini's coup. 
They countered the pro-Fascist press with their own newspapers, most notably II Nuovo 
Mundo in New York. They were encouraged and aided by the fuorusciti, the anti-Fascist 
political exiles from Italy who had escaped to the United States. They knew what 
Mussolini's Corporate State meant for Italian labor, and they felt a duty to set the record 
straight for the American public.142 
The anti-Fascist movement among Italian-Americans was handicapped from the 
beginning. It was never very large: at most, it included about 10 percent of Italian-
Americans. It received little support from the U.S. government, which was still trying to 
maintain friendly relations with Italy, or from other labor leaders and organizations. In 
141 Ibid., pp. 84, 95-110. See also Giovanni E. Schiavo, The Italians in Chicago: a Study in 
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fact, Samuel Gompers of the AFL actually supported Mussolini's economic policies for 
Italy. Groups clashed repeatedly with pro-Fascist mobs, at times resulting in bloodshed. 
Anti-Fascists would resort to violence of their own, including mail bombs to Fasci 
leaders and newspapers. This only undermined what little credibility these opposition 
groups had among Italian immigrants and with the rest of the American populace. 143 
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Ultimately, these opposition groups became their own worst enemy. Italian 
workers were never fully united in their opposition to Mussolini. The Fascist propaganda 
worked, and the old nationalistic feelings were still strong. Local and federal officials 
stepped in to curb the violence, and in the process, they helped split the opposition. The 
members could not even agree on a common ideology. The Anti-Fascist Alliance of 
North America survived only briefly in the mid-l 920s before disintegrating over 
arguments between the anarcho-communist wing and the socialist-liberal wing.144 These 
internal disputes allowed the Fascist propaganda to continue to stir up patriotic passion 
among Italian-Americans and smothered any chance for the anti-Fascists to become a 
viable social or political force in the United States. 
The Italian-American anti-Fascists did have the support of the liberal intellectuals. 
Most American politicians also agreed with their platform, although some kept their 
views quieter than others did. LaGuardia, the former army captain and traveling 
salesman for Wilsonianism, became openly opposed as a congressman to the Fascist 
League of North America chapters in New York that pledged allegiance to Mussolini. 
IO Ibid., pp. 582-6. 
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The movement gained a little momentum in the wake of the Matteotti murder, but this 
was short-lived. It came back to life again after the outbreak of the Ethiopian War. At 
long last, the American public was willing to listen as it became disillusioned with 
Mussolini and his ambitions for conquest. The war, however, caused most Italian-
Americans to rally around their homeland, the cause, and its leader, which alienated the 
anti-Fascist sect even more from the rest of the Italian-American community. 145 
Labor and Business 
Most members of American labor unions echoed the concerns of their Italian-
American brethren. Although their leaders may have ignored or even supported 
Mussolini, most of the men in the trenches saw JI Duce as simply a capitalist opportunist. 
To them, his Corporate State was a conspiracy in which American business was 
inextricably intertwined. Like many of their Italian-American counterparts, they believed 
that the same corruption and violence that built Fascism would soon destroy it. 
Mussolini would survive and even prosper, however, in large part due to the efforts of 
American businesses. To many American CEOs, Italy was "ruthlessly efficient -
seemingly non-political and non-bureaucratic," emphasizing discipline and production in 
all business practices. 146 They also envied Mussolini's ability as dictator virtually to 
outlaw labor unions. Perhaps there was some truth in the unions' accusations after all. 
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Although not universal, American business was hearty in its approbation of// 
Duce. The list of business leaders who extolled the virtues of the Fascist Corporate State 
was a roll call of the influential and well connected, many of whom had personally 
visited Italy and Mussolini. From U.S. Steel's Elbert Gary to Wall Street investor Otto 
Kahn to U.S. Chamber of Commerce head Julius Barnes, the list was long and 
impressive. Thomas Lamont, head of the J.P. Morgan banking network, soon became a 
de facto business consultant for the Italian government and was instrumental in securing 
large loans for Italy, including $100 million in 1926 alone.147 
Eventually, the American business world had to address the fact that they were 
supporting a man whose political methods were antithetical to the beliefs of the nation 
that had made them what they were. Most leaders apologized for Mussolini's 
authoritarianism, saying that Italy was just going through a phase, like a teenager who 
rebels against the mainstream until he learns to act like an adult. Italy was young and still 
reeling from the Great War. It would grow up soon enough and learn to play the game of 
democracy with all of the other nations. Some, however, made no apologies for 
Mussolini's dissatisfaction with democratic ways, and others even publicly agreed with 
his policies, at least as far as economic issues were concerned. 148 
The business press, for the most part, mimicked the feelings of their audience. At 
first, most praised Mussolini's leadership style, some tried to ignore it, and a few 
journals, including Forbes and the Journal of Commerce were outspoken opponents ofit. 
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Even those critical of his authoritarianism felt obligated to applaud him for "rescuing" 
Italy from the threat of a radical communist or socialist takeover. In 1927, after 
Mussolini challenged the world that no country had made as much material progress as 
Fascist Italy had, some editors turned against him. Later, while the U. S. was in the 
depths of the Depression under President Hoover, Italy was able to continue production 
and maintain wages. This caused most of the American business world, including some 
of those that had previously eschewed him, to praise Mussolini as an ideal example of 
what a modem, corporate-minded leader should be.149 
As he did with the foreign press, Mussolini put on a good show for visiting 
businessmen to encourage American ventures in Italy. He implemented a "most-favored-
nation" style treaty allowing U. S. imports into the country without harsh duties. When 
the U. S. pressured Italy to repay its war loans, however, Mussolini played the pauper. It 
was here that his efforts to woo American business paid the greatest dividends. In part 
due to the lobbying of Thomas Lamont and others, and in part due to the excellent 
bargaining skills of Italian Finance Minister Count Volpi (chosen because his negotiation 
style was similar to those of American businessmen), the U.S. in 1925 renegotiated these 
loans, giving Italy an absurdly low interest rate of 0.4 percent on $2.4 billion and an 
upward sliding payment scale that stretched out to the year 1987. In essence, this deal 
was a cancellation of nearly 80 percent of the total amount that Italy would have paid. 150 
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The Government: Official and Unofficial Views 
This deal in particular shows the attitude of the U.S. government. influenced by 
business interests and the American public, toward Mussolini in the early years: he was a 
man with whom the United States could do business. Washington did not perceive him 
as a threat; in fact. he could be a useful counterweight to the threat of Bolshevism in 
Europe. He had legitimate authority, personally bestowed upon him by King Vittorio 
Emmanuel III. He did not threaten U.S. trade or interests abroad; rather, he actively 
sought to do business with the United States. With the wane of Wilsonian liberalism in 
Washington. any opposition to dealings with dictators was weak at best. Finally. many of 
the heavy hitters in Washington enjoyed working with Mussolini because he was willing 
to work with them. Frank Kellogg. Henry Stimson. and even Franklin D. Roosevelt 
admired him for his cooperation in disarmament and peace negotiations. The U. S. State 
Department appreciated him for supporting the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Dawes and 
Young loan plans. President Calvin Coolidge agreed with Mussolini's stance on labor 
issues. especially when he declared strikes and lockouts illegal in Italy. Meanwhile, 
Mussolini continued to market himself as a powerful but moderate statesman. Perhaps 
his most significant domestic feat was the Lateran Concordat of 1929. To many. this was 
proof that Mussolini was rational. not radical. in his governing ofltaly. 1s1 For over a 
decade, Mussolini found helpful partners across the Atlantic. 
Still, there were concerns in Washington. The United States had just fought in a 
bloody global war to make the world safe for democracy. Now. it was tacitly approving 
us Diggms. ,\fwsolini and FasciJm. pp. 267-70; Jord.m. '1bc Amcric.Jn lm3ge of~lu.\SOhni ... 
-p. 215. 
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the installation of a dictator in Italy, an ally during that war. Although the United States 
sent congratulations and cordial platitudes to Mussolini in his first days, it did not send a 
high-level delegation to Rome to meet him. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes 
bypassed Rome during a visit to Europe soon after the March on Rome, perhaps to 
distance America from Fascism and to avoid the appearance of an official endorsement. 
Nevertheless, the three American presidents of the 1920s-Harding, Coolidge, and 
Hoover - said virtually nothing about Mussolini or Fascism, either for or against, during 
their terms in office. Harding's short tenure was marred by scandal, and Coolidge 
brought public reticence to a new level (although he privately concurred with some of 
Mussolini's actions). Although Hoover was quiet during his presidency, he was more 
vocal before (as Secretary of Commerce under Coolidge) and after he was in office. 
Secretary Hoover saw great economic prospects in Mussolini's Italy. "Italy offers a 
special opportunity for American investment in reproductive enterprise," he wrote to 
President Coolidge, adding that Ambassador Child's replacement should be "a man of 
large industrial, financial and commercial vision." Ex-President Hoover, however, 
compared Mussolini to fellow despots Stalin and Hitler and the Corporate State to 
Roosevelt's NRA. 
When Franklin Delano Roosevelt ascended to the presidency in 1933, he held a 
sincere respect for Mussolini and his achievements thus far, partly because of the similar 
economic challenges that each leader faced. Roosevelt considered Mussolini to be a 
"comrade in crisis." He also wanted to continue diplomatic ties with Italy and hoped to 
use Mussolini as a mediator for peace, if necessary, against an increasingly militant Nazi 
119 
Germany. Mussolini held a similar respect for Roosevelt as a leader, although he did not 
necessarily like him or fully trust him. He even read Roosevelt's book, Looking 
Fonvard, and wrote a critique on it.152 Nevertheless, this mutual respect would not be 
enough to prevent the inevitable rift between a champion of liberty and an imperialist and 
revisionist state. 
America Sours on Mussolini 
In the first half of the 1930s, Mussolini was still on good terms with the United 
States. The U. S. Embassy in Italy held mostly favorable views of the Italian capo, 
reporting back to Washington that the Fascist domestic program had created stability and 
popular support for Mussolini. He was good for Italy, even though he was a dictator. 
This opinion soon changed dramatically. On 5 December 1934, small bands of Italian 
and Ethiopian troops clashed at Wal-Wal near the Ethiopia-Italian Somaliland border. 
Two weeks later, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie requested a gesture for peace from 
the United States. For almost seven months, Washington avoided the fray. Many 
officials did not believe that Mussolini would risk a war over such a minor incident. In 
July, Selassie made stronger appeals for U.S. intervention. This time, Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull rejected his appeal, leaving the issue in the hand of the League of Nations. 
At the same time, however, he did put Mussolini on notice that the United States would 
not welcome an annexation of Ethiopia by Italy. On the suggestions of France and Great 
152 DeSanti, pp. 72-4; Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 267-8, 279-81. 
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Britain, Roosevelt sent a personal appeal to Mussolini to keep the peace. Mussolini 
responded that it was too late- he needed a military victory over Ethiopia. 153 
Roosevelt and Hull knew that they could not stop the war. Americans would 
never support another entanglement in a foreign war, nor did they care about the fate of 
Ethiopia. With Great Britain and France standing on the sidelines, Roosevelt had no 
plans to make the U.S. a third-party combatant. He did prohibit private Joans to Italy, 
restrict its credit with the U. S., and embargo arms and other goods. Mussolini was 
outraged. He compared Roosevelt's actions to the disputes over Texas and Cuba that 
respectively resulted in the Mexican and Spanish-American Wars. He denounced the 
sanctions, claiming that other countries had made similar moves without such reactions, 
"but when Italy proceeds to rectify the wrongs which have been committed against 
her ... and to proceed to a legitimate expansion ... they talk about sanctions."154 
It was obvious to Roosevelt that Mussolini would not retreat. In a speech on 
2 October 1935, just before the invasion of Ethiopia, Roosevelt alluded to the conflict and 
portrayed Italy as a belligerent nation. Later, in a letter to the editor of Fortune, he 
labeled Mussolini and Stalin as "blood brothers." The love affair between Washington 
and Rome was over. Roosevelt could no longer trust Mussolini to uphold treaty 
commitments or to act as the ally that Italy once was. The disillusionment would extend 
to the American populace. They began to realize that Mussolini's ambition would not be 
easily checked and that he was not the benevolent leader that he portrayed himself to be. 
153 DeSanti, pp. 57-9; Mary Ruth Millsap, "Mussolini and the United States: ltalo-American 
Relations, 1935-41" (Thesis, University of California-Los Angeles, 1972), pp. 5-20. 
154 Long to Hull, 17 September 1935, US Foreign Relations, 1935, Vol. 1, pp. 752-61: quoted in 
· Millsap, p. 34. 
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Businesses began to lose interest in Italy. The only group that continued in its support 
was the Italian-American population. However, even their enthusiasm waned after the 
creation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936, the anti-Semitic decrees of 1938, and 
Mussolini's support of Generalissimo Franco in the Spanish Civil War. Any remaining 
support would almost completely vanish after Italy's invasion of France in 1940.155 Once 
idolized, Mussolini was now vilified, and he had brought it all upon himself. 
155 Millsap, p. 40-1; Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, p. 278; Ernest E. Rossi, "Italian Americans 
and U.S. Relations with Italy in the Cold War," in Proceedings of the 9'h Annual Conference of the 
American Italian Historical Association, The United States and Italy: The First Two Hundred Years, ed. 
·Humbert S. Nelli (Staten Island, NY: American Italian Historical Association, 1977), pp. 111-2. 
Epilogue: The Duce that Could Have Been 
During the 1920s and 1930s, Europe was groping its way through the darkness 
left by the horror of World War I. The once-great powers of Britain and France were 
struggling to rebuild. Spain was drifting into civil war. The old empire of the Habsburgs 
was now a collection of minor states starting over again. Germany was the focus of all 
the hatred and vitriol left from the war. It had its own problems and spent most of the 
1920s trying to recover from an economic catastrophe. It would not be until the mid-
l 930s that Hitler and the Nazis would have enough power to make their nation strong 
again. Finally, there was Italy, a nation barely fifty years old when Mussolini assumed 
power. Italy and its leader found little respect and less cooperation from its European 
neighbors. Britain and France shunned their former ally, and the rising Nazis in Germany 
saw little value in the other Fascist European state. Italy was almost entirely isolated. 
The one nation that held the most promise for friendship and partnership in global 
affairs was the United States. In thirteen years as prime minister, Mussolini won the 
hearts and minds of the most powerful nation on the globe at the time. From trade to 
diplomacy to public relations, II Duce was a poster child for Dale Carnegie. He knew the 
value of image. By chance, he had entered the world scene at the right time and was able 
to bill himself as the model of the new, vibrant, proactive leader. Although they may not 
have wanted him as their leader, most Americans agreed that he was a perfect match for 
Italy. Mussolini could get things done. 
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Then crune the Ethiopian invasion, and Americans soured on Italy. Great Britain 
and France were still smarting from Mussolini's disregard for their opinions on the 
matter; now, they neither trusted nor respected JI Duce. The Ethiopian fracas forced him 
to look elsewhere to fulfill his goal of gaining legitimacy for Italy. He did not like Hitler, 
nor did he fully agree with the head Nazi's politics, but Hitler was willing to listen to 
Mussolini - something that most other world leaders refused to do. Their marriage was 
one of convenience for Hitler and necessity for Mussolini. Unfortunately, for Mussolini 
and all ofltaly, there were strings attached to the deal. This was no cooperative venture 
to Hitler; it was simply a way to secure one front so that he could concentrate on his plans 
for the other two. By the time Mussolini fully understood Hitler's intentions, it was too 
late and he was in too deep. Ultimately, Hitler led Mussolini into a war that the latter did 
not want when he and his nation were not ready to fight. The master Machiavellian had 
been used by a more sinister one. It would eventually cost him his life. 
The United States in the 1920s and 1930s seemed ready and willing to work with 
Mussolini. The U.S. government would even have agreed to allow Italy to have 
economic and political influence in Ethiopia, as long as it did not include complete 
military annexation. But Mussolini could not restrain his runbition. His greed alienated 
the one nation that was his best hope for becoming a major player in world affairs. The 
U.S. would never have fully accepted his autocratic style, but Italy was never a pariah 
nation like the Soviet Union. America could have found a way to do business with Italy, 
and Mussolini would have benefited tremendously. 
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This opens the door to one of myriad ''what-if' questions in history. What if 
Mussolini had not attacked Ethiopia, thus remaining on good terms with the United 
States? Would the two nations have formed even closer ties? Would Italy have sided 
with the Allies in World War II? Would Hitler have risked war in 1939 with a potential 
enemy, rather than an ally, on his southern front? Alas, the Ethiopian War did occur, thus 
making it impossible to answer these questions. World War II still would have happened, 
but the events and the outcome may have been profoundly different, if not for one man's 
hubris. After all of the propaganda, all of the public relations, and all of the business and 
political deals, Mussolini destroyed in a few months the delicate favorable relationship he 
had built with the United States for over a decade. In the end, he destroyed himself. 
Sixty years later, the legacy of Mussolini has started to fade. He is not seen as the 
personification of evil like Adolf Hitler. His name has no connection to the Cold War's 
"Evil Empire" of the Soviet Union. He is not vilified for mass genocide (although he 
eventually yielded to the Nazis insistence on deporting Italian Jews to concentration 
camps). Instead, to many Americans, he is slowly becoming a footnote in history, "that 
other guy" who fought against the Allies in World War II. For Italians, the relationship is 
much more complex. He is inextricably intertwined in their history and their coming of 
age as a nation and a people. He led them to war and ruin, but first, he made them an 
international power and restored their pride and prestige. Even today, the name 
"Mussolini" carries a wealth of connotations, both good and bad, for Italians. His name 
is rarely mentioned in conversation. He is still a touchy subject: a source of pride for 
some, and embarrassment for others. Nevertheless, his influence is still evident in Italy, 
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from the political parties that still draw from Fascist ideas (and his granddaughter, 
Alessandra, who is a Chamber deputy) to the autostrade that slice through the Apennines 
to Turin's renovated and rebuilt Stadio Olympico, home of the 2006 Winter Olympics 
and first built under the name Stadio Mussolini. 
Few Americans realize today how friendly the United States once was with 
Mussolini. Few would believe how easily Italy could have been an ally in World War II 
instead of an enemy. But there once was a time when// Duce ruled not only Italy, but 
also the American press. In both cases, he allowed his ego to take control and squander 
the opportunity. He once told Isaac Marcosson that his successor had not yet been born. 
He was right. There never could have been another Mussolini. 
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